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ABSTRACT
In this article, I hope to challenge our thinking on perhaps the most private
type of health information by applying its disclosure to someone incredibly public.
I will review the relevant constitutional, tort law, and statutory frameworks for
disclosure of a presidential candidate's health information by applying these
concepts to the specific disclosure of a candidate's genetic testing results. In some
cases, the analysis will shift into a discussion of accessing health information of the
winning candidate. After surveying the different types of genetic tests and possible
methods for disclosure, I then will compare legal and ethical concerns to discuss
the degree to which the public interest may be served by accessing our potential
presidents' genetic information. I will end by questioning whether a double
standard is developing in privacy rights doctrine as it relates to the testing of public
figures.
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I. INTRODUCTION: PRIVATE MATTERS, PUBLIC PEOPLE
Is it true that Barack Obama enjoyed carving pumpkins as a child in Hawaii,'
and Hillary Clinton ate lots of bologna sandwiches in suburban Chicago?
2
Newspapers publish silly details about presidential candidates because we want to
know, and we often digest these tidbits without thoughtful consideration of their
public utility. That is, we rarely pause to ask whether this information helps us
analyze the candidates' leadership styles or governance. Voting is inherently
discriminatory, and it is therefore not unreasonable to inquire into the private lives
of candidates as we may gather private details that can be used to predict public
beliefs or political actions. For example, it makes sense to ask about the source of
Mitt Romney's estimated worth of $250 million. 3 This may help determine
whether he actively participates in the management of the funds, which could lead
to conflicts over tax policy or government contracts.4 It may be less socially
valuable, however, for the public to know specific details about how he settles his
religious tithing on that $250 million.
Predicting a candidate's actions and expressions has become quite
newsworthy in recent political campaigns.5 Perhaps our emphasis on prediction has
grown because in the last fifty years, the President's power, nuclear and otherwise,
has increased astronomically. 6 We may also want stronger politicians where
policies have failed, as personal diplomacy may trump long-term strategies and
goals.7 Whatever the reason, the focus on predicting presidential behavior has
1. Jennifer Steinhauer, Charisma and a Search for Self in Obama's Hawaii Childhood, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at Al.
2. Nancy Benac, Hillary Clinton's Life Pivots Once More, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2007, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/22/AR2007012200323.html.
3. Lisa Wangsness & Ross Kerber, Romneys are Worth up to $250m: Personal Finance Data are
Detailed, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 2007, at Al.
4. Casey Ross, Mitt to Fine-Tune Portfolio; Cashing out of Stocks in Stem Cells, BOSTON
HERALD, Aug. 16, 2007, at 4; Romney Blind Trust to Reduce Investing Conflicts, He Says, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 2007, at A3.
5. James David Barber, a political scientist at Duke University, affirms the importance of personal
prediction in presidential politics, stating: "[T]he crucial differences [in the presidency] can be
anticipated by an understanding of a potential President's character, his world view, and his style."
JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE
HOUSE 3 (4th ed. 1992).
6. See STANLEY A. RENSHON, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
29-32, 43 (1996) (explaining that concerns with "psychological suitability of presidential candidates"
developed. partly out of fear over nuclear weapons in addition to the central role a president plays in
economic development).
7. Author Stanley Renshon posits that historically we could better predict a candidate's stance by
his party affiliation. Id. at 38-39. We have currently grown accustomed to interpreting a candidate's
particular blend of social programs and budget priorities, rather than relying steadfast on what the party
line would suggest. See id. at 39 ("Voters can no longer rely on party labels to inform them of policy
approaches of a party's candidates .... [T]hey must make their own way through the haze of blurred
political personas of the candidates."). Renshon argues however, that more than ever, we need to assess
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reached an all-time high. In an age where analyzing someone's personal history is
limited only by one's internet access, there is a great supply of tabloid-type news to
fill the public's appetite. 8
Having said that, Americans do deserve to legitimately scrutinize our
candidates to see if they are up for the enormous challenges and responsibilities. 9
The press would not be performing its civic duty in this regard if it let certain facts
slide by without comment, or if critical details about the candidates were treated as
gossip, published by way of reckless speculation instead of rich investigative
reporting. Presidential candidates invite others to see them as they see themselves,
and reporters have an obligation to critically examine the nexus between the
candidate's true self and her constructed persona.'
0
Careful consideration must be given as to what sort of information may be
reliably and properly disclosed in this pursuit. In some cases, the public interest
necessitates more disclosure, and in others, the privacy rights of the individual
candidate should prevail. If we want to know trivial data such as presidential
candidates' pumpkin-paring proclivities, it seems curious to limit access to
information that is not entirely trivial. One such example is information about the
candidate's health. As with any employee, the mental and physical health of the
candidate can affect many aspects of performance such as ability to handle stress,
resilience to sleep deprivation, and the strength of the immune system's response to
common colds. Poor neurological health may also lead to poor executive decisions,
and it is for this reason that air traffic controllers are required by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to undergo intense psychological and neurological
testing before they are hired." l The military and the Central Intelligence Agency
the likelihood that a president will keep his word. Id. Lyndon B. Johnson, for example, campaigned
heavily on not sending American troops to Vietnam; but once he was elected to office, he nonetheless
did so. Id. at 33. Johnson's abrupt change in policy may have contributed to public suspicion that a
disconnect exists between campaign promises and presidential delivery. Id.
8. Carl M. Cannon, Here We Go Again: The Public's Right to Know - or Prurient Interest?,
NAT'L J., May 25, 2007, at 20, 20-22 ("The gaggle of 2008 candidates will be acting out their various
pathologies in a technological environment more suited for entertainment than for serious policy
discussion. YouTube, the blogs, and an unfettered cable culture did not exist in 1988 and 1992, the years
that the privacy barriers came tumbling down. They do now."); see also Gina Angie Lee, Privacy Year
in Review: The Intersection of the Rights to Privacy and of a Free Press: Can They Co-Exist?, I J.L. &
POL'Y INFO. SOC'y 441, 472 (2005) ("With a multitude of outlets and venues for disseminating private
yet newsworthy information about public figures and officials, the press necessarily infringes on their
right to solitude.").
9. Robert Streiffer et al., Medical Privacy and the Public's Right to Vote: What Presidential
Candidates Should Disclose, 31 J. MED. & PHIL. 417, 422 (2006) ("We propose that candidates are
morally required to disclose information about any medical conditions that are likely to seriously
undermine the candidates ability to fulfill what we will call the core functions of the office.").
10. RENSHON, supra note 6, at 53.
11. Fed. Aviation Admin., Air Traffic Controllers,
http://www.faa.gov/about/office-Orgheadquarters-offices/ahr/jobs-careers/occupations/atc/ (last visited
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(CIA) also require members to undergo a rigorous pre-employment health screen. 2
If the FAA, the military and the CIA can require their members to undergo health
screens, it seems irrational not to require the same for the head of these important
governmental departments. We currently judge a candidate's health on whether he
jogs or eats hamburgers as represented in newspaper photo-ops. 13 A logical
question is, "Why stop there?" What is the logical reason to require less of the
leader than we do of his staff? If Americans truly want to gain valuable information
that will help guide their vote, we should think about being more precise in our
health assessment of the candidates for this very important job.
In this article, I will present the legal framework for a completely new type of
disclosure: the results of a presidential candidate's personal genetic tests. 14 This
inquiry narrows the more general question of access to a candidate's health
information by analyzing the topic through the lens of a specific type of private
information. The question that I seek to address is whether it is ethical, legal, or
constructive to conduct genetic testing of candidates, and to what degree this
information should be shared with the public. There are many ways to frame this
issue, and political scientists have been researching access to the health information
of politicians more generally for at least 35 years. 15 The lawyers and policy-makers
must catch-up. I am interested in the unique ways that a public figure's genetic tests
may be useful or harmful to public interest, and how this information is different
from other types of private health information. This inquiry may be useful as it falls
right at the delicate intersection of our twin goals of protecting individual privacy
and disclosing information that is in the public interest. 16
Apr. 17, 2007); see also RENSHON, supra note 6, at Ill (noting that borderline personality disorder is
generally associated with substantial difficulties in psychological functioning).
12. Cent. Intelligence Agency, Careers at CIA: Core Collector,
https://www.cia.gov/careers/jobs/view-all-jobs/core-collector.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
13. Editorial, Clinton Puts Heart into Obesity Fight, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 9, 2005, at 51 ("Gone
are the days when Bill Clinton would pose happily mouthing a dripping Big Mac. Or take a fast-food
detour in the middle of a jog."); see also Richard L. Berke, Politicians Find Jogging with Clinton Is No
Stroll in the Park, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1993, at Al (noting that Clinton, who others considered a "big
lug" was a surprisingly fast jogger).
14. A genetic test has been defined as "'the analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins,
and certain metabolites in order to detect heritable disease-related genotypes, mutations, phenotypes, or
karyotypes for clinical purposes."' Wylie Burke, Genomic Medicine: Genetic Testing, 347 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1867, 1867 (2002) (quoting U.S. TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, PROMOTING SAFE AND
EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES (Neil A. Holtzman & Michael S. Watson eds.,
1998)). Genetic tests can be both diagnostic and predictive. Id. Diagnostic testing can be used for
prenatal diagnosis as well as for pre-implantation diagnosis following in vitro fertilization, or newborn
and carrier screening. Id. at 1867-71. Predictive testing can identify future health risks, predict drug
responses, and assess risks to our unborn children. Id. at 1867.
15. See generally HUGH L'ETANG, THE PATHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP 11-12 (1970) (discussing the
need for public disclosure of public officials' health information).
16. Legal scholar George Annas aptly pointed out the importance of the legal principle that
disclosure of the medical information is contingent upon patient authorization and that "[p]residential
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In the first section, I will provide the basic legal framework underpinning the
arguments for and against public disclosure of a presidential candidate's health
information. Specifically, I will look at some of the existing constraints on
disclosure (i.e., the physician-patient privilege, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), tort law, the Fourth Amendment, and federal non-
discrimination statutes) and ask how these apply to genetic information. I suspect
there will be other theoretical constraints, but I have focused on those with relevant
doctrinal precedent. In the second section, I will ask whether the genetic test could
be mandatory as a condition of running for office, or if it must consist entirely of
voluntary disclosure. I will also analyze what form this disclosure could take
depending on the type of genetic information that is involved, and whether it
should consist of a full disclosure of all health records, a succinct report, or
something in between the two. In conclusion, I will then apply the policy
arguments from the second section to the legal framework of the first, and will
distill this down into some basic recommendations. My hope is not to exhaust the
universe of possibilities, but merely to begin a dialogue on the utility of accessing
presidential candidates' health information, by offering how genetic information
may or may not contribute to this discussion. In some cases, it will not matter
whether I'm speaking of the presidential candidate or the President herself, as
information that is obtained during the campaign phase will become relevant once
the candidate is elected.
1I. THE LEGAL AND HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
Historically, Americans have wanted a leader who is "all-wise, all-powerful,
[and] the repository of his followers' hopes and dreams, without human
imperfection and frailties."' 7 We did not want someone we could relate to; we
wanted someone mighty to revere. Less deferential media scrutiny of the office
over the last thirty years has probably humanized it some, as we have seen
presidents impeached, censured, and caught in various scandals and lies.18 We may
now be willing to take the President down a notch from her pedestal, and are more
campaigns .. are based not so much on descriptions of the present as on predictions about the future.
And this is what makes them especially problematic in terms of health information." George J. Annas,
The Health of the President and Presidential Candidates-The Public's Right to Know, 333 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 945, 945 (1995).
17. Robert S. Robins & Jerrold M. Post, Choosing a Healthy President, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 841,
842 (1995).
18. Cannon, supra note 8, at 22. ("'Watergate and the Vietnam War changed everything,' said
veteran Republican activist Roger Stone, who was an aide to President Nixon. 'Prior to these events,
reporters and the public believed in their government and their political leaders, and gave them the
benefit of the doubt. Now we assume all politicians are lying and hiding something."'); see also Alison
Mitchell, The President's Acquittal: The Overview; Clinton Acquitted Decisively: No Majority for
Either Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at Al.
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comfortable scouring her personal life. 19 In some areas, perhaps, we are still asking
too much-requiring the candidate to hide many natural blemishes that might make
him human. This has led several candidates to hide any perceived health
imperfections from the public view, worried that they may appear weak or not fit
for the job.2 ° Secrecy over health imperfections only strengthens the signal of
stigmatization, by silencing the important message that presidents need not be, and
historically have not been, perfectly healthy individuals. Some of the most effective
leaders in our country and the world have been physically disabled or otherwise
stricken with disease. 2' And yet, there are some types of diseases that may affect
the quality of the President's decision-making in such a way that the public would
find troubling.
In a 2004 CNN/Gallup Poll, ninety-six percent of those polled said that the
general health of the President is "important" or "very important" to his ability to
be a good president. Eighty-four percent believed that the President should have an
annual physical examination and seventy-nine percent stated that the President
should undergo an annual mental exam to test for conditions such as depression or
Alzheimer's. 22 While this suggests that Americans still desire a mentally and
physically "healthy" candidate, they are also conflicted about how this should be
ensured. Sixty-one percent said the President has the same rights as other citizens
to keep medical records private, and only thirty-eight percent were in favor of
releasing all information that might affect the President's ability to serve.23 There is
definitely friction between the public interest in accessing private information
about the candidates and the countervailing privacy interests of the individual; this
19. RENSHON, supra note 6, at 320 (discussing the "lies and misfortune" of presidents from the
1960s to 1970s, and how this led to a general distrust of the President and the desire to know the private
behavior of leaders); Thomas Fitzgerald, Likeability May be Kerry's Greatest Hurdle, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Sept. 7, 2004, at A2 ("A recent Zogby/Williams Identity Poll found that 57.3 percent of undecided or
persuadable voters would rather have a beer with Bush than Kerry .... ").
20. Annas, supra note 16, at 945 (discussing how various presidents took efforts to hide their
medical infirmities from the public).
21. KENNETH R. CRISPELL & CARLOS F. GOMEZ, HIDDEN ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 2-3
(1988) (revealing that foreign leaders, such as Marshal Tito and Mao Tse-tung kept their health
problems secret and eventually died while still in power); Aaron Seth Kesselheim, Privacy Versus the
Public's Right to Know: Presidential Health and the White House Physician, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 523,
524 (2002) ("[A]t least 14 of the 19 United States Presidents in the twentieth century suffered from
significant illnesses while in the White House, ranging from Woodrow Wilson's debilitating stroke to
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's congestive heart failure to Ronald Reagan's colon cancer, with varying
impacts on their ability to govern."); Robins & Post, supra note 17, at 842 ("That Franklin Delano
Roosevelt had a physical disability secondary to poliomyelitis did not impair his leadership and
decision-making .... Consider the major heart attack (myocardial infarction) which Lyndon Johnson
suffered while a senator, the multiple illnesses which punctuated Eisenhower's presidency: heart attack,
stroke and ileitis.").
22. CNN.com, American Morning: Looking at the Health of the Presidential Candidates (Sept. 29,
2004), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0409/29/ltm.05.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
23. Id
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recurring thread and the natural tension that it creates is precisely what I'd like to
explore. Just how far are we willing to undermine the candidate's privacy interests
so that we can increase the odds of electing a "healthy" candidate?
To help frame the issues for discussion, imagine this hypothetical:
It's a rainy January morning when presidential candidate Eddie enters a diner
in New Hampshire and orders some apple pie. He is quickly surrounded by locals,
who greet him with handshakes and smiles. During the commotion, Eddie is lightly
pricked in his lower right arm (his sleeves are rolled up, of course) by the tip of an
umbrella, which serves as a giant syringe and extracts some of the candidate's
blood. Eddie doesn't even notice. Steve, the sleazy, rabid journalist, is the owner of
the umbrella. Steve submits Eddie's blood to a DNA lab advertised online, but uses
his name instead of Eddie's in the contact information. The lab results are
eventually returned through the mail, and the devious Steve leaks Eddie's personal
genetic information to an anonymous blogger. No interpretive data was provided in
the report, which eventually makes its way into the mainstream media. Eddie will
not confirm the legitimacy of the findings. He maintains that this implicates
confidential information that he hopes the public will respect as private.
Eddie's ostensible genetic profile revealed that he has some of the markers
associated with a few potentially serious disorders. He has one copy of the ApoE e4
allele, which has been clinically associated with increased risk for developing
Alzheimer's disease.24 His test also reveals mutations on the MLHl and MSH2
genes, which point to an elevated risk for developing nonpolyposis colorectal
cancer. Lastly, the results show that Eddie's racial composition does not square
with the ethnic genealogy he has sketched in books and in interviews. Eddie is 70
years old, and his much younger opponents have successfully made his age an issue
in the primaries. The underlying perception of his infirmity due to age, coupled
with the newly exposed genetic data and questions about his ethnic history,
presents a blow to his campaign that he cannot overcome. Eddie is forced to
remove himself from the election and subsequently lives another twenty years
outside of politics in relative good health and peace.
Unlike other explorations into genetics and ethics, this hypothetical is not that
remote or futuristic.2 6 In fact, eventually an abandoned coffee cup or a piece of
24. Nilifer Ertekin-Taner, Genetics ofAlzheimer's Disease: A Centennial Review, 25 NEUROLOGIC
CLINICS 611, 611, 627 (2007). There are people that develop Alzheimer's disease, who do not possess
the APOE e4 allele, and there are individuals with two copies of this variation who will never exhibit
signs of Alzheimer's. Id. at 627. This tells us that the -disease has more than one cause, and that the
APOE e4 genetic variation is not a necessary component to developing Alzheimer's disease.
25. JOHNS HOPKINS CANCER RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, HEREDITARY NONPOLYPOSIS
COLORECTAL CANCER (HNPCC) AND THE MSH6 GENE (n.d.), available at
http://www.macgn.org/factsheets/HNPCC%20and%20MSH6.pdf.
26. See Tom Infield & Derrick Nunnally, "It Wasn't Right, " Diner Boss Says of an Attempt to Sell
it on Ebay: Obama's Unfinished Waffle Falls from Glory, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 27, 2008, at A12
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chewing gum may provide enough genetic material to conduct reliable commercial
genetic testing.2 7 Commentators are right to point to the mitigating factors on
genetic testing's utility and intrusiveness (e.g., the available genetic data is not very
useful in predicting many diseases and behaviors). However, it is not true that
piecing together the composite genetic picture of a human will only arrive after a
"considerable number of years. 28 Clinical genetic tests exist for over 1,000
diseases, and hundreds more are currently being developed. 29 Most of the mail-in
genetic testing services focus on paternity testing; however, there are labs that will
test for multiple polymorphisms and mitochondrial DNA, and there is potential for
widespread growth in this field. 30 Already, it is possible to submit blood specimens
to a company in Wisconsin, and in exchange for $590 they will test all of your
genetic, hereditary information encoded by DNA (i.e., the "genome") for certain
mutations and provide the results to your doctor within thirty days. 31 A group often
individuals are currently having their entire genome sequenced,32 and two have
(discussing the sale of Barack Obama's used dinner plate on Ebay, including the seller's statement that
the silverware contained Obama's DNA). For simplicity in the hypothetical we will assume enough
blood was extracted to conduct the test. Genetic analysis based on hair specimen is less reliable, and
while it may be used more in the future, blood samples and buccal swabs remain the gold standard. See
Suzanne M. Leanza et al., Whole Genome Amplification of DNA Extracted From Hair Samples:
Potential for Use in Molecular Epidemiologic Studies, 31 CANCER DETECTION & PREVENTION 480, 480
(2007) (finding that blood and buccal DNA are preferred in epidemiological studies because they are
excellent sources of gDNA).
27. See Peter Slevin, For DNA Detectives, the Workload Is Exploding, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2000,
at A3 (demonstrating that genetic profiles from saliva left on a drinking cup provided sufficient genetic
evidence to indict a suspect for four rapes and three murders).
28. Contra Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Approach: A Viewpoint on the Study of the Legal,
Ethical and Policy Considerations Raised by DNA Tests and Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 214,
217 (2006) ("There are a number of factors that will work to mitigate the intrusiveness of DNA usages,
at least in the near future. It is true that we can divine very specific information from DNA-for
example the color of one's hair, or whether one is susceptible to certain diseases-but it will take a
considerable number of years before authorities will be able to look at the genetic code and piece
together a composite picture of a human being.").
29. Kathy L. Hudson et al., Oversight of US Genetic Testing Laboratories, 24 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1083, 1083 (2006).
30. E.g., HomeDNA, The New Standard in DNA Testing,
https://www.homedna.com/ancestry-tests.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008); ARGUS BioSciences,
FAQs, http://www.argusbio.com/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
31. Prevention Genetics, Genome Polymorphism Scan,
http://www.preventiongenetics.com/ClinicalTesting/testdescriptions/gps.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
Prevention Genetics provides the genome polymorphism scan by reviewing 400 short-tandem repeat
polymorphisms (STRPs) in all 24 chromosomes of the individual. Id. Higher marker density scans are
available for $59/year. Prevention Genetics, GenMax Test,
http://www.preventiongenetics.com/clinicaltesting/TestDescriptions/genmax.pdf (last visited Apr. 18,
2008). While not a legal requirement, this online service commendably will not release information to
individuals themselves, but requires a physician to interpret the data. Id.
32. Peter Dizikes, DNA Unraveled-Gene Information Opens New Frontier in Privacy Debate,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2007, at Cl ('Pretty soon, all of us will have access to our personal genetic
data,' said George Church, a Harvard scientist whose study, the Personal Genome Project, will release
20081
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already been completed.33 Online personal genomic testing will be much more
common in the next few years due to companies like 23andMe and Navigenics that
have received enormous investor interest and funding. 34 There are few regulatory
safeguards in place to stop an unsavory media outlet from getting its hands on a
political candidate's blood, discarded toe nail, or chewing gum, and then
irresponsibly publishing the genetic test results without any clinical context or
approval by the candidate.
35
A. The Current State of Play for Disclosure of a Candidate's Health Information
There is no law that requires candidates for the presidency, or the presidents
themselves, to disclose anything at all about their health. If they choose to disclose
their health information, they can decide exactly what is disclosed, who discloses it,
and when and how it is disclosed. Some candidates have preferred to condense
their overall health report into summaries that their physicians then release to the
press. 36 Many have outright lied about their health status. 37 Others have fought the
genetic records of 10 people this fall, including Church's. Church would like to find 100,000 more
volunteers to build a scientific trove of genetic data and estimates he can already sequence the portion of
human DNA containing genes for $1,000.").
33. Erika Check, Celebrity Genomes Alarm Researchers, 447 NATURE 358, 358 (2007); see also
Nicholas Wade, Discoverer Lends His Genome to DNA Study, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 2, 2007, at 3
("The full genome of James Watson, who jointly discovered the structure of DNA in 1953, has been
deciphered ... ").
34. David P. Hamilton, Google, Genentech Fund Personal-Genetics Startup 23andMe,
VENTUREBEAT, May 22, 2007, http://venturebeat.com/2007/05/22/google-genentech-fund-personal-
genetics-startup-23andme/. Private companies like 23andMe, Inc. are hoping to deliver high density
information about someone's genome, "to connect you to the 23 paired volumes of your own genetic
blueprint (plus your mitochondrial DNA), bringing you personal insight into ancestry, genealogy, and
inherited traits.... [W]ith educational and scientific resources with which to interpret and understand it,
your genome will soon become personal in a whole new way." Id. Navigenics, Inc. offers genetic
counseling services to its members through the company, and conducts genetic tests through CLIA-
certified labs. Navigenics, About: What Do We Do?, http://www.navigenics.com/corp/About/ (last
visited Apr. 18, 2008). CLIA certification will be discussed in detail later.
35. See Amy L. McGuire et al., The Future of Personal Genomics, 317 SCIENCE 1687, 1687
(2007), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/317/5845/1687.pdf ("[S]uccessful
integration of personal genomics into routine clinical care will require clear standards, multidisciplinary
collaboration, and careful consideration of the ethical, social, and clinical implications.").
36. Editorial, What's Really Up, Doc?, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 26, 1996, at lOB ("Bill
Clinton ...provided only letters from physicians attesting generally to his good health-'the least
amount of health information,' the New York Times noted at the time, 'of any presidential nominee in
20 years."').
37. In 1960, during Kennedy's campaign for the Democratic primary, his attack on Eisenhower's
and Johnson's health backfired. JOAN & CLAY BLAIR, JR., THE SEARCH FOR JFK 162, 575 (1976). His
opponents discovered that he had Addison's disease and threw his health into question. Id. Kennedy
issued a statement that denied the Addison's disease diagnosis. Id. at 575-76. In fact, Kennedy's
Addison's disease was a matter of public record as of November 1955, when Philip Wilson published
his case in the Archives of Surgery. James A. Nicholas et al., Management of Adrenocortical
Insufficiency During Surgery, 71 AMA ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 737, 739 (1955). Luckily for Kennedy
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press in its demands for medical information 38 and have provided little or no
information about their medical history or current health data.39 Many candidates
have decided to voluntarily release information on the status of their physical
health. This can be in response to public suspicion,40 or opponents egging them
on, 41 or just pure convention.
It is telling that the one of the first presidential candidates to publicize his
health report was Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1931. 4 In releasing his medical
information, Roosevelt acted as if he were responding to a challenge set forth by
Republican journalist Earle Looker.43 In reality, Roosevelt had arranged the
challenge himself.44 The report stated that Roosevelt's "powers of endurance are
such as to allow him to meet all demands of private or public life.",45 That may well
have been true. However, despite his doctors' knowledge that Roosevelt would
no one publicly made the connection during the presidential election, since his name was omitted from
the article. See id.; ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY: ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE
WHITE HOUSE 156 (1992) ("An article that appeared in a 1955 issue of AMA Archives of Surgery, and
examined the case of a thirty-seven-year-old male Addisonian who underwent spinal surgery at the New
York Hospital for Special Surgery on 21 October 1954, is widely believed to have John Kennedy as its
subject."). Presidential candidate Paul Tsongas "said his doctors had declared him cancer free," referring
to his cancer relapse as "suspicious cells" and the radiation therapy as precautionary. Herbert L. Abrams,
Presidential Health and the Public Interest: The Campaign of 1992, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 795, 802 (1995)
(internal citation omitted). In fact, in 1987 Tsongas had a recurrence of cancer, which he and his
physicians successfully covered up. Id.
38. E.g., Lawrence K. Altman, The 1992 Campaign: Candidate's Health, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
1992, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EOCE6DC143FF932A35752C1A964958260
("[U]nlike the two other Presidential candidates, the 62 year-old Mr. Perot has refused to disclose any
information about this health."); Marlene Cimons, Quayle Case Renews Debate on Public 's Right to
Know, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at A5 (noting that when President Clinton was 48 and seeking
reelection, he consistently refused to release his medical records to the public).
39. In 1992, presidential candidate Ross Perot refused to provide even a doctor's letter discussing
his health status. Abrams, supra note 37, at 806 ("Perot's attitude was that questions to his health were
not 'relevant."'); accord Robert Steinbrook, Full Disclosure of Candidates Medical Histories Urged,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at A18.
40. If Dole had been elected, he would have been the oldest person to enter the office. Dole pre-
empted questions about his age and health by calling for an independent panel to review the President's
health. Lawrence K. Altman, Politics: The Candidate's Health, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1996, at A 12.
41. When Johnson's health was suspect in 1960, Kennedy seized on this perceived weakness by
stating that the President needed "the strength and health and vigor of... young men." CRISPELL &
GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 162. For example, Vice President Gore released his medical records "less than
a week after Gore's rival for the Democratic nomination, Bill Bradley, canceled a speech because of a
briefly erratic heartbeat stemming from a common disorder initially diagnosed in Bradley in 1996."
Edwin Chen, Gore's Health 'Outstanding, 'Doctors Say, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999, at A16.
42. BETrY HOUCHIN WINFIELD, FDR AND THE NEWS MEDIA 20 (1990); Robins & Post, supra note
17, at 847.
43. Id.
44. See id. (demonstrating that the release of FDR's medical information was a plan devised by
both him and Earle Looker).
45. Ross T. MCINTIRE & GEORGIA CREEL, WHITE HOUSE PHYSICIAN 54 (1946).
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likely never walk again, they stated that Roosevelt could "walk all necessary
distances" and had "progressive recovery of power in the legs" and that the
restoration continued.46 This probably was not true. It is possible that this
convention has been perpetuated ever since, where candidates choose what to
reveal, and in so doing they create the myth of candid disclosure, which insulates
them from accusations of concealment. Since at least 1992, the White House
medical office has released only summaries of the presidents' and vice presidents'
periodic medical exams according to Air Force physician Richard Tubb.
47
1. The Physician-Patient Privilege as a Constraint on Disclosure
Physicians have a professional obligation to protect their patient's
confidential communications, which include any statements made to the physician
in the exercise of medical care. This fiduciary duty has been codified into a
testimonial physician-patient privilege. The privilege did not exist at common law,
and it was not recognized in the United States until New York passed a testimonial
privilege statute in 1828, which eventually lead to each state providing for some
variation of the privilege. 48 The rationale for these statutes was to encourage people
to seek medical assistance for certain diseases that were socially stigmatized,
without fear of the information being discovered in Court. 4 9 Cultural norms of
protecting privacy, as well as professional honor, were invoked as justifications for
the privilege. 50 Even in states that recognize the privilege, there are certain
situations in which a physician may properly disclose her patient's confidential
information. This includes, inter alia, when it is in the public interest, or when
46. Id.
47. David Brown, Vice President's Overall Health is 'Outstanding,' Medical Records Show,
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1999, at A8.
48. Robert Wade, Note, The Ohio Physician-Patient Privilege: Modified, Revised, and Defined, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1147, 1148 (1989); see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1995) ("[A]II 50 States
and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege."). Some
states, however, limit the privilege in criminal cases, and each state defines the scope of physicians
differently. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-90-107(l)(d)(I), 13-90-107(3) (West 2007) (waiving the
physician-client privilege in cases where a patient has sued his or her physician, surgeon, or registered
nurse and explicitly allowing exceptions for physicians to testify about the mental states of a criminal
defendant in certain situations.), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2157 (West 2007) (waiving the
physician-client privilege in cases where a patient bring a personal injury or malpractice action against a
defendant and produces a physician who has treated the patient for the injury or for any disease for
which the malpractice is alleged).
49. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1530, 1532
(1985).
50. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2830a (John T. rev. vol.
ed. 1961).
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there is a duty to warn a third party who the patient plans to imminently harm.5'
The privilege is decidedly not absolute.
History demonstrates that presidential candidates are already less likely to be
forthright with their doctors, out of fear that the records may one day be leaked.
52
They may forego treatment that they think could be discovered, or may not heed
the advice of their physicians out of fear that the regimen will negatively affect
their public work.53 The justifications for the physician-patient privilege may
operate equally on public figures. Even so, we know that even if the privilege is
maintained, the status quo is for presidents to be guarded about what they share
with their physicians.
a. Permissible Disclosures under the Physician-Patient Privilege
Most states allow for the communication of private health information if it is
necessary for public health reporting, i.e., to track disease epidemics, child abuse,
or criminal activity.54 If a physician alerts the public health authorities to a
shooting, or an outbreak of tuberculosis, under most state statutes she is not
impermissibly violating her patient's privilege. 55 The second exception is rooted in
51. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976) (holding that mental
health professionals may breach a patient's confidentiality, and are required to do so to protect third
parties threatened with imminent bodily harm by a patient). The original 1974 decision required warning
the third-party that was in danger. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 559 (Cal.
1974) (en banc), vacated, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal 1976). In a rehearing two years later, the Supreme Court of
California recognized a therapist's "obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim
against such danger." Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340. Consequently, a mental health professional may
discharge the duty in several ways, including notifying the police, warning the intended victim, or taking
other reasonable measures to protect the threatened individual. Id.
52. Governor William Casey of Pennsylvania deliberately avoided his regular cardiac evaluation in
November of 1990, out of fear that adverse findings regarding the condition of his heart would be
leaked, and negatively affect his campaign. Robins & Post, supra note 17, at 857. In May of 1984,
physicians removed a fibrous polyp from Reagan's descending colon. Id. at 847. It should have
immediately been followed by a complete examination of the ascending colon, but it was not, due to
political concerns that the public would find out. Id. Cancer was found in the suspected area a year later;
its size and nature indicated it had existed in May of 1984. Id.
53. Howard G. Bruenn, Clinical Notes on the Illness and Death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
72 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 579, 580 (1970). While President Roosevelt did not object to the many lab
tests he underwent at the hands of his doctor, Howard Bruenn, he ignored his doctor's advice to take
codeine for a severe cough, to take two weeks off to rest with nursing care, and to undergo sedation to
ensure rest. Id. Dr. Bruenn's "memorandum was rejected because of the exigencies and demands on the
President." Id. Again in March 1944, Dr. Bruenn suggested that a mersalyl injection would be
beneficial, but "it was decided by the group that in view of the complexity of the situation as little
medication as possible be used at this time." Id. at 581-82.
54. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2007); see also N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Morgenthau, 779
N.E.2d 173, 177 (N.Y. 2002); Edelstein v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Addiction Servs., 692 A.2d 803, 806
(Conn. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by In re Michael S., 784 A.2d 317 (Conn. 2001) (citing
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146o (West 2007)).
55. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 139A.3 (West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-503.01 (Supp. 2006).
20081
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
a California Supreme Court case, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, where the court held that a therapist must warn a third party of possible
imminent harm, thereby breaching the physician-patient privilege, when a patient
has made threats to harm the third party to the therapist. 56 In the majority opinion,
Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner famously stated: "We conclude that the public policy
favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist
communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert
danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.,
57
Justice Tobriner further noted that "[a] physician may not reveal the confidence
entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance ... unless he is required to do
so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the
individual or of the community."58
Lawrence Mohr, M.D., the White House physician from 1987 to 1993,
believes that "we must expect and require that the sanctity of the doctor-patient
relationship remain inviolate except in the extreme situation of a medically disabled
president."59 If a physician felt that his patient, the President, were neurologically
or physically unstable, he would have an obligation to disclose that to the Vice
President to trigger an inquiry into whether the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should
be invoked.60 The physician may also have an obligation to inform the Vice
President and the team of White House physicians if illness presents itself in less
than debilitating ways, so that warning signs can be properly assessed. Just what
would rise to the level of "disability" as contemplated by the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, or "public peril" as discussed in Tarasoff, is currently a fact-specific
inquiry, and one that would require a balancing of interests and the reasonable
judgment of the physician.6'
Assuming arguendo that the physician-patient privilege should operate on
presidential candidates in the same way it does on private citizens, a physician
would similarly need to advance either a "public health" or a "duty to warn third
parties" kind of argument in order to respect the confidentiality of the patient's
56. 551 P.2d at 340.
57. Id. at 347.
58. Id. at 347 (quoting PRINCIPLES OF MED. ETHICS OF THE AM. MED. ASS'N § 9 (1957)).
59. Lawrence C. Mohr, The White House Physician: Role, Responsibilities and Issues, 16 POL.
PSYCHOL. 777, 789 (1995).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § I. (outlining the procedures of succession to the presidency and
vice-presidency in the event of the removal from office or death of the President). The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment will be discussed in detail later on, but suffice it to say for now that it is the constitutional
mechanism that provides for presidential succession in the event the President becomes disabled. As we
will see, there is much concern over whether the current Amendment is adequate on its own.
61. See CRISPELL & GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 226 (stating that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
places the President's physician in a position of power with the ultimate decision to either reveal the
President's condition, which may lead to the procedure for medical removal, or participate in a cover-up
to keep the President in office).
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communications. 62 Whether the public health exception could successfully be
broadened to include the impact of the President's poor health, or the reasoning
behind the Tarasoff decision extended to a physician's "duty to warn" of diffuse,
public peril, is an open issue. The relevant safe havens for disclosure under this
privilege would need to be applied in new, but not inconsistent ways for a
physician to disclose a presidential candidate's health information without his
consent.
Lastly, some of the initial justifications for the physician-patient privilege do
not apply in a scenario where the screening would be mandatory. That is, one chief
reason for privileged communications between a patient and her physician is to
encourage individuals to seek medical care even in situations where the disease or
its treatment is stigmatized.63 If an individual were required to undergo genetic
testing, there would be no concern of avoiding medical care. In fact, the testing
may provide an opportunity to discover more about the candidate's health than
would otherwise be known.
2. HIPAA as a Constraint on Disclosure
Physicians have an ethical, and now statutory, obligation not to divulge a
patient's protected health information.64 A physician who discloses the protected
health information of his patient without the patient's consent would be subject to
HIPAA's enforcement actions. These actions include civil penalties of up to $100
per occurrence, and criminal penalties ranging from $50,000 and up to one year in
prison for improperly and knowingly obtaining or disclosing individual health
information, or $250,000 and up to ten years in prison for profiting from the
improper disclosure of a patient's protected health information.65 This is in addition
to any professional sanctions that might be imposed by the relevant licensing
62. See 42 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2007); Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347.
63. Cheryl M. Plambeck, Divided Loyalties: Legal and Bioethical Considerations of Physician-
Pregnant Patient Confidentiality and the Prenatal Drug Abuse, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 1,22 (2002).
64. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, §§
262, 264, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d). The Privacy Rule as called for by this Act,
includes the proscription of covered entities' disclosure of protected health information, and was
implemented as the "Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information." DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY OF INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH
INFORMATION: REGULATION TEXT (2003), available at http://www.dhhs.gov/ocr/combinedregtext.pdf;
45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164. Protected health information is defined to include "any information, whether oral
or recorded in any form or medium, that: [ius created or received by a health care provider, health plan,
public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and
[rielates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual .... 45
C.F.R. § 160.103 (2007).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5, 1320d-6 (2000).
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boards. HIPAA only applies to "covered entities," which includes health plans,
health care providers, and business associates of health care providers.66
a. Permissible Disclosures Under HIPAA
HIPAA provides for disclosure without the patient's authorization for "public
health activities," which is defined to include such things as "preventing or
controlling disease," for "public health investigations" and to "evaluate whether the
individual has a work-related illness or injury." 67 HIPAA also allows for disclosure,
without the patient's authorization, to the extent that "such use or disclosure is
required by law and the use or disclosure complies with and is limited to the
relevant requirements of such law." 68 Under HIPAA, as the public health
disclosures are spelled out in detail, it is less likely that "public health" could be
defined to encompass the President's health and its impact on the public interest.
There is no language in HIPAA to compel disclosure if a patient has communicated
her intention to imminently harm someone, perhaps because the regulations cover
health plans and hospitals that have no direct contact with the patient, and therefore
no privileged relationship. In order for a covered entity to disclose protected health
information under HIPAA, there would generally have to be authorization from the
patient or a legal mandate.
69
We must be careful not to eviscerate the meaning of HIPAA and the
physician-patient privilege with laws allowing disclosure. Even so, HIPAA's
exceptions do provide room for a narrow carve-out for physicians to disclose the
health of the President in cases where: (1) a law is passed that provides for such
disclosure,70 (2) there is some palatable public health or a "duty to warn" type of
argument,71(3) or the President authorized the disclosure. 2 In an attempt to paint a
full picture of the constraints on disclosure of health information, I have included
the above discussion of the physician-patient privilege and HIPAA regulations.
However, it is important to reiterate that the above constraints on disclosure only
apply if it is a provider or covered entity that is asked to disclose the health
information. There exists no privilege between a patient and his mother, or the
66. H1PAA defines a "covered entity" as a health plan, a health care clearinghouse, or a health care
provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a HIPAA
transaction. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
67. Id. §§ 164.512(b)(i), (v)(A)(2).
68. Id. § 164.512(a).
69. Id. § 164.502(a).
70. Id. § 164.512(a).
71. See id. § 164.512(b), O) (permitting the disclosure of health information (1) to prevent the
spread of communicable diseases, (2) in cases where the covered entity, in good faith, believes that the
disclosure is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to an individual or the public, or (3) if
the information is needed by law enforcement authorities to identify or apprehend a criminal suspect).
72. Id. § 164.512(a).
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press for that matter. HIPAA does not apply to a neighbor, colleague, or stranger
who improperly discloses someone's protected health information. These people
would only be subject to the existing civil privacy tort laws of each state.
3. Privacy Torts as a Constraint on Disclosure
Using the hypothetical above, Eddie could sue Steve and the blogger for
invasion of privacy under a few tort theories.7 3 As I am interested in the publication
of private information, we will apply the analysis of the tort of "public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts." To be held liable under this cause of action, an
individual. must publicly disclose private information that would be offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 74 Due to the sweeping
constitutional protection of freedom of the press, even a tortious invasion of one's
privacy is exempt from civil liability if the publication of private facts is truthful
and newsworthy. 75 "Newsworthy" has been defined as that which is "a legitimate
concern to the public.
76
Let us analyze each element of the claim in turn as it relates to the
hypothetical scenario above. First of all, we face the threshold question of public
disclosure of private facts, as Eddie's genetic information was previously private
(in fact not even known to him) and it was disclosed online in a public forum. We
must then proceed to ask whether under these circumstances, disclosure of genetic
information is considered offensive or objectionable. Steve is not a health
professional, and while he does not have a privilege under HIPAA or an obligation
to Eddie, he is also not acting for public health reasons or under the blessing of law.
He published this information purely for sensationalism.
The more private and guarded we are about the information that is disclosed,
the more it will be considered offensive and objectionable. Courts have recognized
the elevated privacy status of an individual's genetic data, stating that "[o]ne can
73. The universe of potentially relevant invasion of privacy actions include a (1) intrusion into an
individual's private affairs, (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, (3) appropriation of a
private individual's name and likeness, or (4) publicity which places an individual in a false light.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). The mere gathering of a person's blood
sample in the manner that Steve did would very likely be an intrusion into an individual's private affairs,
absent any publication of the data. See id. at 389-92 ("The privacy action for [the tort of intrusion] ...
will evidently overlap, to a considerable extent at least, with the action for trespass to land or chattels.").
However, I am more interested in the publication of that private data, and therefore the ensuing analysis
will investigate the second claim as it is most appropriate to the hypothetical.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
75. See id. at cmt. d.
76. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (finding that the commission of a
crime is a legitimate public concern and within the responsibility of the press to report); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88, 400-01 (1967) (holding that a magazine article regarding a play that
depicted an actual crime was not a violation of a New York privacy statute because the article reported a
"newsworthy event" that was a "a matter of public interest").
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think of few subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate privacy
interests than that of one's health or genetic make-up." 77 In addition, recent
legislation and executive orders indicate the special status of genetic information
and the need to safeguard it from disclosure and abuse.78
There is a vast literature surrounding the ethics of genetic testing. 79 The
literature discusses when genetic tests are appropriate, what information should be
relayed before and after the genetic test, how it should be communicated, and
whether there is an obligation to share the results of the genetic tests with family
members. 80 As genetic testing laboratories surfaced and started offering direct-to-
consumer genetic tests, ethicists and scientists also asked who should be permitted
to perform these tests, and what sort of privacy safeguards should be imposed.
Clearly genetic information has been treated differently from other types of health
information; so why is it unique?
The unique treatment of genetic information has historically been known as
"genetic exceptionalism." This concept holds that genetic information is not like
any other sensitive information in a patient's medical record.81 But we need not
77. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994)).
78. On April 25, 2007, the Genetic Nondiscrimination Act of 2007 ("GINA") was passed in the
U.S. House of Representatives, by a vote of 420-3. H.R. 493, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by House);
Coalition for 21st Century Medicine Urges Senate Passage of Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act Before Independence Day, SCIENCE LETTER, Jul. 10, 2007, at 759. It has yet to be passed by the
Senate. Erin E. Dooley, GINA Passes in House, ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, Aug. 1, 2007, at A401.
The act will protect individuals against discrimination based on their genetic information when it comes
to health insurance and employment. H.R. 493, §§ 101(a), 202(a). Executive Order 13145 was issued by
President Bill Clinton on Feb. 8, 2000 prohibiting genetic discrimination by federal civil employers.
Exec. Order No. 13145, 3 C.F.R. 235 (2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/thelaw/1 3145.html. Each suggests that genetic information is to be
considered particularly confidential, and additional privacy safeguards are required due to the unique
potential for discrimination.
79. While originally emphasizing informed consent, and what that means in the context of genetic
testing (i.e., prediction, rate of false positives, treatment options, familial obligations to disclose), the
conversation has evolved to include consideration of the social, legal, and psychological risks of genetic
testing, and how various institutions such as the family, insurance industry, and health care providers
may impact whether these risks materialize. Michael M. Burgess, Beyond Consent: Ethical and Social
Issues in Genetic Testing, 2 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 147, 147-49 (2001).
80. E.g., COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, INST. OF MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 2-15 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994); Francis S.
Collins, BRCAI-Lots of Mutations, Lots of Dilemmas, 334 N. ENG. J. MED. 186, 187-88 (1996);
Michael J. Green & Jeffrey R. Botkin, "Genetic Exceptionalism" in Medicine: Clarifying the
Differences Between Genetic and Nongenetic Tests, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 571, 572-73 (2003);
Statement of the American Society for Human Genetics on Genetic Testing for Breast and Ovarian
Cancer Predisposition, 55 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS at i, i-iii (1994).
81. Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and "'Future Diaries": Is Genetic Information
Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 60, 61 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997); Patricia A. Roche &
George J. Annas, Opinion, Protecting Genetic Privacy, 2 NATURE REVs. GENETICS 392, 393 (2001)
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think that genetics is wholly unique to recognize that it is at least different, and
different in meaningful ways that impact identity and privacy. A DNA molecule is
a source of medical information with predictive powers to estimate an individual's
risk of suffering from a wide variety of conditions in the future. 82 Genetic
information can be stored just like a patient's written medical record, and can
potentially be used and accessed downstream by people who have no relationship
with the patient.83 Additionally, it can inform people about where they came from,
and provide information about their ancestors and their genetic connection to their
children. 84 The potential for extrapolation (and abuse of extrapolation from
overstating genetic impact) is huge. Unlike cholesterol or protein levels, genetic
sequencing of DNA in the nucleus of blood cells should not fluctuate based on the
time of the test.
85
For these reasons, some have called DNA-sequence information, a coded
"future diary. ' 86 However, the diary metaphor may connote a stronger genetic basis
for some conditions than is appropriate. While the presence of a single genetic
anomaly can guarantee disease development in a few cases, the vast majority of
genetic mutations can only predict some amorphous genetic contribution or
association that may or may not result in disease. 87 The reason for the imprecision
(categorizing DNA information as "unique" because it contains information beyond that placed in a
medical record, such as future health risks). Many have argued that predictive genetic tests are not all
that different from other types of diagnostic tests in terms of presentation of clinical options; however,
even those who think the data is not clinically exceptional will acknowledge the potential for greater
discrimination and stigma. Murray, supra, at 64-65; Green & Botkin, supra note 80, at 573-74 (refusing
to view genetic testing as "exceptional," but acknowledging privacy protection is needed in the event of
discovering a stigmatizing disease).
82. Lisa Schriner Lewis, Note, The Role Genetic Information Plays in the Criminal Justice System,
47 ARIZ., L. R. 519, 522 (2005) ("Through DNA testing, scientist can use a sample of blood, saliva, skin,
tissue, urine, semen, or other tissue to develop a genetic profile."). While urine may contain trace
amounts of soluble DNA, it is typically not a reliable source of DNA in healthy individuals. Even so,
urine has some value in predicting health outcomes in so far as kidney function or white blood cell count
can be assessed through urine output. See Ying-Hsiu Su et al., Human Urine Contains Small, 150 to 250
Nucleotide-Sized, Soluble DNA Derived from the Circulation and May Be Useful in the Detection of
Colorectal Cancer, 6 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 101, 101, 106-07 (2004).
83. Roche & Annas, supra note 81, at 393, 395.
84. Carl Elliot & Paul Brodwin, Identity and Genetic Ancestry Tracing, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 1469,
1469 (2002).
85. Douglas L. Riegert-Johnson et al., The Incidence of Duplicate Genetic Testing, 10 GENETICS
MED. 114, 114 (2008).
86. George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded 'Future Diaries', 270
JAMA 2346, 2347-48 (1993). This metaphor has been criticized as perpetuating genetic determinism,
i.e., the mistaken belief that genetics leave no room for environmental factors to affect expression of the
genes. See Murray, supra note 81, at 66-67 ("In complex disorders with many contributing factors...
genetic information may indicate only a rough range of probabilities, something that falls short of a
'probabilistic future."').
87. See, e.g., James P. Evans et al., The Complexities of Predictive Genetic Testing, 322 BRIT.
MED. J. 1052, 1053 (2001) ("The identified risk is sometimes high-for example, in a positive test for
Huntington's disease-but always contains a substantial component of uncertainty ....").
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in prediction is that the risk of development is often compounded by synergistic
genetic mutations, as well as by environmental factors such as diet, exposure to
hormones and pathogens, and lifestyle. 88 Non-genetic factors are not trivial. They
may explain why genome-wide association studies that reported an association
between coronary heart disease and a common variant on chromosome 9 only
appeared to increase risk of disease from 1% to 1.6% in people with two copies of
the gene.89 Genetic information has culturally achieved icon-status, and its
mystique and significance has far exceeded other types of medical information.90
There are those who advance that genetic testing is not conceptually all that
different from blood pressure tests, but whether "[r]ight or wrong, genetic
information is believed to reveal who we 'really' are, so information from genetic
testing is often seen as more consequential than that from other sources."
91
While each court would embark upon a fact-intensive inquiry, it is quite likely
that given the unique privacy status that genetic information holds, disclosure of
someone's genetic information by the press would be considered offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable person. This is because the invasion penetrates many
layers of privacy: informational privacy, decision-making privacy, and privacy over
92our person. 2 The disclosure of one's genetic information implicates real concerns
of discrimination by colleagues and strangers, self-stigmatization and social
stigmatization, and disclosure to the patient and his family of unwanted sensitive
information.
93
a. Permissible Disclosures Under Privacy Tort Doctrine
After passing the first two prima facie hurdles of (1) public disclosure and (2)
embarrassing facts, we then must ask whether the disclosure is constitutionally
protected by the First Amendment. Even if the disclosure is objectionable, the
claim of invasion of privacy will fail if the shared information is newsworthy, i.e.,
88. LYNN B. JORDE ET AL., MEDICAL GENETICS 275 (3d ed. 2006); Amy L. McGuire et a]., The
Future of Personal Genomics, 317 SCIENCE 1687, 1687 (2007).
89. McGuire et al., supra note 88, at 1687.
90. See DOROTHY NELKIN, & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 2 (1995) ("[P]opular images convey a striking picture of the gene as powerful,
deterministic, and central to an understanding of both everyday behavior and the 'secret of life.'... The
biological gene-a nuclear structure shaped like a twisted ladder-has a cultural meaning independent
of its precise biological properties.").
91. Green & Botkin, supra note 80, at 572 (emphasis added).
92. Roche & Annas, supra note 81, at 392-93.
93. Gail Geller et al., Genetic Testing for Susceptibility to Adult-Onset Cancer: The Process and
Content of Informed Consent, 277 JAMA 1467, 1471-72 (1997); Dorothy C. Wertz, Society and the
Not-So-New Genetics: What Are We Afraid of?. Some Future Predictions from a Social Scientist, 13 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 299, 308-14 (1997).
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"of a legitimate concern to the public., 94 This inquiry hinges on our definition of
the "public interest," which traditionally has not been a high hurdle to overcome
even when speaking of lower-level public officials, such as city clerks and police
officers.95 In fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that
there was no invasion of privacy when the media published a police officer's drug
test results, finding that the "fitness for office of a public official and possible
improprieties in police drug-testing" were legitimate matters of public concern.
96
The Supreme Court has emphasized elevated First Amendment protection for
political speech, as this reflects our "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.... ,9 As
the people are sovereign, it is critical that the people be able to make informed
choices between candidates for office, "for the identities of those who are elected
will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation." 98 As the Court
observed in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, "it can hardly be doubted that the
constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office." 99 We see, therefore, that most
information relating to public officials, and particularly information related to those
running for political office, will pass the newsworthy test.
Most commentators agree that the status of the President's health is not only
newsworthy, but in fact quite important to the public. In a recent discussion of
privacy rights, one scholar wrote on the need to distinguish public officials from
public politicians:
the propriety of disclosures depends upon their purpose, not merely on
the type of information disclosed . . . not all public officials are the
same .... there is a big difference between the nation's president and a
local police officer or a teacher. The president's health, for example, is
considered by many to be of public concern. This is hardly true for a
bureaucrat, teacher, local prosecutor, or other minor public official.' 00
94. See cases cited supra note 76. As will be developed in greater detail later on, whether the
presidential candidate's genetic information is of a legitimate concern to the public is the fulcrum in this
analysis. In many ways to resolve this question is to resolve the entire debate.
95. The bar for "newsworthy" does not appear to be that high under some states' interpretation of
the invasion of privacy tort. In New Jersey, a municipal employee's medical report was published in
connection with a retaliatory employment claim. Ferraro v. City of Long Branch, 714 A.2d 945, 948-50
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). This was not considered an invasion of privacy because the employee
was a "public official" and several news articles had been published on the subject of the underlying
employment claim. Id. at 956-57; accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (1977).
96. White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
97. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
98. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
99. 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
100. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967,967, 1010 (2003).
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Perhaps "hardly true" is not consistent with some of the case law, but this
commentator may have been making a normative rather than descriptive statement.
Even so, the level of publicity that someone receives has influenced invasion
of privacy doctrines. Borrowing from principles developed in defamation law, the
"public versus private figure" distinction helps determine if the disclosure of
private facts is actionable. In the landmark case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
the Court held that a public figure may hold a speaker liable for damage to his
reputation caused by publication of a defamatory falsehood, but only if the
statement was made "with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 01 Generally, if a
newspaper publishes defamatory statements about a non-public individual, the First
Amendment protection from liability does not exist as the information is not a
legitimate matter of public concern. 0 2 This demonstrates the now well-established
doctrine that public figures have reduced expectations of privacy, as they must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the published information was
made with deliberate or reckless falsification. 10 3 This is a much higher standard
than that for an everyday, private plaintiff.
Speaking of private plaintiffs, it is worth noting that Eddie's genetic
information was obtained illegally through what might amount to a separately
actionable battery.1°4 The Supreme Court has stated that "[a]lthough stealing
documents or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information, neither
reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the
101. 376 U.S. at 279-80. Further, in Monitor Patriot Co., the Court stated that, "a candidate who
vaunts his spotless record and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry 'Foul!' when an opponent or an
industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate the contrary." 401 U.S. at 274.
102. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) ("On the one hand, a private individual
whose reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does concern an issue of public or general
interest has no recourse unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times .... On the
other hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error which a court deems unrelated to an issue of
public general interest may be held liable in damages .... ").
103. E.g., id. at 342 (holding that public figures "may recover for injury to reputation only on clear
and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard for the truth."); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 499 (1991)
("The First Amendment protects authors and journalists who write about public figures by requiring a
plaintiff to prove that the defamatory statements were made with . . . deliberate or reckless
falsification."); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990) ("[W]here a statement of
'opinion' on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false and defamatory facts regarding public
figures or officials, those individuals must show that such statements were made with knowledge of their
false implications or reckless disregard of their truth.").
104. A battery is an intentional tort where the private individual physically harms the plaintiff. E.g.,
Caudle v. Betts, 512 So.2d 389, 391 (La. 1987). Even though the hypothetical involved a battery by
Steve's pricking Eddie's forearm, it is not difficult to imagine clever ways for outsiders to obtain genetic
information of an individual without committing a battery (filching used coffee cups, discarded toenails,
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impact on the flow of news.' '0 5 There is some protection, therefore, even for public
officials, from the public disclosure of private facts that were obtained illegally.'
0 6
However, the Supreme Court has also allowed illegally obtained information to be
disclosed if the "privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in
publishing matters of public importance."'107 Quoting the classic law review on
privacy by Justices Warren and Brandeis, the Supreme Court reiterated that "[t]he
right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or
general interest."' 0 8 The health of the President is of public interest. So long as the
applicable court buys this argument, it is unlikely that, under current precedent,
Eddie could succeed in an invasion of privacy claim against Steve. Eddie is even
less likely to prevail against the mainstream media who received the illegally
obtained information without having contributed to the illegal procurement. 109
4. The Fourth Amendment as a Constraint on Mandatory Disclosure
The Fourth Amendment states that people have a right to "be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,"
and that this right "shall not be violated," and no warrants will be issued absent
probable cause." 0 This only applies to searches or seizures conducted by the
government or an agent of the government, and does not apply in the hypothetical
above, unless Steve was acting in some way on behalf of the government.1 1 '
However, the Fourth Amendment would apply if a state or federal government
mandated that a presidential candidate disclose her health information through a
105. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972).
106. In The Florida Star v. B.J.F, the Court stated that it need not "accept appellant's invitation to
hold broadly that truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment. Our
cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the future may bring
scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving anticipatorily." 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989).
"Although public persons may have forgone the right to live their lives screened from public scrutiny in
some areas, it does not and should not follow that they also have abandoned their right to have a private
conversation without fear of it being intentionally intercepted and knowingly disclosed." Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 555 (2001) (Rehnquist, C. J. dissenting).
107. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534 (2001). In Bartnicki, petitioners alleged that the publication of their
private phone conversations by respondents was illegal under federal and state wire-tapping laws, Id. at
519. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' ruling, finding that the application of statutory
provisions violated petitioners' free speech rights because the statutes imposed sanctions on the
publication of truthful information that was a matter of public concern. Id. at 533-35.
108. Id. at 534 (quoting Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193,
214 (1890)).
109. "[lIt by no means follows that punishing disclosures of lawfully obtained information of public
interest by one not involved in the initial illegality is an acceptable means of those ends." Id. at 529.
Here, the Supreme Court was referring to the removal of incentives for parties to intercept private
conversations and minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally obtained. Id.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
I11. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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government-mandated blood test." 2 There is a threshold issue as to whether the
genetic testing of presidential candidates would constitute a search or a seizure, and
this will be discussed below.
The language of the Fourth Amendment includes a built-in test to allow only
those searches that are reasonable. The reasonableness of the search and seizure
will depend "upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and
the nature of the search or seizure itself."'"1 3 The Fourth Amendment governs not
only the seizure of tangible items, but also extends to the recording of oral
statements, overheard without any "technical trespass under.., local property
law." ' 14 Similarly, courts have reasoned that one's voice and handwriting are not
protected because the:
Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what a person knowingly
exposes to the public. . . . Like a man's facial characteristics, or
handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No
person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the
sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face
will be a mystery to the world.' 5
The thinking is that we hold our faces, voices, and handwriting out to the public,
and these identifying features require no expert search for interpretation.
The reliance on some form of trespass law aims to protect individuals from
the government illegally obtaining information, while allowing the government to
obtain identifying information that is in the public realm. 116 While trespass law may
be an appropriate legal boundary in the context of wiretaps and physical intrusion
into the individual's house, it does not operate quite so neatly when we're dealing
with genetic information. We carry potential genetic samples with us and present
112. Cf Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606, 616 (1989) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment applied to mandatory drug testing for railroad employees because the collection and
testing of urine intruded upon the employees' reasonable expectations of privacy as recognized by
society).
113. United States v. De Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985)).
114. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961)).
115. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (citation omitted). Along the same lines, in
California v. Greenwood, the Court held that because "respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the
express purpose of conveying it to a third party .... in an area particularly suited for public inspection
and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption . . . respondents could have had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded." 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (citation
omitted).
116. An action for trespass to property requires "possession of the property by the plaintiff when the
alleged trespass was committed, and an unauthorized entry or interference with the property by the
defendant." 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 5 (2002 & Supp. 2007). "Some damage may also be a necessary
element, although, because a legal right is involved, the law recognizes that actual harm occurs in every
trespass, except where the intrusion is so trifling that the law should not recognize it as trespass." Id.
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them publicly everywhere we go, but that does not make our genetic information
part of the public realm. We may occasionally drop it on public streets or discard it
unwittingly on park benches. While the specimens may not yield as reliable or
useful information as blood'l 7-hair, toe-nails, saliva, or skin cells all contain
genetic information that the government could argue is in the public domain and
therefore not subject to the Fourth Amendment's protection." 8
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a urinalysis or blood specimen
test qualifies as a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. 1 9 However, we should
consider framing the laboratory genetic test as the search instead of focusing on the
non-trespass search that results in a seizure of genetic material. This may not be the
current way of looking at DNA testing, but it makes intuitive sense. Toenails may
be publicly observable and obtained without trespass, but the actual sequencing or
decoding of the genetic data would involve a search: revealing information that is
not public and while detached from the person, still remains part of her property. In
the case of United States v. Amerson, the Second Circuit categorized the collection
of DNA samples from convicted felons as a search, as the government sanctioned a
"physical intrusion to obtain the tissue sample" and "chemical analysis to obtain
private physiological information about a person.' 2 0 The second prong of this
justification (chemical analysis) is critical for safeguarding privacy rights. 121 Some
state governments have relied only on the first prong to determine that discarded
genetic material is not private. In a recent case, Washington state police
surreptitiously obtained and tested genetic information from saliva on a sealed
117. If the hair does not contain the root follicle, the quality and availability of genetic testing is
severely limited. Leanza et al., supra note 26, at 481. The reliability of DNA testing using hair samples
depends on the quality as well as the number of samples used. Benoit Goossens et al., Plucked Hair
Samples as a Source of DNA: Reliability of Dinucleotide Microsatellite Genotyping, 7 MOLECULAR
ECOLOGY 1237, 1238-39 (1998). In some cases, up to ten hairs should be tested from the same
specimen. Id. at 1238-39.
118. A group of researchers in the Netherlands recently found that toenail material collected twenty
years ago could be used as a stable source of DNA for analyses of multiple genetic polymorphisms.
Simone G. van Breda et al., Letter to the Editor, Toenails: An Easily Accessible and Long-Term Stable
Source of DNA for Genetic Analyses in Large-Scale Epidemiological Studies, 53 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY
1168, 1169 (2007).
119. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989) (holding that mandatory
urinalysis for drug testing purposes is a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("[A] compulsory administration of a blood test ... plainly involves the
broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment."); Nicholas v. Goord,
430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he extraction and analysis of plaintiffs' blood for DNA-indexing
purposes constituted a search implicating the Fourth Amendment.").
120. 483 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cit. 2007).
121. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 656 n.5 ("In any event, even less intrusive measures of obtaining
physiological data, such as cheek swabs, can constitute a search, since the ensuing chemical analysis of
the sample may also effect an invasion of the [individual's] privacy interests." (internal citation
omitted)).
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envelope. 122 The Washington court did not consider this a search under the Fourth
Amendment, finding that the saliva was "discarded genetic material."'23 The
laboratory analysis of the genetic information is what could and should constitute
the "search" under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment typically requires that a search or seizure result from
a warrant issued upon individualized probable cause.' 24 However, in a limited
number of circumstances, outside the realm of criminal investigations, the Supreme
Court has approved warrantless, suspicionless searches if a "special need" is being
fulfilled that obtaining a warrant would thwart. 125 The Court did not find that such a
"special need" existed in Chandler v. Miller.'26 In this case, the majority ofjustices
held that a Georgia state law that conditioned candidacy for high public office on
successfully passing a drug test was unconstitutional. 127 Justice Ginsburg delivered
the opinion of the Court, which held that the mandatory urinalysis did not fit within
the closely guarded category of permissible suspicionless searches. 128 The lower
court disagreed:
122. Washington v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 37, 43 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).
123. Id. (noting that there is no recognized privacy interest in "voluntarily discarded saliva" when
police collect it for the legitimate government purpose of DNA identification analysis); see also Laura
A. Matejik, DNA Sampling: Privacy and Police Investigation in a Suspect Society, 61 ARK. L. REv. 53,
55 (2008) ("[C]overt involuntary DNA sampling involves targeting a specific individual to obtain items
that he or she discards, such as cigarette butts or coffee cups.").
124. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; accord Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20-21 (1968).
125. Int'l Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003, 1007-08 (6th Cir. 2004). Examples of when these
"special needs" cases were found to be reasonable include: (1) the drug testing of customs officials, if
their job dealt with combating drug-trafficking or the handling of firearms, since their job duties would
be compromised if they were themselves using the illegal drugs or prone to bribery, Nat'l Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 656, 666, 679 (1989); (2) the
testing of public high school athletes for drugs, since the school's involvement in recreational sports
provides them with a burden to make sure they do not encourage the use of steroids and other drugs,
Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 650, 656-57, 663-65; (3) the drug testing of railroad workers who were
working on a train during a serious accident, Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
603, 606, 624 (1989); and (4) the searching of New York subway passengers to prevent a bombing of
the subways by terrorists. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has
held that where the primary purpose of the warrantless search is in fact law enforcement, then the
"special needs" exception cannot stand. For instance, a South Carolina medical school began testing
urine samples of pregnant women who they suspected of drug use, in order to persuade these women to
undergo substance abuse treatment. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70-73 (2001). This was found
to be primarily for law enforcement purposes, and thus a warrant was required. Id. at 82-86.
126. 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
127. Id. It is possible that a candidate may challenge mandatory testing under the Fourteenth
Amendment as well, arguing that the test is a violation of his fundamental substantive due process rights
to keep his medical information private. See id. at 312-313. There has been no fundamental right
recognized as such, although there very well could be in the future. Still, this is not the end of the
inquiry, as the government may still regulate this right if it has a compelling state interest.
128. Id. at 307.
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The people of Georgia place in the trust of their elected officials... their
liberty, their safety, their economic well being, [and] ultimate
responsibility for law enforcement .... The nature of high public office
in itself demands the highest levels of honesty, clear sightedness, and
clear thinking. . . . [And] candidates for high office must expect the
voters to demand some disclosures about their physical, emotional, and
mental fitness for the position. 1
29
In reversing this Eleventh Circuit opinion, the Court decided that the
competing private and public interests advanced by the parties weighed in favor of
the candidates' privacy, prohibiting the warrantless searches. 1
30
The Court reasoned that there was no evidence of a drug problem among
candidates in Georgia, and since candidates are subject to intense media scrutiny,
the media would alert the public to any concerns of drug abuse, should they
develop.' 3 ' The Court also reasoned that as their private physicians could perform
the tests, candidates could cheat the system by abstaining from drugs for a certain
window of time. 132 In another breath the majority praised the urine collection
mechanism for this same reason, saying that it was less intrusive because it could
be scheduled any time within a thirty-day window, and at the candidate's
physician's offices. 133 The Chandler opinion did not adequately represent
Georgia's articulated interest in ensuring a sober, clear-headed governor. Instead,
the Court constructed a symbolic state interest that it precipitously shot down, of
Georgia caring only about its image. 
13 4
Justice Rehnquist authored a dissent, which pointed out another irony in the
majority's opinion: they used the very public nature of the figure to argue in favor
of more privacy, something that runs afoul of the recognized privacy rights doctrine
discussed above.1' 35 While Justice Rehnquist concurred that there must be a
balancing of individual privacy interests against the utility of the search, he stated
that as long as there was a "proper governmental purpose" other than law
129. Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1546-47 (1lth Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
Should the candidate test positive, he or she could forfeit the opportunity to run for office, and in that
event, nothing would be divulged to law enforcement officials. Id. at 1547.
130. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 305, 318.
131. Id. at 321-22.
132. Id. at 319-20.
133. Id. at 310, 318.
134. Id. at 321 ("What is left, after close review of Georgia's scheme, is the image the State seeks to
project. By requiring candidates for public office to submit to drug testing, Georgia displays its
commitment to the struggle against drug abuse.").
135. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Under normal Fourth Amendment analysis, the
individual's expectation of privacy is an important factor in the equation. But here, the Court perversely
relies on the fact that a candidate for office gives up so much privacy ... as a reason for sustaining a
Fourth Amendment claim.").
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enforcement, there was also a "special need."'136 The majority required that the
special need be "closely guarded" and "substantial," but Rehnquist countered that
the articulated need must only be reasonable.'37 The Chief Justice rightly
questioned the logic inherent in the majority's opinion and found it impractical to
require Georgia to first elect a drug addict before a "special need" exists. 138 In
Skinner v. Skinner Railway Labor Executives Ass 'n, there was evidence that
railroad workers were drinking on the job; 139 however, such specific evidence is not
required under the "special needs" doctrine. In National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, the Court permitted random drug testing of customs agents absent
"any perceived drug problem among Customs employees," given that "drug abuse
is one of the most serious problems confronting our society today.'
140
a. Permissible Disclosures under the Fourth Amendment
The Chandler v. Miller case is unusual. It does not necessarily flow from the
precedent for other warrantless, suspicionless searches. The Fourth Amendment
cases leading up to and following Chandler held that the balancing of the privacy
and public interest rights allowed mandatory drug testing of many classes of people
who are much less public than a state Governor. For example, public school student
athletes,' 4' railroad workers, 142 and customs officials 143 were all found to have
diminished expectations of privacy that permitted warrantless drug testing. This
was done to reduce drug use by student athletes,' 44 minimize train accidents due to
worker insobriety, 145 and prevent customs officials involved in drug interdiction
from being bribed by drug-cartels, 146 respectively. In a later case that had nothing
to do with drug testing, the Second Circuit held that even if there were no
136. Id.
137. Id. at 318, 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 326 (arguing that there is a legitimate state interest in preventing the use of illegal
drugs which is not undermined by the notice Georgia's law gives to candidates as to when drug testing
will occur).
139. 489 U.S. 602, 607 (1989).
140. 489 U.S. 656, 673-74, 677 (1989).
141. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648, 664-65 (1995).
142. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
143. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66. The distinction between Von Raab and Skinner explains in part
why Skinner was a 7-2 decision while Von Raab was only a 5-4 decision. Justices Scalia and Stevens
abandoned the Skinner majority to author a dissent in Von Raab, arguing that only demonstrated public
necessity could justify such an intrusion without a warrant and probable cause, and that "symbolic
opposition to drug use" was an insufficient measure of public necessity. Id. at 681. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Int'l Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003, 1009 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that a context-
specific inquiry examining the state's interest is needed to accept a state's invocation of special needs).
144. Acton, 515 U.S. at 650.
145. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607-08.
146. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661.
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diminished privacy interests, individuals could still be searched by the government,
without a warrant, prior to entering the New York subway. 1
47
After reviewing the opinions in many of these "special needs" cases, one
logical way to distinguish Chandler from the other relevant Fourth Amendment
cases is to say that a double standard exists that favor people in power. 148 The
privacy arguments advanced do not comport with previous standards for public
figures, as the governor should be thought to have a weaker privacy interest than
that of a public school athlete. Even if the privacy status of the individual is not the
critical factor, the potential for broad public impact is much greater with the highest
executive of a state than with a private individual playing public sports. 149 Further,
in Chandler the Court reasoned that "respondents have offered no reason why
ordinary law enforcement methods would not suffice to apprehend such addicted
individuals . '.." 150 The same could be said for heavily regulated customs officials
or closely watched student athletes. Much like preventing a drunk railroad worker
from operating trains is in the public interest, is it not possible that the negative
consequences flowing from a drunk or drugged Governor could also be sharply
against the public interest?
147. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006). The Court of Appeals held that (1) "the
special needs doctrine may apply where.., the subject of a search possesses a full privacy expectation,"
(2) "preventing a terrorist attack on the subway is a 'special' need," and (3) the program is "a reasonably
effective deterrent" and thus constitutional. Id. at 263, 275. Note that the Court has not upheld all
warrantless searches of private citizens under the "special needs" doctrine. The outer bounds were
maintained by Ferguson v. City of Charleston, where the Court held that (1) urine tests of pregnant
women who had tested positive for cocaine use were "searches" within meaning of Fourth Amendment,
532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001), and (2) tests, and reporting of positive test results to police, were unreasonable
searches absent patients' consent, given that the primary purpose of the test appeared to be for law
enforcement purposes. Id. at 81, 84-85.
148. There are a number of state cases that may permit warrantless, suspicionless drug testing of
individuals who apply for public positions. State constitutions may be more protective of the implicated
privacy rights, in which case the court undergoes state constitutional review. A Washington state court
found that because the government is obligated to protect the safety of its citizens, "suspicionless
preemployment drug testing [of city employees] is .. .justified ... where the duties of a particular
position genuinely implicate public safety, such that there is potential jeopardy to members of the public
if such duties are performed by a person who abuses drugs." Robinson v. Seattle, 10 P.3d 452, 467
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000); see also Loder v. Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Cal. 1997) ("[A]cross-the-
board drug testing.., is invalid as applied to current employees who have been conditionally approved
for promotion, but is valid as applied to job applicants."); Willner v. Thornburgh, 289 U.S. App. D.C.
93, 102 (1991) ("[U]rine tests of applicants for positions as attorneys at the Justice Department do not
constitute 'unreasonable searches' under the Fourth Amendment.").
149. After all, the President is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; accord Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1987) ("His
authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national security and to determine
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch that will
give that person access to such information flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power
in the President and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.").
150. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 320 (1997).
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State cases that upheld drug testing of public officials did so for many reasons
that would apply equally, if not more, to a presidential candidate. For example, a
Washington state case stated that suspicionless preemployment drug testing of job
applicants is justified "where the duties of a particular position genuinely implicate
public safety, such that there is potential jeopardy to members of the public.... ,,5
It is not altogether obvious why this would not be extended to high-level political
figures. After all, while politicians may not be the proximate cause of train
collisions, they can certainly jeopardize many aspects of our daily lives. While
under the influence, a politician could frustrate diplomacy and lose critical
investments in the state, irresponsibly limit funding of critical social welfare
programs, neglect the public safety by failing to address critical threats, or have her
decision-making powers hijacked by opportunists. Having one's urine studied
seems like a very limited intrusion into privacy when this is what is at stake.
It is not uncommon for courts to concentrate on the method of procurement
rather than the intrusiveness of the type of information being collected. The Court
in Skinner focused more on the degree of intrusiveness in the test procedure itself,
and less on the intrusion flowing from the use of the data collected. 152 A genetic
test would be less intrusive than urinalysis in this regard, as the blood draw or
buccal swab could be done without infringing on the privacy expectation
individuals have when they use the restroom. But if we focus on the way the test
could be used, genetic tests are much more intrusive into the privacy rights of the
individual, for all of the reasons discussed above. A genetic test offers more
nuanced, and potentially more reaching information. The specimen could be stored
and later mined for newly discovered sequences or behavioral genetics data. 53 One
151. Robinson, 10 P.3d at 467, 469. The Washington court further noted that "[p]reemployment drug
testing of applicants who will carry firearms or whose duties may otherwise jeopardize public safety is
justified." Id. at 469. The court's classification likely includes police officers and similar public
employees. See id.; Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(upholding drug analysis testing of the police force for public safety purposes); Jones v. Jenkins, 878
F.2d 1476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (upholding a drug testing program for employees involved
in the transportation of handicapped children); Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E. 2d 1230, 1233-34 (Mass.
1989) (discussing the split among courts regarding the constitutionality of urinalyses). One wonders
whether it is possible for an individual municipal police officer to affect public safety more than the
President of the United States.
152. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989) ("We recognize,
however, that the procedures for collecting the necessary samples, which require employees to perform
an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy, raise concerns not implicated by blood or
breath tests.").
153. In Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969), the Court commented upon the limited
intrusion that was caused by fingerprinting in comparison to other types of searches and detentions. The
Court noted that fingerprinting did not involve probing into an individual's life or harassing that person
since law enforcement needs only one set of fingerprints. Id. Genetic specimens could likewise be
obtained with limited intrusion. However, unlike fingerprints, the information that could be gathered
from genetic information is much more vast. See infra Part II.C-D. Information pertinent to the risk of
developing devastating diseases such as Alzheimer's or Huntington's could be ascertained. Id. In
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distinction that renders the genetic test less powerful and intrusive is the fact that
unlike a positive result on a drug urinalysis, genetic tests currently have mostly
probabilistic power. They can tell you whether someone does or does not possess a
specific mutation, but they typically cannot tell you whether that will result in
disease.' 54 Commercially developed tests, such as BRCA1, cannot predict with
certainty whether a woman will develop breast cancer, as BRCA1 alone is not the
only cause.155 There are only a handful of diseases that can be nearly perfectly
predicted by the presence of a genetic anomaly. 
156
If genetic information could better predict many diseases, it might be
considered just another aspect of a candidate's general health. Justice Rehnquist
pointed to an important distinction the Chandler majority made that could inform
this sort of thinking: "Lest readers expect the holding of this case to be extended to
any other case, the Court notes that the drug test here is not part of a medical
examination designed to provide certification of a candidate's general health.0
57
Rehnquist posits that a case involving a general medical exam could not be decided
differently unless the state has a "far greater interest in the candidate's 'general
health' than it does with respect to his propensity to use illegal drugs. But this is...
[a] policy judgment that surely must be left to the legislatures...., 58
It is possible that Rehnquist is using this rhetorical tool of challenging the
extension of Chandler to suggest that we might want to treat the general health of
executives differently. Courts or legislatures could argue that the state has a much
stronger interest in the candidate's general health than it does in the candidate's
drug use. The proponents of the drug testing in Chandler argued that public
officials needed to make decisions rationally and without compromised mental
faculties.' 59 This presupposes an interest in the public figure's baseline mental
health. Unlike occasional drug-use that a urinalysis would pick up, the genetic test
might one day be able to quantify reliable risk probabilities for developing long-
term disorders such as Huntington's or Alzheimer's disease. While the genetic test
addition, one day genetic tests could be used to assess the increased risk of developing complex
behavioral traits such as alcoholism, depression, or anxiety disorders. Id. Therefore, focus on the
intrusion in procuring the specimen is less important than the nature of the private information that
could be gatheredfrom that specimen.
154. See Margaret P. Battin, Genetic Information and Knowing When You Will Die, in GENETIC
INFORMATION 219, 221 (Alison K. Thompson & Ruth F. Chadwick eds., 1999) ("Women with
mutations in the BRCAI gene associated with breast cancer have a 50/50 chance of developing the
disease by age 50 ... though some women never contract the disease at all.").
155. See id. at 123-24 (stating that environmental factors also trigger disease).
156. See Evans et al., supra note 87.
157. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 327 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 327-28.
159. Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) ("The
nature of high public office in itself demands the highest levels of honesty, clear-sightedness, and clear-
thinking.").
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in no way predicts the onset of most diseases, it might one day foreshadow the
likelihood of a president remaining healthy based upon the presence of
genotypes160 that may develop into the phenotypes of dementia or Alzheimer's
disease. A president's general health affects his day-to-day job and substantial
evidence indicates that mental or physical deficits have played a major role in the
governance of previous presidents.' 16 While there may be a presumption that
someone does not use drugs unless evidence suggests the contrary, there is no
underlying legal presumption that someone is in good health unless evidence is
presented to the contrary.
Genetic information carries its own stigma, but it is not clear that this type of
health information would be more stigmatizing than the revelation that a politician
used cocaine. Just how stigmatizing the genetic information would be depends on
factors such as how the related phenotype is treated, whether it is socially
discriminated against, how prevalent it is, and where the individual is in her own
personal and social development. It might be more stigmatizing for an unmarried
man who is a relative rookie on the political scene to have genetic mutations
disclosed, as he has not had a chance to prove his prowess absent the public's
knowledge of his genetic lottery. It also might affect his ability to fundraise, marry,
or otherwise interact with friends and family.
Communitarian scholar Amital Etzioni has written a great deal on privacy
rights and the flexibility inherent in the Fourth Amendment. He has argued "that
which is considered reasonable changes as the social climate changes."' 62 Perhaps
this explains the loosening of the once rigid ban on warrantless searches. In the
period following September 11, 2001 and the Patriot Act, 16 3 the government has
advanced theories of permissible warrantless wiretaps, and courts may now be
160. A phenotype describes any quality of an organism that can be observed by direct examination,
whereas the genotype refers to all the genes an organism carries. W. Johannsen, The Genotype
Conception of Heredity, 45 AM. NATURALIST 129, 132-34 (1911).
161. This will be explored further in the next section, but many authors have documented this
proposition. See discussion infra Part III.B. "[T]he international list of those who have carried great
responsibility while ill is a long one and there are fleeting glimpses of decisions which good health
might have turned another way." Dean Rusk, The President, 38 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 353, 366 (1960); see
also Jerrold M. Post & Robert S. Robins, The Captive King and His Captive Court: The Psychopolitical
Dynamics of the Disabled Leader and His Inner Circle, II POL. PSYCHOL. 331, 332 (1990) ("Woodrow
Wilson's stroke and the immobilization of his presidency, the Shah's lymphatic cancer and the victory of
the Islamic Revolution, and Mao's arteriosclerosis and the Cultural Revolution are only a very few
examples of the effect of a leader's medical impairment on major political events."). Additionally,
President Johnson's gall bladder surgery "had a negative impact on his congressional leadership" and his
absence from the center state encouraged Congress to vote against a rent subsidy program that Johnson
supported, as well as filibustering against repeal of a section of the Taft-Hartley Act that Johnson
wanted repealed. Robert E. Gilbert, The Political Effects of Presidential Illness: The Case of Lyndon B.
Johnson, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 761, 772 (1995).
162. Etzioni, supra note 28, at 215.
163. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 201-25, 115 Stat. 272, 278-96 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 28, 50 U.S.C.).
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more likely to agree with such measures as being reasonable based on national
security interest. Relevant to our inquiry, Etzioni later said that in this context,
"DNA searches once considered a matter of science fiction and entirely
unreasonable are now becoming reasonable[,] [a]s their service to the common
good becomes better known, their intrusiveness declines. ,164
The Chandler precedent provides a roadmap for allowing genetic testing of
presidential candidates, however murky the road to success. In keeping with the
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness, any law requiring genetic testing of
presidential candidates would need to ensure that the search is not overly broad in
scope, and not more intrusive than necessary to achieve its stated purpose. The
special need must be articulated carefully so that the motivation for the search is
clearly couched in terms of the nation's safety and public interest. Any genetic
testing requirement would need to be automatically applied in specified situations
to eliminate the chance of abuse of discretion by administering personnel. 165 This
may provide fodder for testing all candidates, even if no evidence of compromised
health exists for any one person.
5. Non-Discrimination Statutes as a Constraint on Disclosure
Various forms of statutory protection exist to prohibit genetic discrimination
by employers and insurers. Most states have implemented some type of protection
from genetic discrimination, but exactly what is protected varies from state to
state. 166 Forty-four states and the District of Columbia do not allow insurance
eligibility to be determined based on either genetic traits or some grouping of
genetic traits. 167 Twenty-seven states' privacy laws restrict certain parties such as
insurers and employers from using the individual's genetic information without
their consent.' 68 Eighteen states have established civil, criminal, or some
combination of each type of penalty for violating genetic privacy laws. 1
69
164. Etzioni, supra note 28, at 216.
165. Cf South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining
that law enforcement officers do not make discretionary determinations during automobile inventory
searches because such searches are conducted in accordance with established police department rules
and are not conducted for criminal investigation purposes).
166. E.g., Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Genetics and Health Insurance: State Anti-
Discrimination Laws [hereinafter Genetics and Health Insurance],
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008); Nat'l
Conference of State Legislatures, State Genetics Employment Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programslhealth/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (last visited date); Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures, State Genetic Privacy Laws [hereinafter State Genetic Privacy Laws],
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
167. Genetics and Health Insurance, supra note 166.
168. State Genetic Privacy Laws, supra note 166.
169. Id.
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Federal law has been protective as well. HIPAA clarified that protected health
information included genetic information, and therefore HIPAA prohibits
unauthorized disclosure or discrimination of such information by group health
insurance plans and employers.170 President Clinton signed Executive Order 13145
on February 8, 2000, which expanded this protection to federal civil employees.171
The order prohibited federal employers from discriminating in employment hiring,
promotion, firing, or benefits based on the employee's protected genetic
information or a request for receipt of genetic information. 172 Interestingly enough,
the definition of federal civil employees carved out elected public officials.
1 73
While HIPAA provides some protection to group health care plan recipients, and
the executive order extends that to federal civil employees, gaps still remain in
protection. HIPAA does not, for example, preclude employers from denying
coverage altogether. Most importantly, HIPAA "only applies to employer-based
and commercially issued group health insurance plans and not to private
individuals seeking health insurance on the market ....
To close some of these loopholes, the House introduced H.R. Bill 493, the
Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA), which passed the House in
April of 2007.' 7' After the Senate made a few revisions to the bill to prevent
frivolous employee lawsuits, the Senate passed a slightly different version in April
of 2008.176 President Bush has indicated that he will sign this bill into law. 77
170. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(F) (2000) ("[A] group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering
group health insurance coverage .. .may not establish rules for eligibility (including continued
eligibility) of any individual to enroll under the terms of the plan based on... [g]enetic information.");
Deborah Kohn, Who is Covered by HIPAA, AIIM, Aug. 19, 2004, http://www.aiim.org/article-
docrep.asp?ID=28503.
171. Exec. Order No. 13145, 3 C.F.R. 235 (2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/thelaw/13145.html.
172. Id. at 236.
173. Id. ("The term 'employee' shall include an employee, applicant for employment, or former
employee covered by section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended."). Under Section 717 of
the Civil Rights Act, the "term 'employee' shall not include any person elected to public office in any
State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(O)
(2000).
174. Karen Eltis, Genetic Determinism and Discrimination: A Call to Re-Orient Prevailing Human
Rights Discourse to Better Comport with the Public Implications of Individual Genetic Testing, 35 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 282,282 (2007).
175. H.R. 493, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by House, Apr. 25, 2007).
176. The Senate passed GINA on April 24, 2008, approving unanimously an amended version of
H.R. 493. The passage of the Bill "end[ed] a 13-year odyssey for the bill, first proposed in 1995 by
Louise Slaughter, a House Democrat from western New York, who ha[d] been promoting it ever since."
Andrew Pollack, Genetic-Discrimination Ban Moves Ahead in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at
Cl. While the House still needs to approve the changes made by the Senate, it is expected that the bill
will pass and be signed by the President into law. Will Dunham, Experts See Boost to Genetic Testing
From U.S. Bill, REUTERS NEWS, Apr. 27, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUSN2639236620080427.
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Specifically, the bill proposes prohibiting disclosure of an employee's genetic
information unless it is made to a labor organization at the written request of the
employee, for public health research conducted pursuant to federal law, or in
response to a court order.1 78 Genetic information is defined as information about
"(i) such individual's genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such
individual, and (iii)... the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members
of such individual."' 17 9 Genetic information also includes genetic services such as
genetic testing, counseling or education, but does not include information about the
age or sex of an individual. 180 The term "genetic test" is defined to mean an
"analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that
detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes," but excludes analysis of
proteins or metabolites that do not detect genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal
changes. 181 Under the bill, as currently drafted, discrimination based upon genetic
information is likewise an "unlawful employment practice.' '182 Specifically, it is
actionable to fail or refuse to hire, to discharge an employee, or otherwise
discriminate with respect to pay, terms, or privileges of employment based upon
the employee's genetic information.' 83 GINA also provides that separate treatment
or classification of employees based upon their genetic information would be
illegal if it deprived an employee of opportunities or adversely affected an
employee's status.184
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), could theoretically
provide some basis for protection against genetic discrimination. t 85 Title I of the
ADA prohibits private employers, state and local governments, employment
agencies, and labor unions with more than fifteen employees from discriminating
against qualified individuals with disabilities in job application procedures, hiring,
firing, promotion, compensation, or training.186 It is not immediately clear whether
this applies to genetic disorders or abnormalities unless the phenotype would
177. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 493 - GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2007
(2007), available at
http://www.genome.gov/Pages/PolicyEthics/GeneticDiscrimination/SAPonHR493.pdf.
178. H.R. 493 § 206(b)(1)-(3).
179. Id. § 201(4)(A).
180. Id. §§ 201(4)(B)-(C), (6).
181. Id. § 201(7).
182. Id. § 202(a).
183. Id. §§ 202(a), 207.
184. Id. § 202(a)(2).
185. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 12101-12203 (2000)).
186. § 102, 104 Stat. at331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112).
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amount to a "disability" under current ADA precedent.'87 On May 8, 2002, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) instituted a lawsuit against
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF). 188 The EEOC alleged
that BNSF engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of the ADA by
requesting that certain employees who claimed that they had developed work-
related carpal tunnel syndrome submit to a diagnostic blood test for a genetic
marker. 8 9 The EEOC further alleged that BNSF retaliated against those employees
who refused to submit to genetic testing. 190 In return for the claimants' release of
charges, BNSF agreed to pay the claimants $1,750,000.'9' They also agreed never
to request that their current or past employees submit to genetic tests.' 92
Even if not couched in terms of genetic non-discrimination, the ADA has
been invoked to prevent other types of inappropriate workplace testing for genetic
diseases, such as sickle cell anemia. In 1998, a California laboratory was charged
with violating the ADA by requiring, encouraging, or assisting in testing for sickle
cell anemia in its employees "that was neither job-related nor consistent with
business necessity."' 93 The Ninth Circuit held that the employees had failed to state
a claim under the ADA, as the ADA imposes no restriction on the scope of
employee entrance exams. 194 However, the employees had made out a successful
claim based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as the right to
privacy guaranteed in United States and California Constitutions. The ability of
employers to test employees before making hiring decisions is precisely the type of
gap that the proponents of GINA hoped prohibit. The ADA analysis will no longer
add much as the employees would now be protected from employment genetic
discrimination under many state statutes, HIPAA, and GINA.
187. Mark S. Dichter & Sarah E. Sutor, The New Genetic Age: Do Our Genes Make Us Disabled
Individuals Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 42 VILL. L. REV. 613, 626-28 (1997); Brian R.
Gin, Note, Genetic Discrimination: Huntington 's Disease and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1406, 1417-18 (1997); Deborah Gridley, Note, Genetic Testing Under the ADA: A
Case for Protection from Employment Discrimination, 89 GEO. L.J. 973, 991-92 (2001); Susan M. Wolf
& Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability Insurance: Ethics, Law and Policy, 35
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 6, 7 (2007).
188. Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 02-C-0456,
2002 WL 32155386, at *1 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2002).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *2.
192. Id.
193. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir. 1998).
194. Id. at 1273.
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a. Permissible Disclosures Under the Anti-Discrimination Statutes
There are several statutory definitions of the term "employee" incorporated
into GINA and the other anti-discrimination statutes discussed herein. 95 Of note,
none of the definitions include elected public officials, and the oft-recycled
definition of employee in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically carved out those
elected for public office. 196 Presumably, this is because the "employer" in this
situation is the public and the act of voting is intentionally and inherently
discriminatory. For First Amendment reasons, the motivations for "hiring" one
candidate over another cannot be subject to review under either the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 or GINA. 197 This means that a candidate for public office could not
make a claim under any of the non-discrimination statutes as he or she is not
considered a covered employee.
Therefore, if GINA does go into effect, the only population that may have
compromised benefits or who may be denied employment based on their genetic
information is the U.S. military. 98 The practice of genetic discrimination against
195. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, H.R. 493, 110th Cong. § 201(2) (2007) (including
the definition of: (1) an "employee" as set forth by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)
(2000); (2) a "State employee" as set forth by the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16c(a) (2000); (3) a "covered employee" as set forth in Congressional Accountability Act of
1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000); and (4) an "employee or applicant to which section 717(a) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)) applies"). The term employee does not include elected
public officials. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ("The term 'employee' means an individual employed by an
employer, except that the term 'employee' shall not include any person elected to public office in any
State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such
officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate
adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.") However, the
public official exemption "shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State
government, governmental agency or political subdivision." Id. Further, an "employee" only includes an
"individual who is a citizen of the United States." Id.
196. H.R. 493, § 201(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (excluding elected public officials from the definition
of "employee"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c(a) (prohibiting discrimination against employees or applicants
for employment in the military, United States Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory Commissions,
judicial branch of the federal government, the Government Printing Office, the Government
Accountability Office, and the Library of Congress); 2 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (defining the term "covered
employee" as any employee of the following: (a) the House of Representatives, (b) the Senate, (c) the
Capital Guide Service, (d) the Capital Police, (e) the Congressional Budget Office, (f) the Office of the
Architect of the Capitol, (g) the Office of the Attending Physician, (h) the Office of Compliance; or (i)
the Office of Technology Assessment).
197. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989) ("[Olnee the plaintiff had shown
that his constitutionally protected speech as a 'substantial' or 'motivating factor' in the adverse
treatment of him by his employer, the employer was obligated to prove 'by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to [the plaintiff] even in the absence of the
protected conduct."') (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86
(1977)).
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c(a). The staff of elected public officials was previously not included
under the definition of "covered employees," but now is incorporated into GINA under 2 U.S.C. §
1301(3).
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members of the military is particularly egregious. One publicized example relays
the story of a pregnant military pilot who developed a blood clot after being
assigned to desk duty. The military then refused her retirement benefits when they
tested her for a rare genetic blood-clot disorder that was probably not the cause of
her particular clot.' 
99
B. Analogies to Financial Disclosures as Required by State and Federal Election
Commissions
Congress has the constitutional power to regulate federal elections. 20 0 The
Federal Election Commission (FEC) is an independent regulatory agency
established in 1975 to administer and enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA).2 1 FECA limits the sources and amounts of contributions used to finance
federal elections. 20 2 It also requires public disclosure of campaign finance
information and provides for the public funding of presidential elections along with
the Primary Matching Payment Act and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act.20 3 FECA requires candidates and their committees to file monthly or quarterly
reports disclosing the money they raise and spend.20 4 These campaign finance
reports are available on the FEC website and from the FEC's public records
office.205
Opponents to FECA have challenged the Act, alleging, inter alia, that it
violates the First Amendment. Specifically, opponents of the limits on campaign
contributions felt that such restrictions violated the donor's freedom of speech.20 6
Although First Amendment protections for political speech are exacting, the
Supreme Court found that the governmental interest in preventing actual or
apparent corruption of federal candidates and officeholders was sufficiently
199. See Karen Kaplan, U.S. Military Practices Genetic Discrimination in Denying Benefits, L.A.
TIMES, Aug.18, 2007, at Al; Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr., Genetics Perspective on Policy Seminar-
Genes in Uniform: Don't Test, Don't Tell,
http://www.dnapolicy.org/news.past.php?action=detail&past-eventid=25 (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
201. Fed. Election Comm'n, About the FEC, www.fec.gov/about.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
202. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-441j (2000 & Supp. 2007).
203. See id. § 434; Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9003 (2000);
Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9031 (2000). For more information
on campaign finance law and the role played by the FEC in regulating federal elections, see FED.
ELECTION COMM'N, THE FEC AND THE FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW (2007), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fec_fecabrochure.pdf.
204. 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(3).
205. Fed. Election Comm'n, Campaign Finance Reports and Data,
http://www.fec.gov/disclosure.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
206. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6, 11 (1976) (per curiam) (challenging provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act and the Internal Revenue Code that limit campaign contributions on the
grounds that limiting money for political purposes also restricts communication).
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important to justify campaign contribution limits. 20 7 The Court has also found that
it is constitutional to enact laws preventing circumvention of such limits. 208 The
Court has repeatedly stressed the value of public discussion and debate on the
qualifications of candidates, stating that it is an integral part of the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution. 20 9 The First Amendment
affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order "to assure [the]
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people. 2 °10 Although First Amendment protections are not
confined to "the exposition of ideas," 211 "there is practically universal agreement
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs .... [which] of course include[s] discussions of candidates...
,,2 12 Because the First Amendment protections of political speech are so strong, it
is that much more relevant that the mandatory financial disclosures were upheld.
The mandatory disclosure of financial data has also been challenged on
Fourteenth Amendment privacy grounds.2 13 In addition to the federal regulations
requiring disclosure of certain financial facts, many states have passed laws or
added provisions to their constitutions that require candidates for public office to
disclose their financial interests and associations, and sometimes those of family
members as well.214 However, if the required financial disclosures are considered
too broad, courts may find that they violate the privacy rights protected under the
federal constitution. In Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, a California court invalided a
statute, which directed every public officer and candidate for public office to file a
statement disclosing the nature and extent of investments in excess of $10,000 that
were held by the candidate, his spouse, or his minor child, except for real property
which was used primarily for personal or recreational purposes.215 The court found
that the statute was an overbroad invasion of the right to privacy and reasoned that
there must be a balancing of interests between one's right to privacy while seeking
or holding public office and the government's need to expose or minimize possible
conflicts of interest of public officials. 21 6 The court pointed out that the statutory
requirements applied indiscriminately to persons holding office regardless of the
207. Id. at 26, 29.
208. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003).
209. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
210. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
211. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
212. Mills, 384 U.S. at 218.
213. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 94 n.9 (1982); Plante v.
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1128-29 (5th Cir. 1978); Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 230-
322 (Cal. 1970).
214. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-45-110, 24-6-202 (West 2001); GA. CODE. ANN. § 21-5-50 (2003
& Supp. 2007); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 18 (West 2007).
215. 466 P.2d at 227.
216. Id. at 232,227.
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nature of their function and questioned why no effort had been made to relate the
disclosure requirements to financial dealings or assets that might be expected to
give rise to a conflict of interest.
2 17
This case has often been questioned or distinguished by later state courts; the
majority of mandatory financial disclosure laws have been upheld despite
challenges that they violated a candidate's constitutional privacy rights.218 In Snider
v. Thornburgh, the court held that the law requiring public officials to publicly
disclose financial information, and to some extent the financial affairs of their
families, did not violate the officials' individual rights of privacy. 219 While
recognizing that the privacy interest possessed by an individual extended to his
financial reports, the court held that public officials must abdicate some measure of
their privacy interests in their financial histories which might, under different
circumstances, be successfully invoked by private persons.220 In County of Nevada
v. MacMillen, the court found a 1973 California statute constitutional that applied
to officers, county supervisors, city council members, planning commissioners and
chief administrative officers, and required an annual disclosure of business
investments in excess of $1,000, real estate investments in excess of $1,000, and
sources of loans and gifts exceeding $250.221 The California Supreme Court held
that these disclosure provisions were sufficiently narrow to avoid any potential
constitutional infirmities.222
Lastly, a state constitutional provision requiring public officials and
candidates to disclose personal financial information was held not to violate the
217. Id. at 232.
218. In Evans v. Carey 385 N.Y.S.2d 965, 965-66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), state officers and
employees were required to list income sources for the period during which they held office, specifying
amounts in excess of $1,000, and to disclose all assets and liabilities. However, in upholding the
disclosure requirement, the court found that recent federal precedents involving privacy claims had
tended to look narrowly at the specific complaint and the immediate impact of the governmental
intrusion rather than making categorical assertions about privacy rights. Id. at 968, 971. The court in
Kenny v. Byrne, 365 A.2d 211, 213-14, 218-19 (N.J. 1976), held that an executive order requiring
executive officers of state government to disclose financial interests held by themselves and their
spouses, in statements subject to public inspection, was not an unconstitutionally overbroad invasion of
the right to privacy. In Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 356 A.2d 35, 38-39, 41, 46 (N.J. 1976), the court rejected
claims that a township ordinance which imposed comprehensive requirements on local officials for the
disclosure of their economic interests constituted an overbroad invasion of the officials' right to privacy.
Privacy rights are not absolute, and must be balanced against the right of the public to acquire
knowledge relevant to the actual or potential performance of its officials and the legitimate public
interest in preserving the integrity of the democratic process. Id. at 41-42.
219. 436 A.2d 593,598-99 (Pa. 1981).
220. Id. at 599.
221. 522 P.2d 1345, 1348, 1350 (Cal. 1974).
222. Id. at 1350-5 1 ("The statute.., requires that a person seeking public office make available to
those who vote ... information regarding the property interests which he holds and which, if elected, he
might be expected to protect.").
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right to privacy under the federal Constitution in Plante v. Gonzalez.223 The court
did find that financial privacy was part of the right to confidentiality, an element of
224the right to privacy. However, it held that the interests served by the disclosure in
deterring corruption, developing an informed electorate, and restoring public
confidence in state officials were strong enough to outweigh the privacy interests of
officials and candidates whose legitimate expectations of privacy were less than
those of private citizens. 225 The court rejected a claim that the state's interests
would be similarly served by limiting disclosure to an ethics commission, stating
that the needs of an informed electorate justified public disclosure of the financial
226data. Interestingly, the court relied in part on the fact that such disclosure
requirements did not come at all within the branch of the constitutional right to
privacy concerned with autonomy, which had been invoked and developed in cases
involving govemment interference with intimate decisions.
227
Many state cases permit mandatory disclosure of a candidate's financial
information. The question then becomes, "how is financial information any
different from information regarding a candidate's health, and specifically her
genetic information?" Financial privacy is protected in our society, as evidenced by
legislation like the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999228 and the Right to
Financial Privacy Act.229 Many people prefer not to speak about their finances
publicly, and would consider it quite rude to ask a stranger outright how much
money she had in her bank account or how much she had saved for her retirement.
Even so, the universe of people who can access our financial data is far larger than
those who can ask about our dental records. When we apply for a loan for a house
or a car, the bank will demand to view our credit report and perhaps ask detailed
questions about our assets. When we seek to rent an apartment, landlords may ask
to see a current pay-stub as evidence of ability to pay. Applications for licenses to
professional associations will also ask whether you have ever filed for bankruptcy
or defaulted on your student loans. All of these things severely discriminate against
individuals who are financially less stable. Why then, are so many institutions
allowed to ask about stigmatizing financial information, when we cannot inquire
into any information about health? Might it be tied to our concepts of fault, where
we still believe that most people who are poor deserve it, whereas unhealthy people
do not deserve to be sick?
223. 575 F.2d 1119, 1128-29, 1136, 1138 (5th Cir. 1978).
224. Id. at 1132.
225. Id. at 1135 ("Plaintiffs in this case are not ordinary citizens, but state senators, people who have
chosen to run for office. That does not strip them of all constitutional protection. It does put some limits
on the privacy they may reasonably expect." (citation omitted)).
226. Id. at 1137.
227. Id. at 1128-1132.
228. Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
229. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000 & Supp. V. 2006).
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Perhaps we have grown more private as our society becomes more splintered
and sophisticated, or perhaps we do not want to miss this opportunity to prevent yet
another type of social discrimination. 3 ° Whatever the sociological reasons, there is
no obvious reason why predictive health information should be treated any
differently than other types of potentially discriminatory information. However, if
we think critically about the population of people passing these laws, then we can
understand why older gentlemen might be interested in protecting health
information, or specifically be interested in laws like GINA. Unlike other types of
private information that could be successfully masked, legislators are for once
presented with a possibility that they too will be discriminated against.
Newly discovered genetic information is not obvious to the naked eye, and
cannot be reduced to status symbols like nice cars or huge houses. Genetic
information is therefore largely behind the veil of ignorance for now, to use a
Rawlsian distributive justice term. 23 1 When groups are confronted with the
possibility of receiving the short end of the stick, this may motivate them to pass
anti-discrimination laws that would not be passed if there were no such veil. Still,
the plethora of state opinions permitting disclosure of a candidate's personal
financial information include reasoned and articulated state interests that could
most certainly be applied to permit access to a candidate's private health
information.
C. Background on the Types of Genetic Tests and Their Limitations
1. Chromosomal Genetic Testing
There are many types of genetic tests, depending on which aspect of the
genetic process is being studied. At a high level, scientists will engage in
230. Steven Nock, Too Much Privacy?, 19 J. FAM. ISSUES 101, 101 (1998) ("A general increase in
privacy has occurred for the past century.").
23 1. Distributive justice principles are designed to direct the allocation of the benefits and burdens of
economic activity in a society. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 36, 62
(1993) [hereinafter Rawls, The Law of Peoples]. One popular theory developed by John Rawls asks
members of a society to ask what allocations or rules they would agree to if they were under a "veil of
ignorance" as to their own socio-economic lottery. See id. at 44-45. The idea is that if we can assume an
original position where we do not know how resource-rich or lucky we will be, we should allocate goods
in a way that seeks to provide fair conditions for free and equal citizens. Id. When we discuss genetic
information, it is typically not required to pretend to be under a veil of ignorance, as most of us, in fact,
are naive about our genetic information and risks. The de facto veil of ignorance surrounding genetic
information may explain the greater support given to genetic non-discrimination bills than to similar
non-discrimination bills for people who are homosexual, or who have certain mental illnesses. However,
unlike the true veil of ignorance that Rawls envisioned where the parties making decisions did not know
their social status or "final ends," the Congress, who proposed GINA, know precisely how powerful
they are. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 522-23 (1980)
[hereinafter Rawls, Kantian Constructivism]. This type of information asymmetry provides for
prioritization of self-interested policies. Id at 523.
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cytogenetics studies that analyze the number and structure of entire chromosomes
to study chromosome deletions or translocations.232 In congenital disorders, such as
Down or Turner syndrome, cytogenetics can determine the nature of the
chromosomal defect-whether it be a repeat of genetic data, a translocation, a
deletion, or an insertion of genetic information in either or both of the parents, or in
the fetus. 233 Chromosomal defects are often discovered at birth and can lead to
mental retardation. Examples of these defects include Down syndrome or Edwards
syndrome. 4  Even in these classic chromosomal abnormalities, there is
considerable phenotypic variability. Mosaicism is a condition where an individual
has a mixture of cells with different genotypes in the body. This can lead to milder
expression of a genetic trait and is being uncovered as another biological cause for
congenital malformations. 235 The majority of known chromosomal abnormalities
are discovered either through prenatal or newborn screening, or in response to
children who exhibit severe developmental delay or retardation.236 Even so, there
are some chromosomal disorders that are not tested for in newborns and for which
adult onset is possible. Examples of these disorders include distal leg myopathy and
neurodegenerative disorders such as myoclonic epilepsy and leukodystrophy.237
Leukodystrophy results from widespread myelin loss in the central nervous system
and is similar to the phenotype for multiple sclerosis. 238 Testing for particular
chromosomal neurodegenerative disorders with adult onset may be warranted in the
case of presidential candidates, as even when there is considerable variation in
expression of the disorder, it is still quite likely that the affected person will
experience some dysfunction. Discretionary problems would arise when
determining which disorders to test, but this would be true of every genetic testing
232. JORDE ET AL., supra note 88, at 107, 122, 124. Chromosomes are the organized bundles of a
single strand of DNA found in each of our cells. Id. at 6. Humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes, for a
total of 46 per cell. Id.
233. March of Dimes, Chromosomal Abnormalities (Oct. 2006),
http://www.marchofdimes.com/pnhec/4439-1209.asp; accord JORDE ET AL., supra note 88, at 106, 113.
234. JORDE ET AL., supra note 88, at 106, 113, 116; March of Dimes, supra note 233.
235. KRISTINE BARLOW-STEWART & GAYARTHI PARASIVAM, CTR. FOR GENETICS EDUC., FACT
SHEET 13: MOSAICISM - COMPLEX PATTERNS OF INHERITANCE 1 (2007), available at
http://www.genetics.com.au/pdf/factsheets/fsl 3.pdf; JORDE ET AL., supra note 88, at 115.
236. JORDE ET AL., supra note 88, at 281, 288; Mohamed N. Ahmed et al., Postnatal Developmental
Delay and Chromosomal Abnormalities, 39 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 233, 233-35 (2000); KidsHealth for
Parents, Prenatal Tests, http://www.kidshealth.org/parent/system/medical/prenataltests.html (last
visited Apr. 22, 2008).
237. J. Aicardi, The Inherited Leukodystrophies: A Clinical Overview, 16 J. INHERITED METABOLIC
DISEASE 733, 733-42 (1993); Patricia K. Crumrine, Degenerative Disorders of the Central Nervous
System, 22 PEDIATRICS REV. 370, 370-78 (2001); John M. Shoffner, Oxidative Phosphorylation Disease
Diagnosis, in OXIDATIVE/ENERGY METABOLISM IN NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS, 893 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCi. 42, 50 (John P. Blass & Fletcher H. McDowell eds., 1999) (stating that myoclonic
epilepsy can begin at ages ranging from childhood to adulthood).
238. Univ. of Cal., S.F., Laboratories of Neurogenetics (2006),
http://www.ucsf.edu/humgene/adld.htm.
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schema. A relatively new method, dubbed molecular karyotyping, 239 diagnoses
chromosomal aberrations at a genome-wide level. Unlike traditional karyotyping,
240
molecular karyotyping does more than reveal structural or numerical errors on a
particular chromosome, because it can pinpoint the precise genetic sequence
involved and with a high resolution.2 4'
Because the Y chromosome is passed exclusively from father to son,242 this
chromosome can also be tested for ancestry purposes. Men who share a common
paternal ancestor will have virtually the same DNA on their Y chromosome. 43 This
is true even if that male ancestor lived many generations ago, as the DNA on the Y
chromosome does not mutate very frequently. 244 Progress in identifying single
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) on the Y-chromosome was initially slow, until
recently.2 45 Testing the presidential candidate's Y chromosome would not paint the
entire genealogical picture as the maternal line would be absent. Additionally, one
wonders how relevant this is to the candidate's decision-making or governance, and
whether information on ancestry may only reinforce racial or ethnic discrimination.
239. Molecular karyotyping is a genetic disease screening technique that has a higher-resolution than
traditional karyotyping and can therefore more easily identify genetic diseases that have smaller
chromosomal abnormalities. Joris R. Vermeesch et al., Molecular Karyotyping: Array CGH Quality
Criteria for Constitutional Genetic Diagnosis, 53 J. HISTOCHEMISTRY & CYTOCHEMISTRY 413, 413,
419 (2005).
240. Karyotyping is a test "based on staining chromosomes [that] aim[s] to identify chromosomal
aberrations by screening the genome," or in other words, identify the genetic cause of a disorder or
disease. Id. at 419; accord Medline Plus, Karyotyping,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003935.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
241. The method receives its name from conventional karyotyping, as both technologies are based
on staining of the chromosomes to visualize errors that may lead to a genetic disorder, such as mental
retardation. Vermeesch et al., supra note 239, at 419.
242. JORDE ET AL., supra note 88, at 6.
243. Sorenson Molecular Genealogy Found., Y-Chromosome DNA,
http://www.smgf.org/pages/ychromosome.jspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
244. Id.; WILLIAM S. KLUG ET AL., CONCEPTS OF GENETICS 81 (8th ed. 2006).
245. Mark A. Jobling & Chris Tyler-Smith, New Uses for New Haplotypes: The Human Y
Chromosome, Disease and Selection, 16 TRENDS GENETICS 356, 358 tbl.l (2000). Linda Hellborg &
Hans Ellegren, Y Chromosome Conserved Anchored Tagged Sequences (YCATS) for the Analysis of
Mammalian Male-Specific DNA, 12 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 283, 284 (2003) ("Because [the Y
chromosome] is mainly a nonrecombining chromosome, analysis of Y chromosome SNPs allows the
construction of specific haplotypes defining patrilines. Using this approach, a number of studies have
recently attempted to dissect the evolutionary history of modem humans .... With the access to Y
chromosome haplotyping, it is therefore possible to compare directly the relative contribution of fathers
in shaping the genetic signatures of populations." (citations omitted)); Silvia Paracchini et al.,
Hierarchical High-Throughput SNP Genotyping of the Human Y Chromosome Using MALDI-TOF
Mass Spectrometry, 30 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES., at e27, e27 (2002).
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2. Mitochondrial Genetic Testing
Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is not transmitted through cell nuclei like
chromosomal DNA but rather through the energy-generating mitochondria.246
Chromosomal and mitochondrial DNA are thought to be of separate evolutionary
origin, with mtDNA being derived from the genomes of bacteria that were
internalized by our nucleus-containing ancestor cells. 2 47 Mitochondrial inheritance
challenged our traditional thinking of genetics as Mendelian inheritance presumes
that half the genetic material of a fertilized egg derives from each parent, and
mtDNA is virtually all inherited from the mother's ovum. 248 This type of DNA is
thought to have less non-coding "junk," and therefore most mitochondrial DNA
mutations lead to functional problems. 249 Even so, much of the mtDNA testing that
goes on today is for DNA ancestry testing as one thread of the maternal line can be
traced this way due to its passing via the mother's ovum.
2 5 0
Men and women inherit mtDNA from their mothers. 251 mtDNA disorders
were once considered so rare that they were only of academic interest, but now are
believed to be much more common. Mitochondrial diseases are due to deficiencies
in the generation of cellular energy and respiratory function.2 12 Common related
phenotypes include stroke-like episodes, exercise intolerance and muscular
weakness.2 5 3 Due to the complexity of mitochondrial inheritance and inter-family
variability, clear genotype-phenotype correlations are difficult to demonstrate.
2 54
This is complicated by the fact that mtDNA related diseases may be caused by
nuclear genome defects as well. 25 5 Other examples of mtDNA related diseases
include diabetes, blindness and deafness. 256 In the most common cases, the onset
for the mtDNA related disorder is well before age twenty, but with the case of
246. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 767 (4th ed. 2002).
247. Siv G. E. Andersson et al., On the Origin of Mitochondria: A Genomics Perspective, PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y BIOLOGICAL ScI., Jan. 29, 2003, at 165-66.
248. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 246, at 816-18.
249. See Miria Ricchetti et al., Continued Colonization of the Human Genome by Mitochondrial
DNA, 2 PLoS BIOLOGY 1313, 1314 (2004); Mitochondrial Genes Cause Nuclear Mischief SCI. DAILY,
Sept. 8, 2004, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/09/040907082844.htm.
250. DNAAncestry, Maternal Lineage Test, http://dna.ancestry.com/leamMoreMqternal.aspx (last
visited Apr. 22, 2008).
251. KLUG ET AL., supra note 244, at 227.
252. See Douglas C. Wallace, Mitochondrial Diseases in Man and Mouse, 283 SCI. 1482, 1483
(1999).
253. Cleveland Clinic Ctr. for Consumer Health Info., Mitochondrial Disease (2008),
http://www.clevelandclinic.org/health/health-info/docs/ 1600/1678.asp?index=6957.
254. Sarah White et al., Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Diagnosis for the Mitochondrial DNA
Mutations at Nucleotide 8993, 65 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 474,474-75 (1999).
255. Andrea L. Gropman, Diagnosis and Treatment of Childhood Mitochondrial Diseases, I
CURRENT NEUROLOGY & NEUROSCIENCE REPS. 185, 189 (2001).
256. KLUG ET AL., supra note 244, at 221-22; Cleveland Clinic Ctr. for Consumer Health Info.,
supra note 253.
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mitochondrial encephalomyopathy (stroke-like episodes), the onset is typically
around age 40.257 This means that most of the mtDNA-related diseases would
become present before a candidate ran for presidential office. Even so, to the extent
that the phenotypes have not yet been expressed, the genotype-phenotype
correlations are too unpredictable to be very useful in measuring the possibility that
a president would develop mtDNA-related stroke-like episodes. What is more, the
"[c]linical features are usually extremely heterogeneous because [mtDNA-related
diseases] may involve several tissues with different degrees of severity. 2 58 So
mtDNA genotypes will not tell us very much about the development of disease.
mtDNA testing can tell us something about the individual's ancestry, in that it
can trace distant maternal relatives. However, as with Y chromosome testing, it
cannot tell us about all of the maternal ancestry as it only looks at one single
genetic line. 259 Because we are a genetic mixture of many of our ancestors, these
tests do not tell the entire story. But more importantly, confirming or debunking a
presidential candidate's family history is likely never in the public interest, as it is
near impossible to imagine a scenario where the President's deep ancestral roots are
at all relevant to governance or political decision-making.
3. Marker, Linkage, and Enzyme Dysfunction Testing
We can test DNA directly and indirectly. If we know the gene that we want to
study, we can analyze the DNA error (deletion, duplication, etc).260 If we do not
know the precise gene implicated in a certain disease, we can study the DNA
indirectly by looking to "markers" to determine whether someone has inherited a
crucial region of the genetic code that is typically passed through families
exhibiting the disease. 61 Markers are helpful when the precise gene implicated in
the disease has not yet been identified, but the marker is adjacent or contained
within the targeted gene of interest. Due to its proximity to the target gene, the
marker is likely inherited in tandem with it.262 Indirect studies usually rely on blood
samples from many family members who both exhibit and do not exhibit the
disease. Linkages are then created based on the pattern of inheritance of these
257. See Genetics Home Reference, Mitochondrial Encephalomyopathy, Lactic Acidosis, and
Stroke-Like Episodes (Feb. 10, 2008),
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition-mitochondrialencephalomyopathylacticacidosisandstrokelikeepisodes.
258. Massimiliano Filosto et al., Neuropathology of Mitochondrial Diseases, BIOSCIENCE REPS.,
June 2007, at 23-24.
259. See DNAAncestry, supra note 250; DNAHeritage, mtDNA Test for Maternal Ancestry,
http://www.dnaheritage.com/mtdna.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
260. KRISTINE BARLOW-STEWART, CTR. FOR GENETICS EDUC., FACT SHEET 21: DNA TESTING -
SCREENING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS AND GENETIC SUSCEPTIBILITY 2 (5th ed. 2007), available at
http://www.genetics.com.au/pdf/factsheets/fs2 I.pdf.
261. KLUG ET AL., supra note 244, at 128.
262. BARLOW-STEWART, supra note 260, at 4.
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markers, and can be used to test relatives to determine if they inherited the region
that is reflected in those who exhibit the disease.
263
In addition to studying the gene mutation that caused the abnormality, we can
also study abnormal enzyme production. Enzymes are proteins that regulate the
variety of chemical cascades occurring in our bodies.2 64 Enzymes may be deficient,
absent, unstable, or behave in ways that lead to clinical manifestations in
humans.265 As genes code for the production of proteins, we can also study proteins
to see if they are longer or shorter than they should be and this can indirectly assess
genetic anomalies.266
4. SNP Genotyping and Whole Genome Sequencing
The above methods are used to investigate genes or proteins associated with
specific diseases. But what if we have no target gene, and instead just want to know
what our entire set of genes look like? This question has been answered in part by
high-density SNP (single nucleotide polymorphism) genotyping and whole-genome
sequencing, which have taken off recently. 2 67 To understand what an enormous feat
this is, it is important to understand both how the genome is sequenced and just
how complex it is.
Inside each of the 100 trillion cells in our bodies is a nucleus that contains the
entire genome (forty-six human chromosomes) that regulates human development
through protein transcription. 268 Each chromosome is one long string of tightly
bundled DNA that is coiled in a double helix. 269 Chromosomes are made up of
millions of base pairs, consisting of copies of the four letters of the genetic code A,
C, G, and T, which are arranged into genes and non-coding sections. 270 The aim of
genomics is to figure out the order, or sequence, of these four letters.271 Since
routine sequencing of the genomes of thousands of individuals is still impractical,
263. See id. at 4-5.
264. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 246, at 76-78, G: 12.
265. Muscular Dystrophy Ass'n (MDA), Metabolic Diseases of Muscle, Facts About Metabolic
Diseases of Muscle, http://www.mda.org/publications/fa-metab-qa.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2008). In
fact, enzymes that metabolize drugs are being studied rigorously in order to tailor pharmaceutical drugs
to certain populations. Sharon Gardiner & Evan Begg, Pharmacogenetic Testing for Drug Metabolizing
Enzymes: Is it Happening in Practice?, 15 PHARMACOGENETICS & GENOMIcS 365, 365 (2005).
266. Par K. Ingvarsson, Gene Expression and Protein Length Influence Codon Usage and Rates of
Sequence Evolution in Populus Tremula, 24 MOLECULAR BIOLOGY & EVOLUTION 836, 842-43 (2007);
see also Vivek Mittal & Daniel J. Nolan, Genomics and Proteomics Approaches in Understanding
Tumor Angiogenesis, 7 EXPERT REV. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 133, 138 (2007) (using proteomic
testing to target tumor vessels).
267. KLUG ET AL., supra note 244, at 128, 485.
268. JEREMY M. BERG ET AL., BIOCHEMISTRY 36, 118 (5th ed. 2002).
269. KLUG ET AL., supra note 244, at 246, 246 fig. 10-14.
270. ALBERTS FT AL., supra note 246, at 198; BERG ET AL., supra note 268, at 3.
271. KLUG ET AL., supra note 244, at 8.
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many studies have attempted to systematically test the majority of human genetic
difference that is due to common variations, and map this genetic variance on to the
presence of disease. 212 This method results in genome-wide association studies.
Replication of these disease association studies has proven to be difficult and the
interpretive power of the association is not robust. 27 3 Still, they provide an initial
method of making weak associations between diseases and particular SNPs in large
populations.
At a larger population level, the ambitious HapMap Project aimed to produce
a subset of SNPs to evaluate genetic variation in four discrete subpopulations:
Ibadan, Nigeria; Tokyo, Japan; Beijing, China; and Utah, U.S.A.274 SNPs occur
when one base replaces another in what is known as a point mutation. Usually, T
replaces A, G replaces C, and vice versa.27 5 Compiling all of the SNPs in one
person can tell us something about her genetic profile, as SNPs have been used as
276markers in the association studies of complex human diseases. In one method,
certain relevant SNPs are tagged, each being carefully chosen so that together they
hopefully represent underlying related genetic variants. A sample of SNPs may
then be used to represent a patchwork of the individual's genotype for a certain
disease.277 The commercial genomic company, 23andMe, relies primarily on high-
density SNP genotyping for its services, looking at nearly 600,000 SNPs to survey
a large chunk of the genetic difference between people.
278
272. See id. at 485 (acknowledging that identifying all genes in a genome is "a time consuming
endeavor, which led to the beginning of recombinant DNA technology for genetic analysis"); Genome
News Network, Genome Variations (Jan. 15, 2003),
http://www.genomenewsnetwork.org/resources/whats-a-genome/Chp4_ I .shtml.
273. Paul I. W. de Bakker et al., Efficiency and Power in Genetic Association Studies, 37 NATURE
GENETICS 1217, 1217 (2005); see also J. Raphael Gibbs & Andrew Singleton, Application of Genome-
Wide Single Nucleotide Polymorphism Typing: Simple Association and Beyond, 2 PLOS GENETICS
1511, 1511-12 (2006) (describing another variant of the disease association technique used to retrieve
the same results, but one that is still problematic).
274. de Bakker et al., supra note 273, at 1217. A haplotype is a set of linked alleles that can be
compared with haplotypes from other individuals. Nat'l Human Genome Res. Inst., International
HapMap Project, http://www.genome.gov/10001688 (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
275. TARA RODDEN ROBINSON, GENETICS FOR DUMMIES 282 (2005).
276. Huanyu Zhou et al., Combining Association Tests Across Multiple Genetic Markers in Case-
Control Studies, 65 HUM. HEREDITY 166, 166 (2008).
277. Int'l HapMap Consortium, A Haplonype Map of the Human Genome, 437 NATURE 1299, 1309-
10 (2005). Many researchers question the methodological validity of genetic association studies as
differences exist in allele frequency by population and genes interact with environmental factors. See
Sarah J. Lewis & Eric J. Brunner, Methodological Problems in Genetic Association Studies of
Longevity-The Apolipoprotein E Gene as an Example, 33 INT'L. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 962, 962, 965
(2004); Scott F. Saccone et al., Power-Based, Phase-Informed Selection of Single Nucleotide
Polymorphismsfor Disease Association Screens, 30 GENETIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 459, 469 (2006).
278. 23andme.com, Our Service: How the Process Works,
https://www.23andme.com/ourservice/process (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
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By observing variations in the sequence of the base pairs, geneticists can
identify areas that may be linked to specific diseases. 279 The entire human genome
is made up of about 3.5 billion bases;280 therefore, to map the genome properly
when comparing sections from various donors, complex algorithms must be used to
pick apart and reassemble puzzle pieces from different versions of the same
chromosomes. 281 Geneticists are getting better at this, and are now able to
understand to some degree the genetic variation within a single genome. As the
process of gene sequencing is expensive and time-consuming, scientists are rushing
to find cheaper technologies that can sequence just the protein-coding regions of
the genome while discarding the irrelevant data.2 82 Although thousands of tests are
available for a variety of genetic diseases and there is great potential for gene
sequencing to reveal detailed information about the risks someone may carry for a
number of diseases, many involved caution patients from jumping into genome-
sequencing blindly. The president of the National Society of Genetic Counselors
challenges consumers to ask, "What is this going to tell me, is it going to give me
information that's helpful right now?
283
As the controversial genomics pioneer, Craig Venter, has sequenced his own
genome, we have found out that Venter is likely to have wet earwax and lactose
284intolerance. However, Mr. Venter reports that he is, in fact, lactose tolerant, so
the genotype does not match the predicted phenotype.285 There are potentially many
other discoveries on genetic expression to come from analyses of both Venter's
genome and another celebrity genome, that of James Watson. In partnership with
scientists at Baylor College of Medicine, 454 Life Sciences Corporation completed
"Project Jim," an endeavor to sequence the genome of Mr. Watson, co-discoverer
279. See Genome News Network, supra note 272.
280. Bijal P. Trivedi, Genome News Network, Sequencing the Genome (June 2, 2000),
http://www.genomenewsnetwork.org/articles/06_00/sequence..primer.shtml.
281. See J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 Sci. 1304, 1310-13 (2001)
(describing a complex algorithm).
282. Chao-Qiang Lai, Speed-Mapping Quantitative Trait Loci Using Microarrays, 4 NATURE
METHODS 839, 839-40 (2007); Gregory J. Porreca et al., Multiplex Amplification of Large Sets of
Human Exons, 4 NATURE METHODS 931, 931 (2007); Andreas Sundquist et al., Whole-Genome
Sequencing and Assembly with High-Throughput, Short-Read Technologies, PLOS ONE, May 30, 2007,
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchArticle.action?articeUR=info:doi/10.1371/j oumal.pone.0000484.
283. John Lauerman, Cheap, Detailed Genetic Testing Soon May be Ready for Market,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 14, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=arSzBEcl7W34.
284. Samuel Levy et al., The Diploid Genome Sequence of an Individual Human, 5 PLoS BIOLOGY
2113, 2114, 2131, 2134 tbl.13 (2007); accord Heidi Ledford, All About Craig: The First 'Full' Genome
Sequence, 449 NATURE 6, 6 (2007).
285. Levy et al., supra note 284, at 2131.
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of the double-helix structure of DNA.186 The press release on 454 Life Science's
website stated:
The mapping of Dr. Watson's genome was completed using the Genome
Sequencer FLXTM system and marks the first individual genome to be
sequenced for less than $1 million .... Today, we give James Watson a
DVD containing his personal genome-a project completed in only two
months. It demonstrates how far sequencing technology has come in a
short time.
287
There is big business behind this technology, as the cost will likely drop and
more routine human sequencing will become affordable. An executive vice
president at Applied Biosystems predicted that the market for personal genomic
testing could reach $500 million by 201 1.288
5. Complex Behavioral Genetics
Behavioral genetics measures the genetic influence on complex human traits
that "traditionally have come within the purview of psychologists (and
psychiatrists)., 289 This has been a particularly controversial area of research in part
because of its mixed history with eugenics. 290 The American eugenics movement of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century sought to cleanse the race of
impurities such as violence, disability, or mental retardation through sterilization or
restrictive marriage laws for individuals with these perceived negative traits. 291 As
doctor and author Leonard Fleck points out, "these are not benign intellectual
errors." 292 The "studies" looked at families with shared traits and environments,
and thus failed to isolate genetic causation.293 Measurement of the phenotypes was
less than scientific as well. Perhaps, partially in response to the embarrassingly
unethical eugenics movements, and partially in response to behaviorism, the
thinking in the 1950s shifted from biological explanations of behavior to social
ones. 294 According to these socially loaded constructs, bad behavior was caused by
286. Eliot Marshall, Sequencers of a Famous Genome Confront Privacy Issues, 315 ScI. 1780, 1780
(2007).
287. Press Release, 454 Life Scis., 454 Life Sciences and Baylor College of Medicine Complete
Sequencing of DNA Project (May 31, 2007), http://www.454.com/news-events/press-
releases.asp?display-detail&id=68.
288. Lauerman, supra note 283.
289. Erik Parens, Genetic Differences and Human Identities: On Why Talking About Behavioral
Genetics is Important and Difficult, HASTINGS CTR. REP. (SPECIAL SuP.), Jan.-Feb. 2004, at S4, S6.
290. Anne Kerr et al., Eugenics and the New Genetics in Britain: Examining Contemporary
Professionals'Accounts, 23 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 175, 175-77 (1998).
291. KLUG ET AL., supra note 244, at 659.
292. Leonard Fleck, Creating Public Conversation about Behavioral Genetics, in WRESTLING WITH
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS 256, 259 (Eric Parens et al. eds., 2006).
293. KLUG ET AL., supra note 244, at 659.
294. NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 90, at 33-34.
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bad environments.295 The variance in traits were explained based on parenting,
nutrition, or education.
296
Even when molecular genetics developed a better understanding of the
possible inheritance of behavioral traits, early pronouncements were reported as a
"gene for" addiction or aggression.297 The problem with this reporting is beyond
mere semantics. Stating the genetic cause in this way reiterated genetic
reductionism and divorced genes from the environment as two independent
variables.299 Modem behavioral geneticists understand that genes interact with each
other,299 genetic variation can exist outside of Mendelian models of inheritance, °°
and the environment greatly affects expression of genes.30 1 Put differently, there is
no "gene for" any given complex behavior. Rather, there is almost always a group
of genes that together may increase the chance of a behavior being exhibited in
response to certain environmental stressors.
Although behavioral geneticists employ the genetic tests and methods that
were described above (linkage studies, genome-sequencing), much of behavioral
genetics rests on a wholly different set of methods that employ epidemiological,
psychosocial, and longitudinal studies. 302 These studies often look at the individual
differences in behavior between monozygotic (genetically identical) and dizygotic
(fraternal) twins reared apart, between siblings, and across generations. 30 3 Twin
studies have resulted in interesting attributions of genetic variance. For example,
the famous Minnesota Twin Study by Thomas Bouchard found that about 70% of
the variance in IQ between the twins was associated with genetic variation.
However, later researchers found that the significance of genetic differences in
295. Kenneth F. Schaffner, Behavior: Its Nature and Nurture, Part 1, in WRESTLING WITH
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS, supra note 292, at 3, 4.
296. See id.
297. See Jonathan Beckwith, Whither Human Behavioral Genetics?, in WRESTLING WITH
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS, supra note 292, at 74, 90; Rick Weiss, Behavioral Genetics and the Media, in
WRESTLING WITH BEHAVIORAL GENETICS supra note 292, at 309, 310-11.
298. See Beckwith, supra note 297, at 84-85.
299. KLUG ET AL., supra note 244, at 659.
300. Kenneth F. Schaffner, Behavior Its Nature and Nurture, Part 2, in WRESTLING WITH
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS, supra note 292, at 40-41.
301. Fleck, supra note 292, at 259.
302. E.g., Ayman H. Fanous, A Longitudinal Study of Personality and Major Depression in a
Population-Based Sample of Male Twins, 37 PSYCHOL. MED. 1163 (2007); A.C. Heath et al., Evidence
for Genetic Influences on Personality from Self-Reports and Informant Ratings, J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL., July 1992, at 85; Jonathan S. Raymond, Behavioral Epidemiology: The Science of Health
Promotion, 4 HEALTH PROMOTION INT'L 281, 281 (1989).
303. Parens, supra note 289, at S10-11.
304. Thomas J. Bouchard et al., Sources of Human Psychological Differences: The Minnesota Study
of Twins Reared Apart, 250 Sci. 223, 224 (1990). This data is based on more than one hundred sets of
reared apart twins. Id. at 223.
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explaining variation in IQ scores depends heavily on the socioeconomic status
(SES) of the person taking the test.30 5
Interpreting behavioral genetics information has therefore been thorny.
Legitimate questions have been raised of reporter bias in measuring the behavior as
well as an inability to completely control or quantify the shared and non-shared
environmental factors. History has taught us to temper our reports of any clear
genetic cause for complex behavioral traits, as many of the reductionist predecessor
claims have fallen by the wayside. 30 6 Even still, recent replicated methods have
produced target genes associated with many complex traits such as attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 30 7  depression, 308 alcoholism, 30 9  and
schizophrenia. 3  Nevertheless, it is not yet possible to leap from a genetic
association to prediction or cause at an individual level.
Behavioral genetics data provides the framework for some of the more
interesting questions about presidential candidates. After having suffered a war-
mongering, alcoholic, language-confised executive chief, some members of the
public may react by wanting to test presidential candidates for several behavioral
traits such as aggression, alcoholism, or dyslexia. But the truth is, they cannot - not
with any useful degree of certainty. This does not mean that behavioral genetics
305. Parens, supra note 289, at S9 ("Genes appear to help explain the differences in test scores
among high SES children, but not among low SES children."); cf Eric Turkheimer et al., Socioeconomic
Status Modifies Heritability of IQ in Young Children, 14 PSYCHOL. ScI. 623, 627 (2003).
306. See Beckwith, supra note 297, at 74-75 ("Initial optimistic and widely publicized molecular
genetic studies reporting genes predisposing to schizophrenia, bipolar manic depressive illness,
alcoholism, homosexuality, risk taking, and others have been retracted, rebutted, or have yet to be
replicated successfully.").
307. ADHD is also highly heritable. Josephine Elia & Marcella Devoto, ADHD Genetics: 2007
Update, 9 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPS. 434, 434 (2007) ("Several epidemiologic studies point to a
strong influence of genetic factors in susceptibility to... ADHD.").
308. While heritability estimates of depressive symptoms range widely, there is a growing consensus
that genes and their interaction with the environment play a large part in the development of depression.
Minna Happonen et al., The Heritability of Depressive Symptoms: Multiple Informants and Multiple
Measures, 43 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 471, 475 (2002); Klaus Peter Lesch, Gene-
Environment Interaction and the Genetics of Depression, 29 J. PSYCHIATRY & NEUROSCIENCE 174, 181
(2004).
309. Matt McGue, The Behavioral Genetics ofAlcoholism, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI.
109, 109-11 (1999). Recent studies have discovered the complex genetic components of certain alcohol-
metabolizing enzymes that moderate tolerance and likelihood of dependence. Yasuhiko Mizoi et al.,
Involvement of Genetic Polymorphism ofAlcohol and Aldehyde Dehydrogenases in Individual Variation
ofAlcohol Metabolism, 29 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 707, 707, 709 (1994).
310. Researchers have found that the concordance rates for schizophrenia (i.e., the likelihood that
one twin will develop the disorder that the other twin has) is somewhere around 41-65% for
monozygotic twins, which is much greater than the average population's risk. See Alastair G. Cardno &
Irving I. Gottesman, Twin Studies of Schizophrenia: From Bow-and-Arrow Concordances to Star Wars
Mx and Functional Genomics, 97 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 12, 13 (2000); Jehannine C. Austin & H.L.
Peay, Applications and Limitations of Empiric Data in Provision of Recurrence Risks for Schizophrenia:
A Practical Review for Healthcare Professionals Providing Clinical Psychiatric Genetics Consultations,
70 CLINICAL GENETICS 177, 177 (2006) ("Schizophrenia affects approximately 1% of the population.").
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science is junk, but rather that it is "science at an early stage."31' We can test for
genes that are associated with greater susceptibility to alcoholism, ADHD,
depression, etc. And even if causal alleles are identified, we cannot know whether
someone will become an alcoholic, attention-constrained, or suffer from depression
until we know much more about that individual's unique environmental stressors
and the causative role of the group of genes associated with the behavior. Once you
acknowledge that heritability of certain behavioral phenotypes changes over an
individual's life,312 the information becomes even more speculative. Confusing the
prospect of a "genetic test for alcoholism" more is that the definition of the
phenotype in this continuum is not at all clear. As Steve Hyman noted, "there is no
bright line between normal behavioral variation and disease."
313
D. The Importance ofAssessing the Clinical and Analytic Validity of Genetic
Tests
Over a thousand clinical genetic tests are currently available for specific
disorders or diseases. For purposes of this paper I am interested mostly in
presymptomatic genetic testing, in which there is a genetic mutation that is at least
somewhat predictive of risk of developing a certain disease as an adult. Not all
genetic tests have equally clinical or analytical validity or usefulness. "Analytic
validity" refers to a test's accuracy in detecting a genetic variant when it is present,
and not detecting it when it is not present. 314 "Clinical validity" refers to the
correlation between the genetic variant and a particular health condition or risk. 315
Both of these measures are important to know before receiving any type of test: the
first asks whether the test will yield false positives or negatives, 316 and the second
asks whether this information will tell us anything useful about our future health.
One way to measure the predictive value of a genetic test is to assess the
penetrance of the gene that is thought to cause the disease. Penetrance is the
percentage of individuals with a specific genotype who express an associated
311. Schaffner, supra note 300, at 40, 60.
312. Sarah E. Bergen et al., Age-Related Changes in Heritability of Behavioral Phenotypes Over
Adolescence and Young Adulthood: A Meta-Analysis, 10 TWIN RES. & HUM. GENETICS 423, 423, 429-
30 (2007); see also Tinca J.C. Polderman et al., A Longitudinal Twin Study on IQ, Executive
Functioning, and Attention Problems During Childhood and Early Adolescence, 106 ACTA
NEUROLOGICA BELGICA 191, 204 (2006) ("Moreover, the same genes that influence IQ at age 12 also
influence attention problems at age 5.").
313. Stephen E. Hyman, Using Genetics to Understand Human Behavior, in WRESTLING WITH
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS, supra note 292, at 109, 119.
314. Kathy Hudson et al., ASHG Statement on Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing in the United
States, 81 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 635, 635 (2007).
315. Id. at 635-36.
316. Glenn E. Palomaki et al., Analytic Validity of Cystic Fibrosis Testing: A Preliminary Estimate,
5 GENETICS MED. 15. 15 (2003).
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phenotype.317 The greater the penetrance, the more useful the test (i.e., the better it
is at predicting the risk of developing a particular disease).318 Some of the diseases
with highly penetrant causal genes are Huntington's disease, 319 BRCA1 breast
320 321 32323cancer, sickle cell anemia, polycystic kidney disease,3  retinitis pigmentosa,
Marfan's syndrome,324 and early onset Alzheimer's disease.325
317. Jacques S. Beckman et aL., Copy Number Variants and Genetic Traits: Closer to the Resolution
of Phenotypic to Genotypic Variability, 8 NAT. REVS. GENETICS 639, 640 (2007). For example,
Huntington's disease is 95% penetrant, meaning that 5% of those with the dominant allele for
Huntington's disease will not acquire the disease and 95% will. DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE
GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA PATENTING 23 (2004). Penetrance does not measure how
strongly the phenotype (in this case, Huntington's disease) is expressed; only that it is acting. See HELEN
V. FIRTH & JANE A. HURST, OXFORD DESK REFERENCE: CLINICAL GENETICS 6 (Judith G. Hall ed.,
2005).
318. See Neil A. Holtzman & David Shapiro, Genetic Testing and Public Policy, 13 BRIT. MED. J.
852, 852 (1998) ("Variable expressivity, incomplete penetrance, and genetic heterogeneity all reduce the
ability of genetic tests to predict the future.") (emphasis added).
319. Anne Maradiegue & Quannetta T. Edwards, An Overview of Ethnicity and Assessment of
Family History in Primary Care Settings, 18 J. AM. ACAD. NURSE PRAC. 447, 450 (2006).
320. Jane E. Lacovara & Jessica Ray, Deciphering the Diagnostics of Breast Cancer, 16 MEDSURG
NURSING 391, 395 (2007). It is important to note that there are multiple types and causes of breast
cancer. MayoClinic.com, Types of Breast Cancer (Dec. 28, 2007),
http://www.mayoclinic.com/healthbreast-cancer/HQ00348 (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
321. Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining Public Health, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 171, 183-84 (2005).
322. HAROLD CHEN, ATLAS OF GENETIC DIAGNOSIS AND COUNSELING 797 (2006).
323. Retinitis pigmentosa (RP) is a group of inherited disorders with various causes and penetrance
levels. Sarah Bundey & S. James Crews, A Study of Retinitis Pigmentosa in the City of Birmingham: HI
Clinical and Genetic Heterogeneity, 21 J. MED GENETICS 421 (1984). RP causes gradual degeneration
of the ocular rods and cones or the retina, resulting in progressive visual loss. Thomas Rio Frio,
Premature Termination Condons in PRPF31 Cause Retinits Pigmentosa Via Haploinsufficiency Due to
Nonsense-Mediated mRNA Decay, 4 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1519, 1519 (2008). Many mutations
that lead to RP are autosomal dominant and highly penetrant, while other forms of RP have lower
penetrance and are recessive. See Bundey & Crews, supra, at 412, 427; Hiroyuki Kondo et al.,
Diagnosis of Autosomal Dominant Retinitis Pigmentosa by Linkage-Based Exclusion Screening with
Multiple Locus-Specific Microsatellite Markers, 44 INVESTIGATIVE OPTHALMOLOGY & VISUAL SCL
1275, 1278 (2003).
324. Nicola C. Y. Ho et al., Marfan's Syndrome, 366 LANCET 1978, 1978 (2005).
325. See, e.g., K. Taddei et al., Association Between Presenilin-I Glu3J8Gly Mutation and Familial
Alzheimer's Disease in the Australian Population, 7 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 776, 776 (2002)
(indicating there is a high penetrance in the PSEN I gene for early onset Alzheimer's). Similar to breast
cancer, there are multiple types and causes Alzheimer's disease. See Judith L. Benkendorf et al., Impact
of Genetic Information and Genetic Counseling on Public Health, in GENETICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN
THE 21 ST CENTURY 361, 370-71 (Muin J. Khoury et al. eds., 2000). For example, three genes have been
associated with the rare forms of Early Onset Familial Alzheimer's Disease (EOFAD, also known as
Alzheimer's disease type 3 or AD3). Id. at 370. Lab Tests Online, Alzheimer's Disease (Aug. 19, 2005),
http://www.labtestsonline.org/understanding/conditions/alzheimers.html. Mutations in each of the genes
(PSEN1, PSEN 2, and APP) cause Alzheimer's in anyone who carries the mutation. See Taddei et al.,
supra, at 776; MayoClinic.com, Alzheimer's: Is it in Your Genes? (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/alzheimers-genes/AZ00047. See generally C. L. Lendon et al.,
Exploring the Etiology ofAlzheimer Disease Using Molecular Genetics, 277 JAMA 825, 826-28 (1997)
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Huntington's disease presents an interesting case for the testing of
presidential candidates because it is highly penetrant.326 The mutation follows
autosomal dominant inheritance, meaning that if the candidate has one copy of the
mutant Huntington gene and more than forty copies of the expanded CAG repeat,
he or she possesses a near 100% chance of developing the disease in some form.327
Further, the disease affects important processes such as memory and decision-
making.328 While there is a highly predictive genetic test, there is also no cure.
Adult onset Huntington's disease does not typically appear until between the ages
of 30 and 50,329 and it is not routinely tested for in newborn genetic screens.
330
Huntington's disease impairs skills such as planning, cognitive flexibility, abstract
thinking, rule acquisition, initiating appropriate actions, and inhibiting
inappropriate actions, as well as speech and motor function.331 When present, these
symptoms would be quite significant to an individual's ability to effectively
govern. However, most diseases that significantly affect cognitive functioning do
not have such a simple and well understood genetic contribution.
(discussing the three genes that cause Early Onset Alzheimer's and how they cause the disease).
However, this is a very rare form of the disease and susceptibility to the more common late onset
Alzheimer's disease is attributed to different mutations on different genes. Robert L. Nussbaum &
Christopher E. Ellis, Alzheimer 's Disease and Parkinson's Disease, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1356, 1356-
57 (2003).
326. Maradiegue & Edwards, supra note 319.
327. See Nagehan Ersoy, Molecular Genetics of Huntington 's Disease: When Size Does Matter, 6 J.
CELL & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 1, 1-3 (2007); Anneke Maat-Kievit et al, Letter to the Editor, New
Problems in Testing for Huntington's Disease: The Issue of Intermediate and Reduced Penetrance, 38 J.
MED. GENETICS, at e12, e12 (2001) ("Penetrance of 36 to 39 repeat alleles may be higher in persons
with confirmed ancestry of HD than those from collateral branches with new mutations. Penetrance is
also dependent on the expression of the disease in the parent with the expanded repeat, but reliable
empirical penetrance risks are not yet available [for low intermediate CAG repeat levels].").
328. Michael Morris & Jane Scourfield, Psychiatric Aspects of Huntington 's Disease, in 31
HUNTINGTON'S DISEASE 73, 107 (Peter S. Harper ed., 2d ed. 1996) (finding that Huntington's Disease
impairs recent and remote memory); Jane S. Paulsen & Rachel A. Conybeare, Cognitive Changes in
Huntington's Disease, in 96 BEHAVIORAL NEUROLOGY OF MOVEMENT DISORDERS 209, 215 (Karen E.
Anderson et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) (indicating that Huntington's Disease impairs decision-making).
329. KRISTINE BARLOW-STEWART & GAYARTHI, CTR. FOR GENETICS EDUC., FACT SHEET 44:
HUNTINGTON DISEASE - NEUROLOGICAL CONDITIONS 1 (2007), available at
http://www.genetics.com.au/pdf/factsheets/fs44.pdf.
330. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-449, NEWBORN SCREENING: CHARACTERISTICS
OF STATE PROGRAMS 8, 9 tbl. 1 (2003) (citing that the most common newborn screening programs focus
on the following disorders: phenylkentonuria, congenital hypothyroidism, galactosemia, sickle cell
diseases, congenital adrenal hyperplasia, biotinidase deficiency, maple syrup urine disease, and
homocystinuria).
331. Paulsen & Conybeare, supra note 328, at 210 tbl.15-1, 212; JIM POLAND, A CAREGIVER'S
HANDBOOK FOR ADVANCED-STAGE HUNTINGTON DISEASE 6 (Jim Pollard ed., 2003), available at
http://www.hdac.org/caregiving/pdf/Caregiver Handbook.pdf; Juri D. Kropotov & Susan C. Etlinger,
Selection of Actions in the Basal Ganglia - Thalamocortical Circuits: Review and Model, 31 INT'L J.
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 197, 206 (1999); Carol Brown Moskowitz et al., Palliative Care for People With
Late-Stage Huntington's Disease, 19 NEUROLOGIC CLINICS 849, 854 (2001).
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In some cases, an implicated gene has been extensively studied and appears to
show signs of increased susceptibility to a certain disease, or is associated with
disease development, but there is little data to accurately predict expression. One
example is the exon 41 mutation on the LRRK2 gene that is responsible for some
forms of familial and sporadic Parkinson's disease.332 The penetrance for this exon
41 mutation is not as high as that of Huntington's disease, but it is higher with
people who had two copies of the mutated gene.333 No clinical genetic tests exist
for this mutation, as it remains outside of clinical use and is still being studied for
clinical and analytic validity. This example illustrates that there is often a gap
between the discovery of a tight genotype-phenotype causal association and the
development and availability of a related clinical genetic test. Some bench
scientists believe that these types of findings are "reliable and useful enough to
disclose to participants even prior to the development of a validated clinical
program for delivering the information., 334 However, as there is no common
nomenclature or shared standards for determining when a genetic test has analytic
validity, clinical validity, or clinical utility, it remains that much trickier to assess
when genetic testing is clinically appropriate.
335
Not all sequence variations will have clinical significance, which is to say that
not all sequence variations will inform health decisions in any way. The certainty
that any given variation is of clinical significance falls along a continuum of
interpretations.336 To help clinicians in reporting results to families, the American
College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) published recommended categories for
reporting sequence variations. 337 The first category consists of variations that were
previously reported in the Human Gene Mutation Database or the locus-specific
database, and this variation is widely recognized to be the cause of a disorder.
338
The second category exists when a "[s]equence variation is previously unreported
and is of the type which is expected to cause the disorder."339 This is based on the
332. Hiroyuki Tomiyama et al., Clinicogenetic Study of Mutations in LRRK2 Exon 41 in Parkinson's
Disease Patients From 18 Countries, 21 MOVEMENT DISORDERS 1102, 1103 (2006).
333. Compare Robert Marongiu et al., Frequency and Phenotypes of LRRK2 G2019S Mutation in
Italian Patients With Parkinson's Disease, 21 MOVEMENT DISORDERS 1232, 1233 (2006) ("[Tjhe age-
related penetrance of the LRRK2 disease... has been shown to increase from 17% at age 50 up to 85 %
at age 70 years"), with Maradiegue & Edwards, supra note 319, at 450 ("Another example of a highly
penetrant gene is the gene for Huntington's disease, where those with the Huntington mutation will
manifest the disease 100% of the time if they live long enough.").
334. Lynn G. Dressier & Eric T. Juengst, Thresholds and Boundaries in the Disclosure of Individual
Genetic Research Results, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 18, 18 (2006).
335. Id. at 19.
336. Am. C. Med. Genetics Lab. Practice Comm. Working Group, ACMG Recommendations for
Standards for Interpretation of Sequence Variations, 2 GENETICS MED. 302, 302 (2000).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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type of mutation and the predicted shifting of the messenger ribonucleic acid
(mRNA) that encodes the blueprint for a protein's product. 340 The third category
exists when the variation is unreported and may or may not be of the type that
causes the disorder.34' The fourth is when the sequence variation is previously
unreported and probably not the cause of the disorder.342 The fifth and final
category exists when the sequence variation is reported, but is recognized as a
variant with a neutral effect. 3 43 The ACMG acknowledged that while the causative
link may be influenced by many other parameters such as family history or the
sensitivity or specificity of the test being performed, it is important to have a
framework for differentiating the possible clinical significance when reporting
sequence variations to individuals.
344
E. The Method of Disclosure Is Not One-Size Fits All
In the case of "Project Jim," 454 Life Sciences and the Baylor College of
Medicine decided on a "data release pathway," delivering a DVD to Watson that
contained his completed genomic sequence.345 Watson would then accept
responsibility for discussing the risk with his family members, and decide what
should be kept private and how the sequence ought to be made public. 346 This
release pathway seemed appropriate after "rigorous consent" was obtained, and
after Watson requested that his ApoE gene status, which can indicate an elevated
risk for Alzheimer's disease, be redacted.347 Watson is a Nobel Prize winner and
revolutionary geneticist.348 The disclosure vehicle that might work for him cannot
be generalized to the rest of the population, as he has very sophisticated knowledge
about the way genes work and the limits of genome sequencing. What about those
of us who are not scientists, much less geneticists? Should the presidential
candidates receive every possible type of genetic information and then have a
committee review it? Even if we answer yes to these questions, we still must
evaluate how best this information might be communicated to the public, and
whether it should be done so voluntarily.
340. Id. Messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) is a molecule that encodes a chemical blueprint for
producing a gene's protein product. JORDE ET AL, supra note 88, at 11-12.
341. Am. C. Med. Genetics Lab. Practice Comm. Working Group, supra note 336, at 302.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Marshall, supra note 286, at 1780.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
2008]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
I1. SHOULD THE BACKDROP BE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE?
A. Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure: Privacy and Confidentiality
With voluntary disclosure, the candidate would decide which information to
make public or keep private, and would be furnishing the data herself Anything
released would have her imprimatur, and this would remove the problematic issues
discussed above. First, this maintains patient confidentiality and physicians will not
divulge confidential information about their patient. There would be no HIPAA
concerns, as the covered entity cannot prevent a patient from disclosing her own
health data. There could be no action in court for a violation of the candidate's
privacy right, so long as the information is not eventually presented in a way that
the publisher knows to be false or contradictory to the voluntary disclosure. As the
government did not mandate any test as a condition on running for office, there also
could be no Fourth Amendment claim. Similarly, the non-discrimination statutes do
not apply, as their chief purpose is to preserve and protect the near exclusive rights
of individuals to share their genetic information.
It is possible that even under a voluntary disclosure scheme, individuals may
file Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) claims to obtain any information that was
not disclosed by the candidate. 349 However, unlike the privacy tort regime where
public figures are afforded less privacy protection, FOIA protects personnel
information from disclosure that was determined to be private at the time it was
obtained by the government. 5 ° Title 5 of the U.S. Code, Section 552(b)(6) provides
that records are exempt from FOIA requests if they are personnel files, the
disclosure of which would constitute "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.' 35 1 In construing the federal provisions of FOIA, the Supreme Court has
determined that the federal privacy exemption was designed to protect individuals
from the "injury and embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure
of personal information." 352 Courts also look to whether the individual thought the
information would be considered private at the time when they originally provided
349. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966). The Act was
subsequently amended. Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-64 (1974) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1982)) (adding measures to compel agency compliance).
350. See Painting Indus. of Haw. Mkt. Recovery Fund v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 26 F.3d 1479,
1483-84 (9th Cir. 1994) (demonstrating that once a party establishes privacy in the information,
disclosure only results if the information fits within a FOIA exception); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti,
285 F. Supp. 2d 17, 19-20, 31 (D.D.C. 2003); Fine v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 823 F. Supp. 888, 894, 897
(D.N.M. 1993) (mem.) (explaining that a defendant must demonstrate a "substantial privacy interest" for
information to be withheld from disclosure under FOIA).
351. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000 & Supp. V 2006).
352. Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982).
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the information to the government.353 While the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the First Amendment "embodies the right to receive and gain access to
information and ideas, 354 federal courts have "explicitly rejected the proposition
that government officials, by virtue of their positions, forfeit their personal privacy
for FOIA purposes. 355
B. Problems with Voluntary Disclosure: Cover-ups, Captive Kings, and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The main problem with voluntary disclosure is that history demonstrates that
we cannot trust our candidates to reveal important information about their health.356
As there are no requirements for presidents to reveal their health information in any
particular way, they often do so strategically, and many candidates and presidents
have knowingly deceived the public about their health. There are many examples of
presidents and presidential candidates who have outright lied to the public about
their health information. It is therefore worth considering the frequency and depth
of this phenomenon below.
The first major medical cover-up in the White House for which there exists
ample evidence occurred during Grover Cleveland's second term in office.
357
President Cleveland secretly underwent upper jaw surgery to remove a cancerous
node while aboard a yacht in the New York harbor.358 Out of concern that the news
of Cleveland's surgery would cause serious national financial damage, the
attending surgeons cooperated with the President in his attempt to cover up the fact
that he was having any surgery at all.359 The operation was in fact quite serious as
there was danger of stroke as well as explosion from the large amount of ether that
353. Painting Indus., 26 F.3d at 1483; Judicial Watch, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 31; Fine, 823 F. Supp. at
897.
354. Lieberman v. Bd. of Labor Relations, 579 A.2d 505, 513 (Conn. 1990) (citing Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1984)); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 606-07 (1982); Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978)).
355. Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l Archives, 656 F.2d 856, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981); accord
Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978) (protecting the identity of an FBI agent from
public disclosure).
356. Jerrold M. Post, The Health of Presidents and Presidential Candidates: Dilemmas and
Controversies, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 757, 757 (1995) ("[M]any candidates for the highest office had
suffered serious illness before running for high office, the existence or gravity of which had been
concealed from public view.").
357. Carlos Gomez & Kenneth Crispell, The Cover-Up of Presidential Illness, the President's
Physician, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, in 3 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 3, 7 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1996).
358. CRISPELL & GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 204; Gomez & Crispell, supra note 357, at 7.
359. Gomez & Crispell, supra note 357, at 7 ("W.W. Keen, Mr. Cleveland's chief surgeon, withheld
public comment until 1917, 24 years after the operation .... One of the attending surgeons, John F.
Erdmann said that he did more lying during that time period than in all the rest of his life put together.").
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his doctor needed to use on Cleveland's hefty frame. 360 The New York Times
reported that, at the time "Doctor Bryant sa[id] the President [was] absolutely free
from cancer or malignant growth of any description ... [n]o operation ha[d] been
performed, except that a bad tooth was extracted.
3 61
Perhaps more brazen was the cover-up of President Woodrow Wilson's
multiple strokes. Wilson suffered his first stroke in 1896, and experienced three
more strokes throughout his life as researched and recorded by Edward
Weinstein.362 Historians have extensively investigated Wilson's health problems by
using primary documents provided by his doctor Cary Grayson.363 These
documents indicate that Wilson indeed had cardiovascular disease, producing
severe disabling neurological symptoms. 364 Some political commentators have
argued that Wilson's neurological symptoms affected his mental functions during
the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and during his failed campaign to rally
support for the League of Nations. 365 During the famous conference in Paris, Prime
Minister Lloyd-George noted that Wilson had "suffered something like a stroke,"
while others noted that Wilson seemed less alert.366 Herbert Hoover observed that
Wilson's normally quick mind had to "grope for ideas., 367 The President confided
in his physician, Grayson, that he was having trouble in the evening remembering
what happened each afternoon, 36 8 and Dr. Grayson noted that Wilson had "trouble
arranging his thoughts. 369 In 1919, while making a speech to support the creation
of the League of Nations in Pueblo, Colorado, the President "showed signs of a
massive embolism," and a few days later, he suffered from a severe stroke that kept
him incapacitated until his death. 370 The President's wife and doctor continued to
"shroud the true extent of the President's illness in secrecy," as the first lady denied
360. ROBERT H. FERRELL, ILL-ADVISED: PRESIDENTIAL HEALTH AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 6 (1992)
(describing the risk of stroke associated with the President's operation and explaining that because ether
is highly volatile, "its use with the primitive electrical equipment for cauterization could have caused an
explosion").
361. Id. at 8 (quoting an excerpt from an article that appeared in the New York Times on July 7-8,
1893).
362. Gomez & Crispell, supra note 357, at 8-9.
363. Id.; Michael Alison Chandler, A President's Illness Kept Under Wraps, WASH. POST, Feb. 3,
2007, at BI.
364. Gomez & Crispell, supra note 357, at 8.
365. See CRISPELL & GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 15 ("By the time he arrived in France to undertake
the most arduous and dangerous political task of his life, Woodrow Wilson was suffering from the
sequelae of a series of maladies which have been diagnosed as both neurological and psychosomatic in
origin.").
366. Id. at 64.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 65; accord Edwin A. Weinstein, Woodrow Wilson's Neurological Illness, 57 J. AM. HIST.
324, 345 (1970).
370. CRISPELL & GOMEZ, supra note 2 1, at 65-67 accord Weinstein, supra note 369, at 345-46.
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aides access to the President for four months; during that time she took affairs into
her own hands. 371 Dr. Grayson informed the cabinet that Wilson "had suffered a
nervous breakdown, indigestion, and a depleted nervous system," but he cautioned
the cabinet not to bother the President, because "any excitement might kill him."
372
When Robert Lansing, then Secretary of State, pointed out that the Constitution
provided for the Vice President to assume the duties of the President in case of
some incapacity, Grayson was "incensed and said that he would never certify that
the President was disabled., 373 During the several months after Wilson's stroke, the
executive office went almost completely "out of business-[b]ills were left
unsigned, policy left undecided. 374 Mrs. Wilson did all she could to hide her
husband's serious illness, and to "keep the burden of government from hindering
his recovery., 37 5 Up until Wilson's death, Grayson continuously issued his
"reassuring, and patently false, press releases" about the President's health.376
Likewise, it is now well known that Franklin D. Roosevelt had medical
problems throughout his life. He had typhoid, stomach distress, appendicitis and
lumbago, pneumonia and severe influenza, tonsillitis, and sinusitis. 377 Of course, he
also developed polio in 192 1, from which he never fully recovered.378 In addition to
the paralysis of his legs as a result of the polio, Roosevelt had many other problems
such as severe coughing and heart failure, perhaps due to an enlarged left
ventricle. 379 The President had to take long naps during the day and slept for
approximately ten hours a night. 380 Roosevelt once left the White House for five
weeks to rest, leaving major world events to occur in his absence: he was
nominated for the Democratic Party ticket, the Russians captured Riga and invaded
Warsaw, and the American troops captured Brittany in France. 381 Roosevelt was
aided in his health cover-up by a cooperative media that was deferential to his
image management. 382 The image management ran deep, involving misleading
disclosures by his doctors and staged speaking platforms that would disguise the
President's disability. 383 When Roosevelt hosted dinner parties, his aides would
wheel him into the dining room first so that guests would not witness this as they
371. CRISPELL & GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 70.
372. Id. at 70-71.
373. Id. at 71.
374. ld.(citation omitted).
375. Id.
376. See id. at 72.
377. GILBERT, supra note 37, at 43-44.
378. Bruenn, supra note 53, at 579.
379. Id. at 579-82, 590-91.
380. Id. at 581-82.
381. Id. at 587.
382. GILBERT, supra note 37, at 47-48.
383. Id. at 49-50, 53-54.
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filed into the room. 384 The President engaged in other types of "presidential
theatrics" to camouflage his severe physical disability, including sitting on a
bicycle that was cloaked in ferns so that he would appear to be standing while
addressing a group.3 85 He often disguised his inability to walk by having his aides
escort him to the podium, which he would grasp for support as he spoke.386
"Unknown to the public until recent years was the fact that [Roosevelt]... had
visited the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda at least 29 times" from 1941
to 1945, using false names. 387 In 1970, Roosevelt's physician, Dr. Howard Bruenn,
published an account of the President's health history.388 This history revealed that
Roosevelt had hypertensive heart disease, heart failure, and high blood pressure,
and was in frequent need of bed rest due to his poor health. 389 Dr. Bruenn stated:
"[I]n most instances not only have the details [regarding the illness of a president]
been obscure[d] but the very fact that illness existed has been not infrequently
denied. 3 90 He closed by acknowledging the reason for his long-awaited
publication: "Many people rightfully attach much importance to the health records
of the men whom they have considered and elected to the office of President of the
United States.
39 1
President John F. Kennedy successfully concealed that he had Addison's
disease, a potentially fatal adrenal illness, by managing the debilitating effects with
regular shots of cortisone. 392 As the 1960 presidential campaign approached, the
question of Kennedy's health became front-page news for the first time. 393 Stories
circulated that Kennedy had more than just back pain-rumors spread that he had
some incurable "malady., 394 The Kennedy camp lied about what they knew of
Kennedy's adrenal function at the time, stating that "[John F. Kennedy] does not
now nor has he ever had an ailment described classically as Addison's disease,
which is a tuberculosis destruction of the adrenal gland. Any statement to the
contrary is malicious and false. . . .395 Kennedy's campaign team created the
image of a "young, heroic politician, full of vital energy," an image that the media
and general public accepted, and which catapulted Kennedy into the White House,
384. Id. at 49-50.
385. Id. at 50.
386. Id. at48, 50.
387. Gomez & Crispell, supra note 357, at 15.
388. Bruenn, supra note 53, at 579.
389. Id. at 580-81.
390. Id. at 579.
391. Id. at 591.
392. Robins & Post, supra note 17, at 846 (suggesting that Kennedy was receiving some cocktail of
amphetamines and steroids to treat his Addison's disease).
393. Gomez & Crispell, supra note 357, at 20.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
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despite his serious health problems. 396 In a clever spin, Kennedy's doctor, Dr. Janet
Travell, suggested that to call Kennedy an Addisonian would be a misdiagnosis, as
he did not exhibit one of the disease's main symptoms-pigmentation of the skin or
mucous membranes. 397 Travell failed to mention that the cortisone treatments that
he was taking would clear up the discoloration.398 Further, his "depletion of adrenal
function" was said to be due to malaria, 399 and his back pain appeared after he
swam to rescue fellow military men when his boat was blown up in World War
1I. 400 Later, his spokesperson would say that they did not use the term "Addison's
disease," even though they knew that to be what it was, because the public wrongly
thought that Addison's was fatal, and it would give a false impression to use the
term.40 1 When deciding who should run alongside Kennedy in the event that he
were to step down, Kennedy famously told one of his aides, Kenny O'Donnell:
"I'm the healthiest candidate for President in the United States.... [and] I'm not
going to die in office. So the vice presidency doesn't mean anything.
402
There have also been examples of presidential candidates deceiving the public
about their health. Paul Tsongas was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in
1983, 403 and in his 1992 presidential campaign he attempted to counter the image of
a recovering cancer patient by releasing ads where he vigorously swam the
butterfly. 404 During this campaign, he lied to the public, characterizing himself as
11 405
"cancer-free" when in fact he was fully aware that he was no longer in remission.
The doctors who treated Tsongas at the Dana-Farber Cancer Center were complicit
in this dishonesty, as they masked the fact that the bone marrow transplant that
Tsongas received did not cure him of cancer.40 6 They knew that the cancer recurred
in 1987, which required excising a cancerous node.40 7 Instead of confronting this
recurrence directly, the medical team used euphemistic and misleading language to
describe Tsongas' health to the press.40 8 The cancer was referred to as "suspicious
396. Id. at 21-22.
397. CRISPELL & GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 195.
398. Id. at 195-96.
399. Id. at 195.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 199.
402. This was in response to O'Donnell's opposition to choosing Johnson as the Vice President,
should Kennedy die in office. KENNETH P. O'DONNELL ET AL., "JOHNNY, WE HARDLY KNEW YE," at
vii, 192-93 (1972).
403. Editorial, Cancer in a Presidential Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1992, at A26.
404. Karen De Witt, Tsongas Pitches Economic Austerity, Mixed with Patriotism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
1, 1992, at A10.
405. See Lawrence K. Altman, Tsongas's Health: Privacy and the Public's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 1993, at A26.
406. Robins & Post, supra note 17, at 854.
407. Id.
408. Id.
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cells" and the radiation he received was labeled "precautionary. 40 9 There are no
doubt countless others who have run for office under false pretenses about their
health, and the examples listed above only highlight some of those for whom we
have documented evidence of extensive cover-ups.
Many presidents who were sick or died in office have left inspiring and
fruitful legacies in United States government. 4  This point underscores that
presidents need not be completely healthy to be effective leaders. However, the
degree to which presidents and presidential candidates have been able to dupe the
public regarding their health through obfuscation, secrecy, and cover-ups is
somewhat mind-boggling. The quality of the data presented through voluntary
means cannot be verified. It also cannot be sufficiently relied upon as the
physicians providing the summaries may be close friends of the candidate, or they
may have a conflict of interest that runs counter to the desire for full and accurate
disclosure.4 '
Another problem with voluntary disclosure lies in the political structure of the
executive branch and the ways in which power is transferred should a president
become unable to discharge her duties. This is where the critical link is made
between what information is divulged during the run up to the White House and
how this disclosure may be relevant once the successful individual is inaugurated.
If we had a clear mechanism for diagnosing disease in presidents and assessing
when a president is too diseased to effectively govern, then information gathered
during the campaign stage would be less relevant. But as we will see below, the
Constitutional mechanisms for transferring power when the President is disabled
are not described in great detail.
The only formal, legal method for the transfer of presidential power due to
presidential disability is the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 412 The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1967 in the wake of Eisenhower's
cardiac problems and the growing concern of presidential disability and uncertain
procedures for succession. 3 The Amendment provides a method for the President
to certify to his disability, transfer his duties to the Vice President, and then resume
409. Id. Paul Tsongas eventually apologized for the cover-up in an editorial for the New York Times.
Paul Tsongas, The Cancer Freed Me. It FreedMe., N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at A29.
410. Herbert L. Abrams, The Vulnerable President and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, with
Observations on Guidelines, a Health Commission, and the Role of the President's Physician, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 453, 461-62 (1995) (listing the fourteen presidents of the twentieth century who
suffered from significant illnesses while serving the Presidency).
411. One of Paul Tsongas' physicians at the Dana Farber Cancer Center, Dr. Tak Takvorian had
contributed money to Tsongas' campaign and thus had not only a personal but a financial investment in
presenting a rosy picture about the candidate's health. Abrams, supra note 37, at 801, 803. Also,
Tsongas was a trustee of the Dana Farber Cancer Center, posing its own conflict of interest. Id. at 803.
412. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
413. William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of Presidential Succession: "'The
Emperor Has No Clones," 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1393, 1399-400 (1987).
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his duties when no longer disabled.414 The flaw of the Amendment is twofold. First,
it vests initial authority in the President to certify to his disability.415 For obvious
reasons, evidenced throughout history, presidents loath to give up their power
voluntarily, and particularly if they are disabled and grasping at straws.
The second flaw in the amendment is its provision that allows the Vice
President and a majority of the cabinet to determine disability in the event that the
President is unable to certify to his disability.4 16 This is a problem because a
physically or psychologically impaired president "might cling to office, concealing
the extent of his impairment behind a protective cordon of aides whose loyalties as
'president's men' lie primarily to the person rather than to the office., 4 17 If a leader
is totally disabled by heart attack or gunshot wound, it is quite difficult to cover up
or ignore. A more insidious and subversive problem is that of a partially disabled or
neurologically impaired president, such as President Wilson.418 If the President is
fully aware of his disability, this allows his principal advisors, cabinet members,
and the Vice President to "become co-conspirators in their efforts to deny or
minimize the extent of the disability., 419 Conversely, it could lead to clever
414. The third section of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment states:
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
Section four provides:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office ....
Id. § 4, cl. 1-2.
415. Id. § 3.
416. Id. § 4; Jimmy Carter, Message from Former President Jimmy Carter, in PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY, at xv (James F. Toole & Robert J. Joynt eds., 2001).
417. Edwin M. Yoder Jr., Determining Presidential Health Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 607, 608 (1995).
418. See Mohr, supra note 59, at 785 ("In obvious situations, such as a massive stroke, a medical
disability determination should be quite easy. In other medical conditions, such as Alzheimer's disease,
alcoholism, AIDS, or insidious mental illness, astute clinical judgment and considerable courage may be
required to make such a determination."); see supra notes 362-76 and accompanying text.
419. Post & Robins, supra note 161, at 341; see also Louis A. Gottschalk et al., Presidential
Candidates and Cognitive Impairment Measured from Verbal Behavior in Campaign Debates, 48 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 613, 617 (1988) ("The impaired brain can sometimes not critically evaluate its own
malfunction.").
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manipulation of the leader by his close advisors. A conflict presents itself when the
very person who would receive the transfer of power is the one to initiate it.
Researchers looking at the effects of a leader's disability on political decision-
making determined that particularly in less transparent leadership models where
there is "no clear succession mechanism, the intricate relationship between the
disabled leader and his inner circle can be of crucial significance., 420 The aide or
vice president who acts too assertively to invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
when the President is incapacitated may find himself alienated if the President
recovers.
Adding to this, presidents are special patients and because of that, they may
receive especially bad treatment. 421 Research shows that celebrity patients often
receive worse care because their medical team is often too many or too few,
comprised often of inexpert physician-friends, and the referral channel is typically
indirect and unusual, which can lead to a lack of continuity in care.422 Celebrity
patients more frequently call the shots in the delivery of their care, which can lead
to improper treatment where the providers are too deferential and may not advise
the cabinet of the President's truly failing systems.
423
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment has not been invoked when it ought to be.
424
This leaves the efficacy of the Amendment largely untested as only one President
has ever invoked it for the transfer of presidential power to the Vice President due
to the inability of the President to perform his functions.425 This is remarkable
given the life-threatening and temporarily incapacitating events that have taken
place since the passage of the Amendment. After Ronald Reagan was shot and
seriously wounded, it was not clear that he was going to live.4 26 Even so, the Vice
President did not initiate the transfer of presidential power temporarily to himself
420. Post & Robins, supra note 161, at 333.
42 1. See Anastasia Kucharski, On Being Sick and Famous, 5 POL. PSYCHOL. 69, 79-80 (1984).
422. Id. at 70.
423. Often the inner circle will cater to the leader's denial of ill health, and this will prevent direct
and timely treatment of the disease. Post & Robins, supra note 161, at 341. There are many examples of
this throughout history. When Ataturk suffered from liver disease, his staff shared in his denial by
repeatedly exterminating the palace for the "insects" biting at him. Id. "It was only when [Ataturk] left
the country that a physician whose view was not clouded by idolization saw the obvious stigmata of
terminal liver disease." Id.
424. E.g., Abrams, supra note 410, at 460-62 (noting that President Reagan refused to invoke the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment when he underwent surgery to remove his colon cancer even though he
delegated the power of the presidency to the Vice President).
425. Mike Allen, Bush Resumes Power After Test, WASH. POST, June 30, 2002, at A13. On July 21,
2007, President George Bush wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate indicating that he planned to invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and pass
his duties off temporarily to the Vice President, as he was undergoing sedation for a routine procedure.
Jim Rutenberg, Bush Has 5 Polyps Removed in Colon Cancer Screening, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2007, at
A20.
426. Abrams, supra note 410, at 455-458.
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according to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 427 Again, Reagan underwent surgery
on July 13, 1985 to have a polyp removed from his colon.428 The President was
under anesthesia for several hours, and slept from 11:28 a.m. until about 7:00
p.m. 429 Although he transferred the duties of his office to the Vice President, he
wrote a letter before surgery stating:
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will be briefly and
temporarily incapable of discharging the Constitutional powers and
duties of the office .... I am mindful of the provisions of Section III of
the 25th Amendment. . . . I do not believe that the drafters of this
Amendment intended its application to situations such as the instant
430
one.
The means by which the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should be invoked are thus not
abundantly clear, and as this is the case, it becomes even more important for voters
to have information on the health of the President. If we cannot rely on the
President to step down when disabled, or on his cabinet and inner circle to invoke
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment when necessary, we really ought to know more about
the underlying health of the President before he is elected.
C. Benefits of Mandatory Disclosure: Standardization and Openness
The benefits of mandatory disclosure mirror the disadvantages for voluntary
disclosure. Even so, mandatory disclosure would have to involve adequate
regulation and enforcement to ensure that it is not voluntary disclosure dressed up
in the clothes of compliance with a required Congressional form. If Congress were
to mandate some sort of regulated health disclosure before a candidate could
receive federal matching funds for his campaign, the candidate could not cover up
any potentially serious health issues by providing careful summaries of his health
or no summaries at all. Each candidate would be held to the same standard, and the
same information would be released for each person, yielding better comparative
information. Voters would be able to be as informed as possible about the
candidate's health, rather than relying on photo-ops of the candidates running
around picturesque Camp David, eating salads, or sailing on the Chesapeake.
Having a more concrete idea of the presidential candidates' health risk factors
could prompt voters to evaluate more closely the vice presidential candidate if the
President's health appears to be diminished in some way. In addition, with
427. Id. at 460.
428. JOHN R. BUMGARNER, THE HEALTH OF PRESIDENTS 284 (1994); accord Gerald M. Boyd, On
the Mend; White House Prepares for a Post-Surgical Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1985, available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fllpage.htmlsec=health&res--9C0 1 E3D91538F932A I 5754COA9639482
60.
429. See BUMGARNER, supra note 428, at 284.
430. Id. at 284-85 (internal citation omitted).
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mandatory disclosure, we would not need to worry as much about a secretive and
protective cabinet shielding the public from the truth about the President's health,
or manipulating his poor health to advance a puppet-style agenda.
D. Problems with Mandatory Disclosure: Third Parties, Stigma, and Privacy
While the benefits of regulated mandatory disclosure are legion, the obstacles
confronted by such a scheme are as well. In addition to the legal framework
discussed above, there are ethical problems with disclosing the results of a
presidential candidates' genetic test. First of all, to the extent the President has any
living family members, they will learn something about their own genetic profile
that they may not want to know. Unlike tests for pregnancy or kidney function,
genetic tests would convey information that could be clinically extrapolated to the
candidate's extended family.43' We may learn that the President is a carrier for
genetic diseases that he does not express, but that his children might. This is not a
trivial bit of information, and could impact the family member's day-to-day
behavior, pregnancy planning, and psychological well-being.432 Much of the
invasion of privacy doctrine rests on the distinction between public and private
people and the fact that public people hold themselves out for public scrutiny.433
The children or siblings of presidential candidates did not choose to be thrust into
the public sphere. We need to think critically about whether they should have their
health privacy compromised on behalf of a third-party's actions. It is one thing to
communicate the genetic results to family members privately, it is another thing
entirely to make this publicly available.
434
The effect on stigmatization of disease could cut either way, depending on the
facts of each case and public reception of each candidate's illness. On the one hand,
a successful candidate who has depression could erode the stigma of this disorder
by exposing its prevalence and the benefits of drug therapy. However, if the
candidate is never given the chance to prove that someone with depression can
effectively manage his professional life and mood, the stigma will attach.
Another ethical problem with mandatory disclosure is that even if the
candidate is herself consenting to increased scrutiny by running for office, it is not
431. John Balint, Issues of Privacy and Confidentiality in the New Genetics, 9 ALB. L.J. ScI. &
TECH. 27, 29 (1998); Nancy Kreiger et al., A Qualitative Study of Subject Recruitment for Familial
Cancer Research, 11 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 219, 219 (2001).
432. See e.g., Janene Holzberg, Genetic Counselor Shows Patients the Options; Neighbors, BALT.
SUN, Dec. 21, 2007, at 3G.
433. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
434. The American Society for Clinical Oncology (ASCO) believes that obligations to at-risk family
members are best fulfilled by communicating the familial risk to the person who is being tested, where
the provider will stress the importance of sharing this information with family members so that they too
can benefit. Am. Soc'y of Clinical Oncology, American Society of Clinical Oncology Policy Statement
Update: Genetic Testing for Cancer Susceptibility, 21 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2397, 2403 (2003).
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clear that we want to expose the candidates to every possible type of scrutiny. There
might be some types of information that are so private and so personal that we
might even want to protect the most public people from being forced to disclose
them. 435 As a society, we must ask ourselves whether we want to discourage
reasonable people from running for office because we make disclosure so unwieldy
and intrusive. In a democratic society that supports free speech, we cannot control
the tabloid-type obsession with silly details about public figures' lives. But we do
not have to encourage it with statutes mandating disclosure. In fact, we might want
to consider the long-term effects of focusing on what might be considered
peripheral information about candidates.
A theoretical problem with disclosure is that the list of diseases or disorders
for which testing is mandated will inevitably be both over and under-inclusive. Due
to the universe of possible neurological or cardiac diseases that could debilitate the
President's decision-making capacity, it would be impossible to tailor a subset of
genetic tests that captures everything without including some that are less relevant.
There would necessarily be a point of diminishing returns, where each additional
genetic test would add little probabilistic value of detecting significant health risk.
To the extent the list is under-inclusive, disclosure at the candidacy stage may
reduce vigilance in monitoring presidential health as it may be perceived that
anything relevant would have been captured by the pre-presidential screening.
Another ethical hurdle exists due to the poorly regulated market for
commercial genetic tests. If a genetic test is administered as part of a package of
clinical services, the clinical laboratory performing the test is subject to the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Act, (CLIA) which imposes basic requirements regarding
personnel qualifications, quality-control standards, and documentation and
validation of testing procedures.436 Since the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) "has not created a genetic testing 'specialty' for molecular and
biological tests. . . specific proficiency testing for genetic tests is not mandated
under CLIA.'A 37 Genetic tests performed using a kit of purchased reagents and
protocols are regulated by the FDA as in vitro diagnostic devices, much like the
kits used to diagnose HIV.43 s However, of the roughly one thousand commercially
available genetic tests, less than a dozen are sold as kits and have been reviewed by
435. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967).
436. Pub. L. No. 90-174, § 5, 81 Stat. 533, 536-39 (1967), amended by Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 236a
(2000)). CLIA is enforced by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA): Overview (Nov.
8, 2007), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/clia/.
437. Gail H. Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Federal Neglect: Regulation of Genetic Testing, ISSUES SCI. &
TECH., Spring 2006, at 59-61.
438. Audrey Huang, Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr., Who Regulates Genetic Tests? (Sept. 27, 2007),
http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/issuebriefpdfs/Who-Regulates-Genetic-Tests-Issue-Brief.pdf.
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the FDA.439 This means that the FDA does not regulate the overwhelming majority
of genetic tests. Labs that assemble their tests in-house are subject to minimal
CLIA oversight, and CMS cannot conduct pre- or post-market surveillance of the
analytic validity or utility of these tests. 440 The FDA has stated publicly that it lacks
statutory authority to regulate in-house assembled genetic tests.44 1 Presumably the
problems with lack of clinical laboratory quality controls could be mitigated when
it is a public figure receiving the test as part of a Congressional mandate; however,
it is worth highlighting the lack of uniformity in laboratory and test regulation as
another compounding factor in test reliability. Lack of FDA standards or oversight
further compromises the clinical and analytical validity of the test. It intensifies the
potential of confusing consumers and leading them to believe that the test is a more
accurate predictor of disease than it is.
In order to mandate some type of health disclosure, such a scheme would
need to overcome challenges under state laws, federal statutes, and the
Constitution. As we saw from the discussion above, there are many safeguards that
protect an individual's health information from being disclosed, including the
physician-patient privilege, HIPAA, tort law, GINA, and the Fourth Amendment.
However, if disclosures were legally mandated, we would eliminate the problems
with unauthorized disclosure of protected health information under HIPAA, as
there is a carve-out for disclosures as required by law. 442 A careful look at each of
the employee categories covered by GINA and the other existing non-
discrimination statutes reveal that public officials such as the President are not
currently defined to be protected "employees." Federal agency employees, the
military, and public employees in group insurance plans are statutorily protected,
but not presidential candidates or presidents themselves.443 The remaining
constraints on disclosure hinge on whether the presidential candidate's health
information is considered a matter of public interest. If it is, then it is likely there
will be no successful tort of invasion of privacy, as the precedent holds that private
information may be publicly disclosed about public figures when it is newsworthy,
i.e., in the public interest. 4  The physician-patient privilege is not inviolate." 5
439. Id.
440. Javitt & Hudson, supra note 437, at 61.
441. Id.
442. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2007).
443. See supra Part II.A.
444. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) ("[l~f a newspaper lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not punish the
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order."); Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (adopting the standard from Daily Mail).
445. See Mohr, supra note 59, at 789 ("1 choose to believe that physicians must maintain
confidentiality within the context of the doctor-patient relationship unless a compelling legal or ethical
reason exists to release information without a patient's consent in the interest of the public welfare. Any
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Physicians have in fact been obligated to breach their patient's privilege if it was
squarely in the public interest446 (and it might be possible to tailor the disclosure in
a way so that a physician is not complicit and the information comes only from the
candidate herself). The balancing test under the Fourth Amendment depends
greatly on the degree to which the search is considered part of the public interest.
44 7
If the government's purpose in the search greatly advances the public interest or
national security, it is much more likely to be upheld. Thus, everything depends on
just how much the public interest is served by knowing more about the President's
health, and specifically his genetic information. To know whether disclosure of the
genetic information would be in the public interest, we need to look more deeply at
what type of genetic information is being shared.
E. Which Types of Genetic Information May Be Appropriate for Mandatory
Public Disclosure?
So how then might we decide which battery of genetic tests would be
appropriate to employ in any mandatory presidential health test? Some of the
options are: (i) tests for linkages at certain loci associated with behavioral traits; (ii)
genome sequencing; (iii) high-density SNP testing; (iv) SNP genotype testing for a
defined group of cognitive diseases such as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's or dementia;
or (v) genotype testing for only those diseases with strong genotype-phenotype
correlations. This section will analyze each of these in turn.
Behavioral genetics traits may be the most interesting to potential voters, but
they are also the most difficult to test. Even whole genome sequencing cannot
diagnose or even predict any increased risk for expressing these behaviors, 448 as we
have only scraped the surface in identifying some of the genes associated with
complex behavioral traits. Perhaps one day we will have batteries of genetics tests
for behaviors such as autism or alcoholism, but for now behavioral genetics still
operates largely in a world of loose associations in large populations. What is more,
we have a much better predictor of a presidential candidate's behavioral traits, that
is, his demonstrated behavior. Put differently, why rely on a grouping of genotypes
that indicate greater likelihood for risk-taking when voters can ostensibly assess the
candidate's risk-taking behavior directly by reviewing his record? If this is the case,
the public simply needs more vigilant media scrutiny on information that matters,
namely the candidate's health and health behavior.
The next option is whole-genome sequencing. As was discussed above,
Venter's genome report tells us some interesting things, but not all of it is currently
such release of medical information in the public interest must only be done through properly
established channels ....").
446. E.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346-47 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
447. See supra notes 113-40 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
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relevant to his health, and much of it is useless in his clinical care.449 We learn from
his genomic sequence that his parents were not closely related. 450 He has the short
form of the DRD4 III Exon SNP,45' which indicates he is less likely to be novelty
seeking, 452 but he also has the C/C genotype on the DRD4 gene, 453 which
conversely indicates the "highest novelty seeking scores. 454 How do we interpret
this apparent contradiction? While it seems that this information may be interesting
to some voters, the roughly $1 million price of the genome sequence combined
with the two months of full laboratory support that it would take to create each
profile makes this impractical. 455 The public and Congress are not likely to endorse
this method in order to find out information such as whether Rudy Guliani's
parents were closely related or that John McCain is genetically predisposed to be a
night owl. While the information that whole genome sequencing could provide
would no doubt satisfy some morbid curiosity, it is not of great public value when
weighed against its cost. This is especially true given that most clinically and
publicly relevant data found through high-density SNP testing could specifically be
tested, such as appearance of the ApoE e4 allele as a predictor of elevated risk of
Alzheimer's disease.456
As 23andMe and Navigenics, Inc. now provide the second option of high-
density SNP testing for under $1000 per pop, 457 it might be more cost-justified to
test presidential candidates for this information. While the online commercial
providers claim that their information is currently meant for novelty purposes, 458 in
the hands of a skilled geneticist some predictions could be made about risk of
certain types of cancer, diabetes or Alzheimer's disease. Not all of the information
that is provided would be in the public interest, and so some winnowing down of
the 600,000 SNPs provided would perhaps be necessary in advance of any public
449. See supra notes 284-87 and accompanying text,
450. See Levy et a]., supra note 284, at 2115, 2118 ("[W]e identified heterozygous alleles within the
HuRef sequence. This variation represents differences in the maternal and paternal chromosomes.").
451. Id. at 2134 tbl.13.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Press Release, 454 Life Scis., supra note 287.
456. Ertekin-Taner, supra note 24, at 628 (demonstrating that longitudinal studies have concluded
that the presence of ApoE is a predictor of future Alzheimer's Disease development, but also stating that
its use in the clinical setting is not substantiated).
457. Mike Macpherson et al., 23andMe, White Paper 23-01 (Nov. 18, 2007),
https://www.23andmeobjects.com/res/2273/pdf/23-02-IncidenceAndEthnicity.pdf; 23andme.com,
Build Your Order, https://www.23andme.com/store (last visited Feb. 8, 2008) (showing price of $999.00
per kit).
458. E.g., 23andMe, About Us: Core Values, https://www.23andme.com/about/values/ (last visited
May 4, 2008) (stating that the company was "founded to empower individuals"); About Navigenics:
What Do We Do?, http://www.navigenics.com/corp/About/ (last visited May 4, 2008) ("[N]avigenics
brings genetics out of the lab to help you live a longer, healthier life.").
[VOL. 1 1:295
DOUBLE HELIX, DOUBLE STANDARDS
disclosure. The reliability of the predictions may not be great, but in some sense
there may be value to the public in mere elevated risk, regardless of whether this
risk materializes.
Rather than test a veritable sea of SNPs, it might be preferable to determine a
subset of diseases that are most relevant to presidential governance, and then test
only for those. This could include chromosomal, mtDNA, or smaller groupings of
SNP mutations that are associated with such things as cognition or memory. While
it would not be a trivial task to get the policymakers to agree on which genotypes
should be assayed, it is theoretically possible to narrow the field to those disorders
that. would significantly impair the individual's decision-making or executive
functioning on average. The benefit from this type of genetic test is that there will
be less noise from presenting data that is completely unrelated to a president's
ability to govern. However, the same caveats apply that were discussed above.
Depending on the specific genotype that is being studied, there may not be great
statistical data as to likelihood of the disease being expressed and how severe it
would be.
In general, the tighter the causal link, the more the public interest is served by
possessing the genetic information. Think back to our discussion of Huntington's
disease and how the candidate's possession of one copy of a mutant gene would
almost always predict development of that neurological disease in some form.4 59
This type of genetic information would better fit in with information in the public
interest, as there is no conjecturing about the potential of developing a disease and
the information takes on less of a gossip, novelty flare. However, the majority of
traits we have discussed herein are not inherited in this way. Only certain diseases
can be predicted based on a single mutation or single gene, and yet we would be
under-inclusive if we only tested for such disorders. Further, testing only certain
diseases based on a single known phenotype with demonstrated single-allele causal
genotypes would perhaps be an under-inclusive approach as many of the multi-
factoral neurological or disabling diseases would not be captured.
460
Specific determinations as to which tests ought to be employed based on
current clinical utility or validity is beyond the scope of this paper and the expertise
of its author. However, if genetic testing of candidates is pursued, an expert panel
of clinical human geneticists should then provide recommendations to Congress on
which tests would be appropriate in any given campaign cycle. Should genetic tests
predicting the likelihood of developing dementia, Parkinson's, Alzheimer's or
serious cardiovascular disease become reliable and valid, information on the risk of
developing these types of diseases would be particularly useful to voters. As was
discussed in brief above, there is psychological value in the genetic data that exists
apart from any clinical value or diagnosis. It might not have true public import, but
459. Maradiegue & Edwards, supra note 319.
460. See supra Part lI.D.
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it might have public value based on old-fashioned curiosity surrounding celebrities.
Whether this is a laudable justification will be discussed further below.
1. Even If This Is Legal, Is It Ethical to Fully Disclose, and How Might This
Be Done?
Even if we waive the confidentiality of genetic information when speaking of
presidential candidates, this does not mean we should waive the rest of the ethical
safeguards implemented for private individual tests. There is no public interest
served by prohibiting the candidate from accessing other clinically relevant
information about the test. Irrespective of the method of disclosure, the candidate
should have access to genetic counseling. The candidate should also be provided
information about the therapeutic options or lack thereof, the sensitivity and
specificity of the test, and the strength of susceptibility predictions. This would
typically occur before one can consent to the test, but in a mandatory framework, it
should still be part of the testing and disclosure process.
There is quite a gulf between full disclosure and keeping the records entirely
private. The appropriateness of the disclosure of course depends on its purpose. A
private panel reviewing Watson's or Venter's genome sequence and then
discussing the results privately with either scientist would not serve the group's aim
of broadening access to comparative genomic data. Similarly, reporting genetic test
results only to the presidential candidate does not directly serve the public interest
if there is no mechanism by which this information is publicized. There may be
some public good in the candidates' knowing what their genetic test results are so
that they can minimize whatever environmental factors exacerbate development of
genetic disease. Because we have no way of knowing how the candidates will
respond to this information, if at all, the public interest component is severely
diminished if the information is not publicly shared. The true value in the
information comes from voters being able to predict the health of the presidential
candidate in some way and to use this to inform their decision-making.
If the point of departure in this section is mandatory genetic testing, at least
some information should be communicated to the public in order to justify the test.
The question then becomes what would be most useful. One possible option is
confidential review of certain genetic tests by a skilled medical panel, which would
then provide either a "medically fit" or "medically unfit" assessment based on the
candidate's genetic information. Assuming for a second that the panel was
approved by Congress, the value of this "fit" for the job stamp of approval would
be highly suspect and probably politically very dicey. Sympathizers to anyone who
was deemed "medically unfit" could argue that the panel had been hijacked, and
questions about the legitimacy of the clandestine and binary decision would no
doubt ensue. To counter these questions of legitimacy, surely there should be
medical geneticists as well as population geneticists, counselors, neurologists,
cardiologists and internists; but how would these people be selected? If they are
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appointed by the executive branch for political reasons, then speaking practically,
there might as well not be mandated public disclosure. Some sort of bipartisan
committee might meet the goals of fair and standardized disclosure, where each
party selects four members from particular medical disciplines, and then the
Director of the Institute of Medicine or some other respected CMS or NIH
representative could break the tie.461 The candidate's personal primary care
physician could serve in a consultative role, but probably should not draft or
comment on the final statement that would be issued. The details of such a
committee's composition are subject to additional research and review, and will not
be investigated in depth here. Suffice it to say that some type of confidential
reviewing panel is one option.
There could also be a tiered disclosure option to promote the autonomy of the
candidates while at the same time screening them for relevant health risks. This
approach has been suggested in the context of revealing genetic test results to
participants in research protocols, but could be applied to this situation as well, as
the data would not be primarily used for the individual's clinical care .462 Here, the
presidential candidate could choose what type of information he would want to
have personally communicated to him, and the other information would be
destroyed once the testing took place. The candidate could then be required to
comment on the information that was disclosed to him in a public setting, choosing
whatever means of communication he so chooses, but with the understanding that if
he contradicts what an independent panel finds, that they could go public with the
contradiction. While this option favors the autonomy of the President, it is
practically not that useful. If the candidates can choose what information they want
to know, and this will become the universe that can be commented upon in the
public media, then the candidates will just choose to know nothing or very little
about their genetic test results.
Another option is review by a confidential, bipartisan medical panel as
loosely described above, which would publish a health report rather than a mere
statement that the candidate is either medically fit or not fit for the job. This report
would outline any significant present health issues, as well as highlight any
significant potential future health risks based upon the candidate's genetic data. It
would not be detailed, and would consist only of "comments" in each of the
selected medical disciplines. With the exception of the President's personal
physician, it seems that the same panel should oversee each of the candidates, for
consistency and fairness. Of course, what would be considered significant is a
461. Some variations on this type of review panel have been suggested elsewhere. For example, Dr.
Bert Park contemplates a medical panel to review the health of the President generally. Bert E. Park,
Presidential Disability: Past Experiences and Future Implications, 7 POL. & LFE SCI. 50, 57 (1988);
accord Abrams, supra note 410, at 464-65.
462. Mark A. Rothstein, Tiered Disclosure Options Promote the Autonomy and Well-Being of
Research Subjects, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 20-21 (2006).
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pivotal question, and would no doubt be roundly debated. There are many
possibilities to get the debate going as to what may register as "significant." One
definition could include anything that the panel thinks could reasonably and
foreseeably lead to an event that could give rise to a Twenty-Fifth Amendment
transfer of power. However, we have seen that presidents differ in terms of what
would trigger a Twenty-Fifth Amendment event.463 Another possible definition
could have a temporal prognosis attached, and include any information that
indicates an increased likelihood that the candidate may develop a physical or
mental disability in the next four years that would negatively affect his day-to-day
executive functioning, decision-making, or general ability to govern. These are
only two of many potential definitions.
Another option would be for the specific genetic mutations that the candidates
possess to be disclosed, along with statistical data about how likely it would be for
the candidate to develop the phenotype for the disease. Embedded within this
option could be the idea that only those tests that are clinically and analytically
valid and yield useful data about risk susceptibility would be administered. It is not
necessary that the test have any clinical utility, in that we are not exclusively
concerned here with whether interventions or therapies exist; this is where the role
of patient and president are quite divorced. If the test is not clinically valid, or if
there is insufficient replicated data to support the susceptibility prediction, then the
genetic information should not be disclosed. The problem with this method is that
as the presidential candidates approach celebrity status, anything associated with
them can become an advertisement or endorsement for use. A candidate's genetic
test may serve somehow to encourage inappropriate consumer genetic tests. It
would not be irrational for private individuals to confuse the purpose of the
candidate's test (information dissemination of comparative risks) with the potential
for clinical benefit. The reasons for testing the candidate would not be wholly to
intervene or improve her care. The chief reason may be to share the genetic data in
the hopes that this may inform voters' decisions. This is quite distinct from any
clinical goals, and yet as the candidate's genetic test may operate as an
advertisement, the public may inflate the value of genetic testing for clinical care.
The public nature of the test may also lead to perpetuation of deterministic thinking
about the relationship between genes and disease. Lastly, disclosing the candidate's
genetic information may reinforce associations between diseases and specific
ethnic groups, and may increase stigma if certain polymorphisms are considered
too deleterious or risky for public life. 46
Theoretically, another option would be to post the candidates' SNPs or
sequence data on a website without any accompanying statistical or descriptive
463. See supra notes 412-30 and accompanying text.
464. Sarah E. Gollust et al., Limitations of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising for Clinical Genetic
Testing, 288 JAMA 1762, 1764 (2002).
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information. However, this will not help if the goal is to provide voters with
information that will assist them in their decision-making. Merely posting data
about an individual's genetic polymorphisms or sequence absent any idea of how
this mutation increases risk would be virtually meaningless. It would be like
handing sheet music to someone who does not play an instrument, and then telling
them to transpose the notes to a different key. Genetic information in a vacuum will
likely only confuse the voter, as he will not be able to interpret what the mutations
mean. Is this mutation the only way to develop the disorder, or is it even the most
common way? Does the SNP interact with other mutations? Is it highly penetrant?
Does this mutation only increase the risk by a small percentage? What kind of
environmental influences increase the risk of developing the phenotype? Without
these kinds of answers, the information is practically useless.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal principles that protect the privacy of individuals generally, and
those that relate to genetic information specifically, could be applied in new but not
doctrinally inconsistent ways to allow for the mandatory testing of public figures
such as presidential candidates. The physician-patient privilege would not be an
absolute bar, as the testing could occur outside of a clinical setting.465 Even if a
personal physician conducted the blood draw, a strong public interest (and
prevention of harm) argument could perhaps militate disclosure. HIPAA does not
preclude disclosure, as a Congressional requirement that candidates be tested prior
to receiving FEC public funding may provide the legal exception that HIPAA
permits.466 The larger obstacles are the Fourth Amendment arguments and privacy
causes of action. Here, the key question is how well the public interest would be
served by the mandatory testing. According to the Chandler precedent and the
voluminous case law on the privacy of public figures, this inquiry rests on
balancing individual privacy interests with the public interest arguments in favor of
disclosure. 467 In theory, we make this determination based on the political
candidates having reduced expectations of privacy.
It may be possible to test presidential candidates by conditioning their
receiving public funding on whether they undergo genetic tests for disorders that
would affect their governance or decision-making. Of course, there may be other
constitutional incentive structures that could work, but the point here is this could
happen legally so long as the public interest weighs mightier than the intrusion into
465. 23andme, supra note 278 (describing how one only need spit in a tube, mail it in, and obtain the
results with no physician involvement).
466. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2007).
467. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997); see also supra notes 126-40 and
accompanying text.
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the presidential candidate's privacy.4 68 We now must ask, assuming that courts
recognize a sweeping public interest in knowing the presidential candidates'
genetic information, whether mandatory genetic testing and disclosure is a good
thing.
A. The Public Interest Is More Than What the Public Is Interested In
As genetic testing currently stands, the public interest would not be
sufficiently served by intrusion into the presidential candidate's privacy. This is
true for all types of genetic tests, and has been hinted at throughout the article. It
becomes clear once we thoroughly investigate the global risks and benefits of such
a mandatory testing program that much personal damage could be caused to the
candidate and her family, with very little countervailing informational benefit to
voters. Thus, genetic testing and mandated disclosure is not warranted in the public
interest at this time. This conclusion rests on four factors.
First, the genetic tests that currently exist are poor predictors of most health
outcomes. With the exception of a relatively small number of diseases like
Huntington's disease, genetic tests are not reliable and valid predictors of the onset
of most disorders.469 Further, the genetic information that would be most relevant to
a presidential candidate's governance is largely behavioral, and behavioral genetics
has produced no clinically valid tests for the complex traits. 470 Although there may
be psychological value in merely knowing a candidate possesses some elevated risk
for developing a disease, this information is not justified by the intrusion into the
candidate's privacy and the airtime it would take away from more pressing
substantive concerns. Genetic tests with low clinical validity could be used as a
distraction from meaningful policy distinctions and measures.
Second, because many of the tests are poor predictors of clinical outcomes,
and most tests exist purely in research stages, broadly testing the candidates and
then publicly disclosing the results misleads the public about the present value of
genetic testing for individuals who are not at risk. 47 1 This confers more scientific
and clinical legitimacy on the data than it currently deserves. It may encourage
private citizens to canvass their genomes without understanding the clinical
relevance of the results, or it may implicitly perpetuate deterministic thinking about
genetics, as no comparable information on the candidates' environments could be
simultaneously shared.
Third, the families of political candidates have not agreed to have their
genetic information tested or disclosed. 72 Even if it remains unknown whether the
468. See supra Parts II.A.I-4.
469. See supra notes 290-313 and accompanying text.
470. See supra Part 1|. C.5.
471. Seesupra Part lI.D.
472. Seesupra Part III.D.
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relative possesses a certain genotype, once the results are public, the informational
burden may be on the relative to prove that she is not "affected." The public interest
justification underlying disclosure of a candidate's health information does not hold
for a private individual, as we are not voting on the executive functioning of the
President's children.
Finally, what we see when we embark on this inquiry into specific types of
health information is that we really need to clarify the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
mechanisms for the transfer of power, rather than inundate voters with quasi-useful
information about the candidates.473 In the absence of a predictable method for
transferring power from the President when he becomes unable to discharge his
duties, much more health information should be made available to voters.
However, it would be better to work within our existing Constitutional construct
and elucidate what we mean by "unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office" under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Put differently, it might be useful to
test presidential candidates for Huntington's disease as the genetic test is highly
predictive and the disease impairs decision-making and planning (two functions
critical to the leader of the free world). However, if we had a better method for
detecting and tracking the development of the disease once the successful candidate
enters the White House, then the value of the genetic test results wanes
dramatically. It seems both less ethical and efficient to discourage someone from
becoming president based on increased probability of developing a disease.
However, voters then need to be assured that once that disease materializes, the
media, his cabinet, and the Vice President will scrutinize the President's health, and
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment will be invoked if appropriate. Under the current
framework, this expectation is unrealistic. Unless the media takes on a much more
aggressive role inquiring into the President's health, any resulting disease that
could be kept from the public will be kept from the public.
B. A Possible Double Standard Developing in Public Officials' Privacy Rights
In practice, and by design, we see that the privacy of public figures should be
greatly reduced.474 However, for reasons that are not superficially obvious,
candidates for high public office have been granted greater privacy rights than
many private figures when it comes to mandatory testing of their biological
samples.475 Privileging their privacy in this way is particularly egregious given that
private people have not been endowed with countervailing protections when it
comes to genetic testing.
473. See supra Parts l11.B-D.
474. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
475. See supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
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The DNA Fingerprint Act, effective July 27, 2006, allows the Attorney
General to collect DNA samples from individuals who are neither charged nor
convicted of any felony.476 While one may support the creation of a database to
identify future suspects from past offenders, it is a huge invasion of privacy rights
to include those who were merely arrested in this registry, as the Federal DNA Act
and some states have done.477 In California, individuals who are arrested on
mistaken information and later completely cleared could still have their genetic
information warehoused.478 This promotes indiscriminate detentions because police
can use a database match even when the initial arrest is invalid.479 The statutes that
require arrestees to provide genetic samples are not clear as to what sort of
behavioral genetics research could be conducted on the samples that were obtained
purely for identification purposes. 480 Further, police can conduct "DNA dragnets"
to take DNA samples from dozens to hundreds of persons who are not suspects, but
481who are guilty only of living or working near a crime scene.
This data on the mandatory DNA testing of innocent civilians is provided to
demonstrate (i) the shifting of our Fourth Amendment privacy rights doctrine away
from its roots, and (ii) the potential implications this has for searches of private
476. Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1004, 119 Stat. 3084, 3085 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A
§ 14135a(d)(l) (Supp. 2007)).
477. With little public comment, President George W. Bush signed comparable federal legislation
into law. Pub. L. No. 109-162, §§ 1001-05, 119 Stat. 3084, 3084-86 (2006) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); TANIA SIMONCELLI & SHELDON KRIMSKY, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y,
A NEW ERA OF DNA COLLECTIONS: AT WHAT COST TO CIVIL LIBERTIES 1 (2007). DNAresource.com
maintains a database of state statutes and the conditions under which samples may be collected.
DNAresource.com, State DNA Database Laws: Qualifying Offenses,
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/statequalifyingoffenses2008.pdf.
478. Robert Berlet, Comment, A Step Too Far: Due Process and DNA Collection in California After
Proposition 69, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1487 (2007) ("Louisiana and California refuse to overturn
a conviction based on DNA obtained by mistake. California is the only state that specifies that failure to
follow its DNA database act does not invalidate a database match.").
479. Id. at 1510-11.
480. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (Supp. 2006) ("[A]ny person convicted as an adult or
adjudicated as a juvenile offender because of the commission of an unlawful sexual act . . . shall be
required to submit specimens of blood or an oral or other biological sample authorized by the Kansas
bureau of investigation to the Kansas bureau of investigation in accordance with the provisions of this
act.").
481. "[D]ragnets are conducted on a supposedly voluntary basis; but since refusing to consent raises
suspicion, there is little an individual can do to avoid having their DNA sampled." Aaron B. Chapin,
Arresting DNA: Privacy Expectations of Free Citizens Versus Post-Convicted Persons and the
Unconstitutionality of DNA Dragnets, 89 MrNN. L. REV. 1842, 1846 (2005); see also Matejik, supra
note 123, at 62 ("DNA Dragnets, also known as DNA sweeps, occur when police officers ask citizens to
voluntarily submit DNA samples for the purpose of eliminating suspects in an unsolved case ...
Described by critics as 'warrantless searches administered en masse to large numbers of persons whose
only known connection with a given crime is that authorities suspect that a particular class of individuals
may have had the opportunity to commit it,' the use of DNA Dragnets is largely unregulated by the
legislature" (citation omitted)).
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482people's DNA in criminal as well as non-legal contexts. The Fourth Amendment
"special needs" doctrine began as a narrow exception to the rule that searches by
the government should not be conducted without individualized suspicion and a
warrant predicated on probable cause.483 The expansion of this doctrine permits
warrantless searches of New York subway riders, low-level state employees,
probationers, and unlucky folks who live near crime scenes.
4 84
Despite being the most influential leader in the United States with power to
send troops to war and veto spending on important social programs, we somehow
do not see our president or the presidential candidates as being as "public" in this
regard as a sixteen year old who plays basketball on his local high school team.
While some may argue that national security concerns often require increased
government surveillance over greater populations, the way that the doctrine has
been articulated over time has created perverse incentives. The less tied to law
enforcement the search, the more likely it is it will satisfy the "special needs"
485loophole, meaning that individualized suspicion is not necessary.
About a decade after the Supreme Court protected the privacy rights of public
gubernatorial candidates in opposition to Georgia's interest in making sure its
leaders were not high on drugs, 486 the Patriot Act massively reduced the privacy
rights of private civilians by allowing applications to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court ("FISC") for warrantless eavesdropping orders.487 Unlike law
enforcement agents who utilize grand jury subpoenas and judicially approved
search warrants, counterintelligence officials issue "National Security Letters" and
obtain "surveillance orders for searches and wiretaps from the secretive [FISC].488
As one legal commentator put it, "[t]he notion seems to be that there can be no
'unreasonable search or seizure' when conducted in the name of national security..
[and [i]f this is so, the Fourth Amendment is hardly much of a protection of
482. Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669-76 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(discussing a brief of the history of the Fourth Amendment); see supra notes 141-65 and accompanying
text.
483. Acton, 515 U.S. at 669-76.
484. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
485. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
486. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1996).
487. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§
1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2007)) (allowing applications to the FISC for eavesdropping orders where
foreign intelligence was "a significant purpose" of the surveillance). The court in In re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717, 735 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002), ruled that the primary purpose could be a criminal
investigation, as "the Patriot Act amendment, by using the word 'significant,' eliminated any
justification for the FISA court to balance the relative weight the government places on criminal
prosecution as compared to other counterintelligence responses."
488. Michael German, Trying Enemy Combatants in Civilian Courts, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1421,
1431 (2007). Instead, the surveillance orders come from the secretive FISC. Id.
20081
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
privacy. ' ' 89 It is an anathema to the privacy doctrine that protects public officials
from disclosure of private facts, while more and more private civilians are exposed
to warrantless searches and seizures. The information and privacy asymmetry
appears to be growing in many ways.490 While it is clear that we should not stand in
the way of legitimate national security concerns, we need to be vigilant in working
to close the privacy asymmetry as it relates to good faith surveillance of our
presidents' decisions and decision-making capacity.
As genetic testing currently stands, access to a candidate's complete genetic
results will not close this widening gap. What we need is better scrutiny by the
press of candidates' health generally and predictable guidance as to how the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment operates. However, this begs the question of whether
clinically valid information about a presidential candidate's neurological or cardiac
health may be appropriately disclosed in the public interest. This is something that
should be addressed in further detail elsewhere. What can be said at this point is
that genetic information would only serve as a petty distraction from the broader
goal of empowering voters with relevant information about the person they are
electing to office. As the clinical validity of genetic information improves, we
should revisit the potential of genetic testing of political candidates as part of a
larger mandated health screen. Without better public surveillance or mandated
health disclosures, presidents will continue to cover up disorders that may
significantly impair their leadership ability.
489. Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Different War: Ten Key Questions About the War on Terror, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1021, 1041 (2007). The questionable protection of the Fourth Amendment is especially
true following the Patriot Act's blurring of the line between intelligence gathering and law enforcement.
Id.
490. This year the National Intelligence Director Mike McConnell confirmed for the first time that
telephone and interet companies lent a hand to President Bush's warrantless surveillance program. See
Bruce E.H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, Recent Developments in Commercial Speech and Consumer
Privacy Interests, 918 PLI/PAT 499, 505 (2007).
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